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Nrc."'t&A~ \1.'-· (L• FFoAb 
No. ~;). -3S1 I 
(u.J tJ. f\E-PoA..,.) 
,, 
.,I,~ .. . "1_,b;' ff;e originated fn the vapors of i'l fla;.at~able li~u.i<( ( colt~rr.a.rl f'l .. l.'~l) -w'.:c:!. ::!"! ( 
. .. • .-a6 unaer the basement stL::.rwe.y e Wbl:ge apace. !'be. t'ireextenc.ad . to 10\oi burn.i.r~e 
1 
to the 2x4 bast: plate of the bssement st.o:rase l!lpaoo partition wall. '.L'h,;:. fire f'ur·t.har 
extended to heavy charring to the under side of the basement at.air,;e.y, at.ep~ ..• F'\ .. ·J'th.::r 
to througn and throughout the storage space. F\lrthor to burning UJ.l bet1.-een t;·,e O;.l; 
wal i. s'tuCls of the pa.rti tion wall between thfJ basement anc th•3 first floc,r . l~trt.tM?r 
to consurn.ing the t.r.e floor joist und.er the ki tchc:n floor • .Fur. ~.:.lc l~ to cc ::._a;:-~r ·· oqf 
. • the .d tc~en . troor. ,further t6 burning ano. hl:!avy c::r...arring to the underEaae o! tre 
first floor,floor. The fire further extended up· between the 2x.~ wall stu::s of tc.e 
partition wall of the stair-way leading to the aeoond floor, to the second floor 
level ;resul tins -w 9ollapsing of the aecond floor sta.i~. l<'urther to burning up 
between the 2x4 wctil st ... cis between the first and secona floor. Ji'urther to burning 
. and h.:;avy charrine of the second floor linen and storage closet, loc:a.tea· ir .. ticH: 
second fl0or common hallwa::; FUrther to high l:'..eat and smoke dam.<.ge throu..::;hot:.t the 
en~ire dwelling. The f~e was there confined. 
v.riters talKed to "ames •'Jotz W/M 41 13b26 Linnhurat 5214409 
Ee said that he has understood that rey neighbor has had proble:.r .. a wi tb severc.W. 
juv....niles resicing in the area. l.!ue to the fact that he ie a police officer. 
Last ~ric ~y Oct. 10 his wife returnea r~me to fino burning newap~pers thrown into 
tht:.~r tc.sement. l uncierste.nd t:rJ.£:.t both the :police and 'the arson B-d,Uao. we:·a not. i t'l.eC. at 
tr.e. t "time. ·rhis .!<'rid.ay Oct. 17 the owner left at appromix.mately between:> w.:d 6 ?~t~. 
with mezr:bers of his boy scout troop, also his wife and their two children to go up 
north. """' 7 l • • 
~ •no C •f 0-811 ·1£ (bv. 11-79 
--·- - ---·---------·---.~---··-------~-------··--------~-·-··--·--- .. '···--·----·-'-· -- .. --- .. 
'··.s 01 ~P~I!: h,:c 2 Fire at 136~~9 Linnhurst on 10/18/80 0542 
l further got a hold of t;he owner Ray Cliffo1·d and told him about the fire. hr. 
cal } e~ ancl cc.lled his :i.n;JUro.nce agent ox.i'or'C.i tmd .ctano of St Cle.ir·e shoret> but r" was 
ur.a.cle t.o get in ·to""ch with them. So he gave me the :phone number to call o.nd I tl4 ied 
at' l~ast "' ho.lf c. ':1ozen tiir.es to no avail. l than called the St. Claire Shoree police. 
I epo~e to & Sgt. ne.nms he sent a scout car to the agents house, who then callej rJ·w 
IJOli ce who in turn called me. I spoke to a ClarenGe Imbrisione(phon.} who pror.·t.i sea to 
send. out a boarcdng up crew and a :.adjus tor·: I furtber.~ta1ked to !'<lr."'Clifford by v-fJ 
. pho:-:e and t,ol c. hi:~;r got a hOl a o! bl s agent. :Further .L told him about the r'ire '\ 
aamo.0e. f-ir. Clifi,Pr\i told me that he would not be back because there is not.hin? l. J~v-' 
co.n oo. ;·urtner ;he said that he was going fishing. 
~riters talked to Esther Sear W/F 73 1)aj5 Linnhurst 372~4~57 
She said that the people next door Etama and Ray il.Ufo:cd went up north to their 
property near Alp ana. She further said they left their house about 4: )0 P .t<:. t.hey 
had both of their chilaren with them. Also they took their camper. She further 
:said :tb?Y left their dogs in the g&.r-!J(}e. F'urther that she was asleep on 10/1b;b0 
and ti.o.t sh~ard the does-next door banging their bo~>;ls on the driveway. She L...rther 
said that ste sta.yed in bed for about another half hour and at that time she sa ... a 
tl)at she smelled smoke. She further said that she got up and looked ol.!t her side 
wi .. 1do,. and saw srnoi:-:e co:r.:ing rrom the front porch of the Clifforda house. At th.i.s time shE 
further saio that she callea 911 and about 5 min. later the fire aept. got there. 
sr.e !urtr:.er said that tile l-lifford.s had another fire just a.boout a week before this one, 
She said someone broke out the basement window and put Durning pi; pers into the basement. 
She t'urther said that Mrs. Clifford is very nice she g~ve ua a srno::<.e detector abcut 
a weeA before this fire, Jl.t the time she gave ua the smoke o~ .. ecto:r she said '1 I' am 
giving yo\..1 tl'lis smoke detector so you and Jack won'nt burn up • 






lie said that he observed the side d.Oor be.1ng'1Uelte<1 l.n l."t. W& t.l.llW -r;.J·un, ll.t'el~gtl~erB 
got water on the fire.He further said that ha WU told oy •.. 1!.'!. O:f:f:l,.cer , tJ:u,.t~· the firofigh"t. . 
on the :front porch nGeded.h.elp with the 11 line. At this time we advanced the line 
in the front door about 4 ft . when we notioed t.h&t the ballwa,y floor betheeo U1e li viL 
room tmd kitchen was ready to coll&p.se. l than b&cked out and notified "tM cr.ier of 
the situation. When I reentered the house at that tj~e the fire waa fluing up the 
side of t:le stairway. Further he aid that F.F. removed a , 6 
Writers talked to o ert Kinnee W -1 .Pollee o oer "')f{a Pet. ba:!> en.C"nt. 
He said that he was good friend of Ray Clifford and that they went to sohool together. 
He further sa..;,.d that .iiay had another fir~ about 6 to 7 ya~.:re aso in a houae he 1.taa 
living in.He furthor said that Ray's aaughter burned berael~· severly-in anotr.er fire. 
He further said that he was not sure of the etreet but b.e said it could have been 
Castleton or Castle or maybe l,..yca.ste, but it was near 'the City ..til"pprt. He :further aaj . 
That nay and his wife went up to their property in Presque Iele Harbor. Ho further sai ~ 
that he called hay at'ter the fire and ray was not that upset about it. Hs said that 
Ray told him that tb.ec'e was 'nt a.nyt.b.ing he could do. So be was going to atay \ZP 
0 
n orth and go fish.ing. Further ll. 0 .. Kinnee said that R8.! had a selec-cavision 
on top !lis T.V . in the livingroorn, but it is missi now . 
nspection of the scene revealed 2-~ story brick and frame d~lling wn.ieh ,was~ 
1n good conai tion prior to the fire. 'Writers noted· a can of coleman by tne aio.e 
door of the owelling. loiriters further viewed the fire o.amage. Writara nct.ed the 
point of origin which ~as under the basement stairway. At ~e ~int of ori~in writ~ru 
noted a strong odor of a flammable liquid. Also :found at tne po~nt of Ol'i&l-~ were 
two coleman fuel oil cans. Which were placed on Ev~dence TagSif 8o0441 a.nd 8oo4 lt1·• 
.._ l>-41 ·lf·A {lov. 11-70) 
-~-----·--- --· ---··-------··-- ---·--·-·----· 
_______ ___ , ______ ----
• •~o, ..... . 
l'age 4 Pire at 13829 Linnhurst on 10/18/00 
of cole which 
P aceo o a& • wri tera also recovere a s ow cooker from unoer 
the stairway storage space ana placed it on ~Vidence tagff8o0443 ~ritera further dug 
t~ough the fire debris and located a electioal appliance cord which was running 
unaer the basement carpeting from the storage space, to behin(i the laundry room 
door. writers looke~ behind the laundryroom door next to the hot waterbeat a."ld 
aw a Z!f hour appUa.nce timer, which was pluged in to the outleton ,_the south of ·~:-le 
basement recreat~onroom. Writers compared the appliance cord with the cord on 
the slow copfer . Writers noted that both ends of the cord looked the eame. ;~so 
tne slow oooker and the cord were both shorted out and the ends of the wires were 
alled. u.'ri'ttrs recovered the Appliance timer and laced it on evidence t~sf 8o0445 · 
Writers also requested Dept. photoc:;rapher Greenway to responae.:::t to the soeneana ' 
t;Ke oyer aJJ photo's of the scene. Writers further noted that ~e closets and 
2E~ssera in ~he ~pstairs bedroom contained qlder clothing and older sbpes. Further 
wr1 ters coula not l ocate Nr. CHffords b<:1dge or uniform · cap. 'w'ri tera did locate 
a.mr:1urli tion for a 30-)0 rifle and ammunition for 30-06 rifle, but writers didnot 
locate the rifles. Writers received information from that scout car 15-7 recovered 
a 30-30 rifle from the fire scene and placed it on evidenco tagff243259· Writers 
also t~ted tc locate selectavision video tape mao~tne which was reported to be in 
the livingroom. ~"riters noted wiring behind the T. V. which was coiled u.9 e.nd numours 
\
videotape cassettes 0~- th~ b~ok-case but writers were {i'uable to locate the videotape 
machine. <'~ri tera noted nails i n the diningroom, which appeared to bo us.sd to hang 
pictures, but no pictures were found. f check of the front and rear and side aoors 
revealed that the locks were, in the locked position at tho time of the fire . 
Writers were also i~ormed by F.F. Carter that fire fiehters forced entry ~ the 
"""'c o1~1:~. 11.101 dwelhna • 
••••. ,.?1t 
.rage 5 Fire at 1,3829 Linnhurat on 10/1.8/80 at 0).42 :~, .... 
(• ' ,· ·,·: 
,;. ,') "1,,, I' • 
, .. . • 'r •. • ., 
writers also noted 1n 'the upstairs be~ om a digital clock which had stprf ed at 
4 1 15 A.M. the cloak was located in the secor~d floor southwest bedroom. , 
W'ri ters view tht ~-erto::of the dwelling and noted that t hor e wns no eoo~ng on t he 
t 
. f the dwelling 'Wb.:i.ch would indic .. te that t,.lj.e windows and ooors were intact. 
ex enor o . . 
before 'ciieoovery of the fire. W'ri ters also noted fi"· h.e !iv}>' ooncent ro.tion of d;.; .. r-k 
) brown syrupy s tains on t.he light bulbs and .. gl& &a- throughout t ha dwelling) ln.:U catir.,g 
.(
1 tte fire burned for a considerable length of time prior to di eooverY• wr i ter s 
noted t.ha.t. the timer tha t was founo behind the launo.ry£·oom door was s et to go on 
at 3;4j a.m. and to "tUr1n of.:f at ~:00 a.m. 
In view of the above investigation it is the opinion ot the writerB that this fire 
was incendiary in nature and set by unknown ;versone for the moti v 0 of f!'~'..!~ ... 'I':!! s 
investigation to be o~tinuea with interview of ~~on~et~ , 
M~ !/~~"£/¢c_) 
. ~~~~f!r ?r. . 








MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Mark 
Re: Michigan v. Clifford, No. 82-357 (Oct. 29 Conference) 
~~~~ 
You asked for my views on whether this is a good case in 
which to consider recognizing a "good faith" exception to the 
exclusionary rule. My answer is "no." 
The result in this case seems absurd. I tend to agree with 
---. ----
the concurring judge that there is an attenuated expectation of 
privacy in this "burned and gutted building which was accumulat-
er and which was open t~;assers." (Pet. at 16.) ~t 
this view did not prevail i~ With the exception of Jus-
tice Rehnquist, all agreed that a warrant is required to search 
such a building after the fire is over. 
Even pursuant to Tyler the result here may be questioned. 
Had these investigators arrived on the scene and entered after 
the basement was pumped out, their entry arguably would have been 
permissible under Tyler's holding that "officials need no warrant I 
to remain in a building for a reasonable time to investigate the 
cause of a blaze after it has been extinguished." 436 U.S at 
510. Thus a different result obtained here primarily because 
"the arson investigators did not arrive while the fire was being -- - - -
put out. " (Pet. at 15 (lower court opinion).) 
Since there is no hint that the arson investigators deliber-
ately violated the owners' 4th Amendment rights, a case can be 
made for a "good faith" exception here. But there are two prob-
2. 
lems. other reason 
for their failure to obtain a warrant. According to the peti-
tion, the firefighters reported that the fire was of suspicious 
origin. The investigators arrived six hours later. This was 
sufficient time in which to obtain a warrant. 
Second, and more significant, the investigators entered the 
' \ ,, 
building pursuant to a Detroit Fire Department policy that "per-
mits an investigator to enter a burned dwelling without a warrant 
if the owner is not present and the dwelling is deemed open to 
trespass." (Pet. at 12.) Although at one time adherence to this 
pol icy could have been a "good faith" mistake, after Tyler --
decided two years prior to the entry here -- the policy unques-
The point of a "good faith" exception is to permit the in-..__ ______ ______,_ 
traduction of evidence where exclusion would not promote the de-
terrent rationale of the exclusionary rule. See Brown v. Illi-
nois, 422 u.s. 590, 609-10 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in 
part) • 
premise that a warrant should have been obtained and given that 
the officers had no good reason not to do so. Exclusion of this 
evidence may impel the Detroit Fire Department to conform its 
policy to Tyler and to instruct investigators to seek warrants 
when conducting investigations that are "detached from the ini-
tial exigency and warrantless entry." Tyler, 436 u.s. at 511. 
Therefore, although I agree wholeheartedly that the result 
in this case creates disrespect for the law, I think the "good 
faith" exception issue should be reserved for a better case. 
... ' 
.. . 
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1. SUMMARY: (1) Whether an arson squad investigator may 
enter a burned dwelling six hours after a fire is extinguished 
without obtaining a search warrant~ and (2) if the entry was 
improper, whether the illegal entry was a "but for" cause of the 
discovery of the items seized. 
2. FACTS & DECISION BELOW: Early one morning, a fire broke 




arrived on the scene within minutes, and, by 7:04a.m., the fire 
was extinguished and the fire units departed.~ 
Later that same day, at about 1:00 p.m., arson investigators 
'------. 
arrived for the first time at resps' home. The investigators did 
not enter the home until 1:30 p.m., because they had to wait 
until water was pumped out of the basement by agents of resps' 
insurance company. After the water was pumped out, the 
v 
investigators entered the home without a warrant, based upon the 
arson squad's policy which permits an investigator to enter a 
burned dwelling without a warrant if the owner is not present and 
the dwelling is deemed open to trespass. As a result of their 
vl~arrantless search of the basement, the investigator~seized 
three empty cans of fuel, an electric crock pot, and a timer with 
a cord attached. 
The TC denied resps' motion to suppress this evidence on the 
basis that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry. 
The Mich. Ct. App. reversed. The Ct. App. found that, under 
~Michigan v. Tyler, 436 u.s. 499 (1978), the arson squad's policy 
was unconstitutional, and that the evidence therefore had to be 
suppressed. 
In Tyler, this Court held that, although no warrant is 
needed in order for fire fighters to enter a home to fight a 
blaze or to remain in the burned building for a reasonable time 
~ 
to investigate after the blaze has been extinguished, a warrant 
is required for subsequent, nonconsensual reentries that are ----- --"clearly detached from the initial exigency and warrantless 
entry." Id. at 511. The Ct. App. found that Tyler dictated 
-3-
suppression in this case, because the investigators did not 
arrive until six hours after the fire was extinguished. They did 
not enter the premises for the purpose of ensuring that the blaze 
would not rekindle or to prevent the imminent destruction of 
evidence. 
Judge Kelly filed a concurring opinion. He agreed with the 
majority that the circumstances were not "exigent," and that 
Tyler therefore compelled suppression. However, he encouraged 
the state to take this issue further in the appellate process, 
because the Tyler holding is "ludicrous." He queried: "What 
expectation the owners, who were away on a 
camping trip, have of a burned and gutted building which was 
accumulating water and which was open to trespassers?" 
The Mich. Sup. Ct. subsequently denied the state's 
application for leave to appeal. One justice dissented. 
3. CONTENTIONS: The state argues that Tyler allows arson 
investigators to enter a burned building without warrant 
"promptly" after a fire is extinguished in order to determine its 
origin. The question is one of reasonableness. The 
-~
investigators entered as soon as possible. Indeed, when they 
arrived, they still had to wait before investigating until the 
water was pumped out of the basement. 
The state also contends that the exclusionary rule should 
not be mechanically applied in situations where the police 
d . . . v d f . "b con uct, even 1f 1mproper, was 1n goo a1th and was not a ut 
for" cause of the discovery of the items seized. "Since it 
cannot be said that the evidence would not have been discovered 
-4-
but for the allegedly improper entry, the evidence should not be 
suppressed." 
4. DISCUSSION: Unless the Court wishes to reconsider the 
"ludicrous" Tyler decision, cert should be denied. This case 
turns simply on a fact-bound finding that the investigators' 
entry was "clearly detached from the initial exigency and 
warrantless entry." The state's conclusory contention that the 
warrantless search was not a "but for" cause of the discovery of 
the evidence seems meritless, and, in any event, there is no 
indication that this issue was raised below. 
I recommend denial. 
There is no response. 
October 8, 1982 
ME 
D'Zurilla Opinion in Petition 
Court ................... . 1-·oted on .................. , 19 .. . 
82-357 
Argued .................. . , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 .. . No. 
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From: Justice Rehnquist 
Circulated: c 
Recirculated: __ J_A_N _ 4_ 19_8_3 __ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
MICHIGAN v. RAYMOND CLIFFORD AND 
EMMA JEAN CLIFFORD 
JuSTICE REHNQUIST dissenting from denial of certiorari. ~ ./.l.A:) 
The respondents in this case, Raymond and Emma Jean 
Clifford, were charged with wilfully and maliciously burning ~ 
a dwelling house and the contents thereof in violation of MCL ' 
750. 72; MSA 28.267. They moved to suppress certain gov-
ernment evidence on the grounds that it was the fruit of an 
unconstitutional warrantless search of their home by state ar-
son investigators. The trial judge denied the motion and re-
spondents took an interlocutory appeal to the Michigan Court 
of Appeal. That court reversed the trial court, holding that 
our decision in Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499 (1978), re-
quired a conclusion that'the arson investigators' search vio-
la~ent to the Uimea"States Constitu-
tion and that the fruits of the search had to be suppressed. 
Pet. at 11. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to ap-
peal, Pet. at 18, and the State petitioned for a writ of certio-
rari, presenting, among others, the question whether "an ar-
son squad investigator [may] enter a burned dwelling to 
investigate the cause of a fire at the earliest time possible 
after the flames are extinguished without obtaining a search 
warrant?" Because I think that the decision below rests on 
an artificial and illogical restriction that hinders important 
state investigative efforts I would grant certiorari to clarify 
our holding in Michigan v. Tyler, supra. 
I 
On October 18, 1980, at about 5:45a.m., a fire broke out at 
l\~ the Cliffords' home in Detroit, Michigan. At the time the 
~ Cliffords were out of the city. Fire units arrived at the 
W/tf. Y d U111Ut-zt.4 ~ ~ -v "~ ·~ ., w 
zypJCjft::¢;=~h~~~ 
2 MICHIGAN v. CLIFFORD 
scene within minutes of the alarm but the flames were not 
extinguished until shortly after 7:00a.m. While attempting 
to put out the blaze firefighters encountered evidence that 
the fire had been deliberately set; owing to their lack of train-
ing in such matters the firefighters did not disturb the evi-
dence, but instead notified members of the Detroit 
Police/Fire Arson Squad of their suspicions. Later the same 
day, at about 1:00 p.m., Lt. John Beyer, an arson investiga-
tor, and a partner arrived at respondents' home. At the 
time unidentified persons-presumably agents of respond-
ents' insurance company-were engaged in pumping water 
out of the basement of the dwelling. Lt. Beyer waited until 
this task was completed and then entered the basement. He 
had not obtained a warrant to search the remains of the 
structure. During his investigation he discovered three 
empty fuel containers, an electric crock pot, and a timer with 
a cord attached. 
As noted above, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that 
Beyer's warrantless search of respondents' basement was in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment and suppressed the evi-
dence obtained during the search. The court relied exclu-
sively on our decision in Michigan v. Tyler, supra. 
In Tyler a fire had broken out at a furniture store at 12:00 
a.m.; the Fire Chief, charged with investigating the causes of 
fires, did not arrive until2:00 a.m., when the blaze had been 
all but extinguished. He was informed that firefighters had 
encountered evidence of arson, and briefly entered the 
smoke-filled building. The Chief then called a Police Detec-
tive, who arrived at 3:30a.m. Because of smoke and steam 
within the store the two abandoned their investigation and 
left the scene. 
Six hours after his initial arrival at the scene, the Fire 
Chief returned, accompanied by an Assistant Fire Chief, and 
again briefly examined the building before leaving. An hour 
later, at 9:00 a.m., the Assistant Fire Chief and the Police 
Detective returned once more and thoroughly searched the 
building, discovering considerable evidence of arson that had 
been overlooked earlier. Finally, almost one month later, a 
MICHIGAN v. CLIFFORD 3 
different police officer returned and reexamined the building. 
None of the entries was made pursuant to a warrant. 436 
U. S., at 501-503. 
The Court, in a badly split decision, upheld the constitu-
tionality of all but the final search-that which had occurred 
several weeks after the fire. It rejected, as "unrealistically 
narrow," id., at 510, the lower court's conclusion that once 
the last flame at a fire has been doused firefighters must 
abandon the structure. Instead the Court noted that fire de-
partments are "charged not only with extinguishing fires, but 
with finding their causes." Ibid. It continued: 
"Prompt determination of the fire's origin may be nec-
essary to prevent its recurrence, as through the detec-
tion of continuing dangers such as faulty wiring or a de-
fective furnace. Immediate investigation may also be 
necessary to preserve evidence from intentional or acci-
dental destruction. And, of course, the sooner the offi-
cials complete their duties, the less will be their subse-
quent interference with the privacy and the recovery 
efforts of the victims. For these reasons, officials need 
no warrant to remain in a building for a reasonable time 
to investigate the cause of a blaze after it has been extin-
guished. And if the warrantless entry to put out the 
fire and determine its cause is constitutional, the war-
rantless seizure of evidence while inspecting the 
premises for these purposes also is constitutional." 
Ibid. (emphasis added). 
The Court concluded that, under this standard, the first war-
rantless "searches" of the firefighters and the somewhat later 
search by the Fire Chief were plainly lawful, apparently be-
cause the officials had merely "remain[ed] in [the] building 
for a reasonable time" after concluding their firefighting ef-
forts. I d., at 509. 
Despite the fact that most of the later entries by fire and 
police officials on the day of the fire were detached from these 
initial entries, the Court held them constitutional. Thus, the 
majority approved the entry, at 3:30a.m., of the Police De-
l 
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tective and the subsequent entries of the Assistant Fire 
Chief and the Police Detective, at 8:00 and 9:00a.m. These 
results were justified on the grounds that the later entries 
"were no more than an actual continuation of the first" 
search. ld., at 511 (emphasis added). The entries occur-
ring in the weeks after the day of the fire were held uncon-
stitutional, however, on the ground that they were "clearly 
detached from the initial exigency and warrantless entry." 
Ibid. 
Interpreting this language, the Michigan Court of Appeals 
decided that the arson investigators' warrantless entry into 
respondents' former home was unconstitutional. The inves-
tigators were not viewed as having "remained" in the struc-
ture, nor was their search an "actual continuation" of the 
firefighters' entry. The court relied on the facts that the in-
vestigators did not arrive on the scene until six hours after 
the fire was extinguished, that they were not involved in 
firefighting efforts and that they had time to obtain a warrant 
for entering the structure. 
II 
The correctness of the Michigan court's application of 
Michigan v. Tyler to the facts of this case is by no means free 
from doubt. Plainly the ability of arson investigators to 
have obtained a warrant should be irrelevant under our deci-
sions; in Michigan v. Tyler the 8:00 and 9:00a.m. entries, oc-
curring six and seven hours after the blaze was controlled, 
could easily have been made pursuant to a warrant. Like-
wise, the mere elapse of time does not serve to distinguish 
the cases, since the time elapsed between the controlling of 
the fire and the later investigations was greater in Tyler than 
here. Similarly, the fact that the arson investigators hap-
pened not to have participated in quelling the fire at respond-
ents' home is of no consequence: in Tyler neither the Assist-
ant Fire Chief nor the Police Detective played any part in the 
firefighting effort. In any event, it would be anomalous for 
the constitutionality of arson investigations to turn on the 
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question whether the investigator also happended to be a 
firefighter. 
Indeed, it is difficult to draw any distinctions of conse-
quence between the cases. In both instances, after an ini-
tial, cursory investigation by firefighters had aroused suspi-
cions trained investigators were notified. In each case the 
investigators arrived at the scene well after flames were 
extinguished, and further delayed their examination owing to 
the immediate aftermath of the blaze-the presence of smoke 
and steam in Tyler, and in this case, the fact the basement 
was filled with a foot of water. In short, if the subsequent 
searches in Tyler were an "actual continuation" of the initial 
entry for firefighting purposes, it is difficult to see why the 
subsequent entries in this case do not fit within the same 
category. 
While the Michigan court's application of the rule set forth 
in Tyler may be faulted, the more fundamental difficulty lies 
in the Tyler opinion itself. First, the holding of the opinion 
is not altogether consistent with its results. Its concluding 
paragraph states that "In summation, we hold that an entry 
to fight a fire requires no warrant, and that once in the build-
ing, officials may remain there for a reasonable time to in-
vestigate the cause of the blaze. Thereafter, additional en-
tries ... must be made pursuant [to a warrant]." I d., at 511 
(emphasis added). Despite this, the Tyler Court approved 
several searches conducted by persons unrelated to the 
firefighting effort long after the building had been emptied; 
plainly, the officials-who had never before set foot in the 
structure-had not "remained" there, much less remained 
there for a reasonable time. 
Second, and more troubling, the decision sets forth a 
rather vague exception to the "remain for a reasonable time" 
standard; the standard is neither capable of clear application 
nor supported by the rationale of the decision. Even if 
firefighters abandon a structure, and different fire investiga-
tors return only hours later, their search may be upheld, pro-
vided that it is the "actual continuation" of the firefighters' 
6 MICHIGAN v. CLIFFORD 
first entry. Tyler does not, however, indicate what factors 
influence the determination that an "actual continuation" has 
occurred. Apparently the fact that different personnel are 
involved, that a considerable period of time has elapsed and 
so forth are of little importance; were this not the case, then 
the subsequent searches in Tyler would not have been ap-
proved. Drawing the line between an "actual continuation" 
and a "clearly detached" search is plainly difficult for judges, 
not to mention fire department investigators, and the fact 
that the Michigan Court of Appeals struck down a search that 
was factually identical to that upheld in Tyler gives some in-
dication of the inherent ambiguity of the "actual continua-
tion" standard. I would grant certiorari to clarify the cir-
cumstances under which arson investigators may make 
warrantless entries into fire-damaged buildings. 
Finally, the reasoning of Tyler fails to support the stand-
ard articulated by the majority. Persons owning or inhabit-
ing fire-damaged buildings undeniably have considerably re-
duced privacy expectations. Such persons-unlike 
occupants in ordinary times-expect, and welcome, the intru-
sions of fire, police, and medical officials in the period 
following a fire. Likewise, as here, relative strangers such 
as insurance agents will frequently have authority to enter 
the structure. Such considerations are particularly appli-
cable where, as here, a structure is open to trespass, fire 
damage is unrepaired, and the cleanup of the firefighting ef-
forts continues. Moreover, powerful justifications for entry 
are present in the period prior to cleanup and a commence-
ment of repairs; it is in this time that clues to the fire's origins 
may still remain. As the Tyler majority noted, "Immediate 
investigation may . . . be necessary to preserve evidence 
from intentional or accidental destruction [in the imminent 
cleanup and repair activities]. And, of course, the sooner 
the officials complete their duties, the less will be their subse-
quent interference with the privacy and the recovery efforts 
ofthe victims." !d., at 510. These considerations justify, in 
my view, warrantless searches made by arson investigators 
so long as the structure has not yet been secured against 
MICHIGAN v. CLIFFORD 7 
trespass, or, so long as general repairs of the structure have 
not yet commenced. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
MICHIGAN v. RAYMOND CLIFFORD AND 
EMMA JEAN CLIFFORD 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF 
APPEALS OF MICHIGAN 
No. 82-357. Decided January-, 1983 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN 
joins, dissenting from denial of certiorari. 
The respondents in this case, Raymond and Emma Jean 
Clifford, were charged with wilfully and maliciously burning 
a d!Yelling house and the contents thereofill violabon ofMCL 
750. 72; MSA 28.267. They moved to suppress certain gov-
ernment evidence on the grounds that it was the fruit of an 
unconstitutional warrantless search of their home by state ar-
son investigators. · 'udge denied the motion andre-
spondents an interlocutory a 1 to the Michigan Court 
of Appe . That court reversed the ial court,_holding that 
our dec sion in Michigan v. Tyler 6 U. S. 499 (1978), re-
qmre a onclusion that th on investigators' search vio-
lated the o en ment to the United States Constitu-
tion and that the fruits of the search had to be suppressed. 
Pet. at 11. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to ap-
peal, Pet. at 18, and the State petitioned for a writ of certio-
rari, presenting, among others, the question whether "an ar-
son squad investigator [may] enter a burned dwelling to 
investigate the cause of a fire at the earliest time possible 
after the flames are extinguished without obtaining a search 
warr ?" · at the decisi s s on 
an rtificial and illogical restriction at hinders important 
' state mves a 1ve e orts wou gr:ant certiorari to clarify 
our holding in Michigan v. Tyler, supra. 
I 
On October 18, 1980, at about 5:45a.m., a fire broke out at 
the Cliffords' home in Detroit, Michigan. At the time the 
~J. ~ ~ Ck/ f1 Me vrrJi ~ 
f, v-~-r-; - -· ~ t(_ -;;tL., ~ --t/..M ~ ~ ~ I - ~-
fO ~~ · · 
' 
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Cliffords were out of the city. Fire units arrived at the \ ~ "1 
scene within minutes of the alarm but the flames were not ~Y · 
extinguished until shortly after 7:00 a.m. While attempting 'h/ 'l('r" 
to put out the blaze firefighters encountered evidence that ·1 vJ"' -< 
the fire had been deliberately set; owing to their lack of train- • \t" 
ing in such matters the firefighters did not disturb the evi-
dence, but instead notified members of the Detroit ""' ~ 
Police/Fire Arson Squad of their suspicions. Later the same if..,.. -
day, at about 1:00 p.m., Lt. John Beyer, an arson investiga- , J::}) JY oJt,.p 
tor, and a partner arrived at respondents' home. At the ~./ u-/' 
time unidentified persons-presumably agents of respond- / ~A 
ents' insurance company-were engaged in pumping water 
out of the basement of the dwelling. Lt. Beyer waited until 
this task was completed and then entered the basement. He 
had not obtained a warrant to search the remains of the 
structure. During his investigation he discovered three 
empty fuel containers, an electric crock pot, and a timer with 
a cord attached. 
As noted above, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that 
Beyer's warrantless search of respondents' basement was in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment and suppressed the evi-
dence obtained during the search. The court relied exclu-
si~ on our decision in Michigan v. 'l'yler, s'igJra. 
In Tyler a fire had broken out at a furniture store at 12:00 
a.m.; the Fire Chief, charged with investigating the causes of 
fires , did not arrive until2:00 a.m. , when the blaze had been 
all but extinguished. He was informed that firefighters had 
encountered evidence of arson, and briefly entered the 
smoke-filled building. The Chief then called a Police Detec-
tive, who arrived at 3:30a.m. Because of smoke and steam 
within the store the two abandoned their investigation and 
left the scene. 
Six hours after his initial arrival at the scene, the Fire 
Chief returned, accompanied by an Assistant Fire Chief, and 
again briefly examined the building before leaving. An hour 
later, at 9:00 a.m. , the Assistant Fire Chief and the Police 
Detective returned once more and thoroughly searched the 
building, discovering considerable evidence of arson that had 
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been overlooked earlier. Finally, almost one month later, a 
different police officer returned and reexamined the building. 
None of the entries was made pursuant to a warrant. 436 
U. S., at 501-503. 
The Court, in a badly split decision, upheld the constitu-
tionality of all but the final search-that which had occurred 
several weeks after the fire. It rejected, as "unrealistically 
narrow," id., at 510, the lower court's conclusion that once 
the last flame at a fire has been doused firefighters must 
abandon the structure. Instead the Court noted that fire de-
partments are "charged not only with extinguishing fires, but 
with finding their causes." Ibid. It continued: 
"Prompt determination of the fire's origin may be nec-
essary to prevent its recurrence, as through the detec-
tion of continuing dangers such as faulty wiring or a de-
fective furnace. Immediate investigation may also be 
necessary to preserve evidence from intentional or acci-
dental destruction. And, of course, the sooner the offi-
cials complete their duties, the less will be their subse-
quent interference with the privacy and the recovery 
efforts of the victims. For these reasons, officials need 
no warrant to remain in a building for a reasonable time 
to investigate the cause of a blaze after it has been extin-
guished. And if the warrantless entry to put out the 
fire and determine its cause is constitutional, the war-
rantless seizure of evidence while inspecting the 
premises for these purposes also is constitutional." 
Ibid. (emphasis added). 
The Court concluded that, under this standard, the first war-
rantless "searches" of the firefighters and the somewhat later 
search by the Fire Chief were plainly lawful, apparently be-
cause the officials had merely "remain[ed] in [the] building 
for a reasonable time" after concluding their firefighting ef-
forts. Id., at 509. 
Despite the fact that most of the l;:~.ter entries by fire and 
police officials on the day of the fire were detached from these 
initial entries, the Court held them constitutional. Thus, the 
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majority approved the entry, at 3:30a.m., of the Police De-
tective and the subsequent entries of the Assistant Fire 
Chief and the Police Detective, at 8:00 and 9:00a.m. These 
results were justified on the grounds that the later entries 
"were no more than an actual continuation of the first" 
search. ld., at 511 (emphasis added). The entries occur-
ring in the weeks after the day of the fire were held uncon-
stitutional, however, on the ground that they were "clearly 
detached from the initial exigency and warrantless entry." 
Ibid. 
Interpreting this language, the Michigan Court of Appeals 
decided that the arson investigators' warrantless entry into 
respondents' former home was unconstitutional. The inves-
tigators were not viewed as having "remained" in the struc-
ture, nor was their search an "actual continuation" of the 
firefighters' entry. The court relied on the facts that the in-
vestigators did not arrive on the scene until six hours after 
the fire was extinguished, that they were not involved in 
firefighting efforts and that they had time to obtain a warrant 
for entering the structure. 
II 
The correctness of the Michigan court's application of 
Michigan v. Tyler to the facts of this case is by no means free 
from doubt. Plainly the ability of arson investigators to 
have obtained a warrant should be irrelevant under our deci-
sions; in Michigan v. Tyler the 8:00 and 9:00a.m. entries, oc- t)r .1. .:: ... "'"'\ 
curring six and seven hours after the blaze wa controlled 
could easily have been made pursuant to a warrant. Like-
wise, the mere elapse of time does not serve to distinguish " 
the cases, since the time elapsed between the controlling of 
the fire and the later investigations was greater in Tyler than 
here. Similarly, the fact that the arson investigators hap-
pened not to have participated in quelling the fire at respond-
ents' home is of no consequence: in Tyler neither the Assist-
ant Fire Chief nor the Police Detective played any part in the 
firefighting effort. In any event, it would be anomalous for 
the constitutionality of arson investigations to turn on the 
_ _. 
MICHIGAN v. CLIFFORD 5 
question whether the investigator also happended to be a 
firefighter. 
Indeed, it is difficult to draw any distinctions of conse-
quence between the cases. In both instances, after an ini-
tial, cursory investigation by firefighters had aroused suspi-
cions trained investigators were notified. In each case the 
investigators arrived at the scene well after flames were 
extinguished, and further delayed their examination owing to 
the immediate aftermath of the blaze-the presence of smoke 
and steam in Tyler, and in this case, the fact the basement 
was filled with a foot of water. In short, if the subsequent 
searches in Tyler were an "actual continuation" of the initial 
entry for firefighting purposes, it is difficult to see why the 
subsequent entries in this case do not fit within the same 
category. 
While the Michigan court's application of the rule set forth 
in Tyler may be faulted, the more fundamental difficulty lies 
in the Tyler opinion itself. First, the holding of the opinion 
is not altogether consistent with its results. Its concluding 
paragraph states that "In summation, we hold that an entry 
to fight a fire requires no warrant, and that once in the build-
ing, officials may remain there for a reasonable time to in-
vestigate the cause of the blaze. Thereafter, additional en-
tries . . . must be made pursuant [to a warrant]." I d. , at 511 
(emphasis added). Despite this, the Tyler Court approved 
several searches conducted by persons unrelated to the . 
1 0 firefighting effort !9.~ a~ th.~Jmilding had been emptied; ~
plainly, the officials-wlio~n~before set foot in the .• ro 
structure-had not "remained" there, much less remained ~ 
there for a reasonable time. 
Second, and more troubling, the decision sets forth a 
rather vague exception to the "remain for a reasonable time" 
standard; the standard is neither capable of clear application 
nor supported by the rationale of the decision. Even if 
firefighters abandon a structure, and different fire investiga-
tors return only hours later, their search may be upheld, pro-
vided that it is the "actual continuation" of the firefighters' 
first entry. Tyler does not, however, indicate what factors 
6 MICHIGAN v. CLIFFORD 
influence the determination that an "actual continuation" has 
occurred. Apparently the fact that different personnel are 
involved, that a considerable period of time has elapsed and 
so forth are of little importance; were this not the case, then 
the subsequent searches in Tyler would not have been ap-
proved. Drawing the line between an "actual continuation" 
and a "clearl detacned" search 1s plainly di(_ficult for judges, 
nor o mention fire depa ment mvestigators, and the fact 
that the Michigan Court of Appeals struck down a search that 
was factually identical to that upheld in Tyler gives some in-
dication of the inherent ambiguity of the "actual continua-
tion" standard. I ~ould grant certiorari to clarify the cir-
cumstances under which arson investigators may make /::?' 
warrantless entries into fire-damaged buildings. 
Finally, the reasoning of Tyler fails to support the stand-
ard articulated by the majority. Persons owning or inhabit-
ing fire-damaged buildings undeniably have considerably re-
duced privacy expectations. Such persons-unlike 
occupants in ordinary times-expect, and welcome, the intru- W c.-1:.'~ Jt., 
sions of fire, police, and medical officials in the period r. uJ) ~ 0 ~.o-1 , 
following a fire. Likewise, as here, relative strangers such]~ J_a;.-~ y 
as insurance agents will frequently have authority to enter ( ; v- C ~ 
the structure. Such considerations are particularly appli- c ~ c;J"" ~ 
cable where, as here, a structure is open to trespass, fire ~ ,1 
damage is unrepaired, and the cleanup of the firefighting ef- lo fl..l"-
forts continues. Moreover, powerful justifications for entry 
are present in the period prior to cleanup and a commence-
ment of repairs; it is in this time that clues to the fire's origins 
may still remain. As the Tyler majority noted, "Immediate 
investigation may . . . be necessary to preserve evidence 
from intentional or accidental destruction [in the imminent 
cleanup and repair activities]. And, of course, the sooner 
the officials complete their duties, the less will be their subse-
quent interference with the privacy and the recovery efforts 
J\... view, warrantless searches made by arson investigators i
f the victims." Id., at 510. These considerations justify, in 
1 ~ long as t e structure has not yet been secured against 
I • 
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trespass, or, so long as general repairs of the structure have 
ot yet commenced. 
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Motion of Respondents to vacate Writ 
of Certiorari as Improvidently Granted 
SUMMARY: Resps argue that the second issue presented in this case was 
never addressed below. Therefore, they move to vacate the writ of cert as to 
~
that issue. 
FACTS: Following a fire in resps' horne, arson investigators entered the 
dwelling and seized incriminating evidence without first obtaining a warrant. 
Applying the exigent circumstances exception, the trial court allowed 
introduction of the · seized evidence. The Mich. ct. App. reversed, citing 
Michigan v. TYler, 436 u.s. 499 (1978). Here, the court said, investigators 
did not enter the house until six hours after the fire was put out. 
The Mich. S.ct. denied petr's leave to appeal. Petr thereafter filed its 
I. •May an arson squad investigator enter a burned dwell-
ing to investigate the cause of a fire at the earliest 
time possible after the flames are extinguished with-
out obtaining a search warrant?• 
II. •should the exclusionary rule be applied in a situation 
where the JX>lice conduct, even if viewed as inproper, 
was taken in good faith and was not a 'but for' cause 
for the discovery of the items seized?• 
CONTENTIONS: Resp contends that the record clearly establishes that the 
•good faith• issue, presented in question 2, was never raised in the state 
trial or appellate courts. The record below contains no reference to that 
issue. And petr's brief before the Mich. Ct. App. also fails to raise the 
issue. 
Resps assert that they missed the petr's interjection of a new issue 
because it was •disingenuously• added to language of the second question (the 
•but for• issue) which had been raised for the first time in the Mich. Ct. App. 
Insertion of the words •good faith• creates an entirely new issue and in 
effect expands the •but for• issue which was never properly raised in the 
trial court. Accordingly to resps, the Mich. Ct. App. implicitly declined to 
address the •but for• issue because it was not raised in the trial court. 
Failure to present a federal question in conformance with state procedure 
provides an adequate and independent ground for denying review. Henry v. 
Miss., 379 U.S. 443, 447 (1965). 
Resps emphasize that the only issue raised by petr in the trial court was 
question number one--the exigent circumstances issue. That was also the issue 
relied upon by the .Mich. Ct. App. in its decision. 
Resps also point out that the petr's merits brief departs substantially 
from points raised in the courts below. Petr now concedes that given Mich. v. 
Tyler, supra, the Mich. ct. App. decision was inevitable. For the first time, 
petr now urges reversal of an entire line of cases--including Mich. v. Tyler. 
DISCUSSION: From the information available to the Court, it appears that 
re~s' arguments have merit. By adding the words "good faith" in the second 
question, petr has apparently tried to take advantage of the Court's recent 
interest in the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Assuming that 
the court's interest would incline it to continue to hear such arguments, the 
question is. whether this case properly presents the issue. The record will 
probably not provide much help in assessing the worth of either the "but for" 
or the "good faith" issues. 
Although resps' arguments on their fact are persuasive for dismissing the 
second question, it might be appropriate to first call for a response from the 
petr. 
There is no response. 
4/26/83 
PJC 
Schlueter Brief and Ops App'd 
- ,). 
\__, 
May 19, 1983 COnference 




CLIFFORD, et al. 
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SUPPLEMENI'AL MEMJRANDUM 
Motion of Respondents to vacate Writ 
of Certiorari as Improvidently Granted 
SUMMARY: Petr has filed a brief response to the resps' motion to vacate 
the writ as improvidently granted (see attached Legal Officer memo). It 
argues that its issue No. II was fairly encompassed in the state court briefs 
and is properly before the Court. 
FACTS: The background facts are laid out in the attached Legal Officer 
memo which addresses the resps' recent motion to vacate the writ. The court 
called for a response from petr and it has filed its reS£X>nse. 
CONTENI'IONS: 'Ihe petr' s summary response of fer s no help. In its 
~ I~ ; SSII e- J . 
flii 1W-t-u ~ t<!"M 
. 
,'\ • t '~ 
'1. Petitioner's Issue II in this Court was fairly encoopassed and 
described by the issue as headed in the Petition for Certiorari. see 
Rule 34.l(a). Although much more briefly presented in the state courts, 
given the unliklihood of its acceptance there, Petitioner further submits 
that the issue was fairly encompassed in the state court briefs in the 
Michigan court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court. 
2. The Brief on the merits, and the Petition itself, presented two 
issues; certiorari was thus granted on two issues. Even if this Court 
were to view Issue II as having expanded the issue, which Petitioner 
. strongly submits is not the case, all of the Issu~ I and a large portion 
of Issue II would remain. Dismissal or summary A~erment would thus be 
inappropriate in any event. ' 
3. Petitioner submits that· the issues in their entirety are 
properly before this Court, and that the motion of Resp:mdent should thus 
be denied. 
DISCUSSION: Issue IIl could present real problems. First, the "but for• 
issue was raised for the first time before the Mich. ct. App. which did not 
squarely address it. Resp has argued that that court implicitly declined to 
face the issue because it had not been raised in the trial court. In that 
light, the record below probably won't provide much assistance in resolving 
that issue. 
, . 
second, the "good faith" issue was clearly not raised below. Resp's 
argument that it was "disingenouously" added to Issue II is well taken. 
Petrs' summary contention that the issue was fairly encompassed in the state 
court briefs is not persuasive. The connection, if there is one, between what 
is raised in Issue II and what was argued below is tenuous. 
Arguably, only that portion of Issue II which deals with the "good 
faith" issue is clearly improvident; as noted, supra, the "but fot" issue was 
raised in the state appellate court. However, given the weak record on both 
!Issue II reads: 
"Should the exclusionary rule be applied in a situation 
where the police conduct, even if viewed as improper, 
was taken in good faith and was not a 'but for' cause 
for the discovery of the items seized?" 
points it would seem appropriate to dismiss Issue II in its entirety unless 
I 
the Court is clearly anxious to address the •but for• portion of the question. 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
No. 82-357 
Cammie R. Robinson ~· August 23, 1983 
Questions Presented 
1. Whether this Court should exempt from the warrant 
requirement every class of administrative search where the 
governmental interest in the search outweighs privacy interests, 
thereby overruling Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and 
County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)~ See v. City of 
Seattle, 387 u.s. 541 (1967)~ Marshall v. Barlow's, 436 u.s. 307 
(1978); and Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 486 (1978). 
c~~~-r~~~ 
7-~~1, 
2. If this Court retains the warrant requirement for most 
administrative searches, whether the facts of this case fit 
within the exigency exception recognized in Tyler and thus 
3. If this Court retains the warrant requirement and holds 
that the warrantless search and seizure does not fit within the 
exigency exception recognized in Tyler, whether the Court should 
recognize a sood faith exception to the exclusionary rule in this 
case. ~-~-~~~~ ~~9) 
~ L-1-~~~~~~~ 
IA/-c-. ~  J py- ¢ 
~,to~ 6-/r·~~~-
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(1) Administrative Searches Requiring A Warrant: 
Camara, See, Barlow's, & Tyler 
(2) Exemptions From Administrative Warrants: 
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 u.s. 594 (1981) ............_ 
( 
B. Facts 
C. Decisions Below 
II. Discussion 
A. Warrantless Entry for Administrative Searches 
B. Exigency Exception under Tyler 













The Court apparently granted cert in this case to re- (I 
examine the warrant requirement in administrative searches. 
Absent a desire to re-examine the Court's position in this area, 
this case presents nothing more than a factual application of the 
exigency exception applied in Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 486 
(1978). As in Tyler, this case involves a warrantless 
administrative search to determine the cause of a fire. The 
search was performed by arson investigators who arrived on the 
scene 6 hours after the fire had been extinguished and the fire 
"----? 
officials had left. The investigation disclosed evidence of 
arson, which is the subject of the suppression motion challenged 
here. 
In Tyler, the Court restated its position that 
administrative searches generally require warrants. The Court ~ 
then held that the exigency exception justified one of the 
administrative warrantless searches challanged there. In that 
search, firemen had made a warrantless entry into a furniture -
store to fight a fire. The Court held that the warrantless entry 
to fight the fire was constitutional under the exigency exception 
and that officials could remain for a reasonable time after the 
fire was extinguished to search for its origin. The Court then 
/ ----~ 
applied the exigency exception to justify re-entry 5 hours later I~~ 
.....:...--
to complete the search begun under the intial entry. The Court 
held that the re-entry and the second search were merely 
continuations of the intial entry and search and were likewise 
exempt from the warrant requirement. 
---( 
... 
Tyler would have been thoroughly conventional had it not 
applied the exigency exception to justify a warrantless re-entry 
by officials 5 hours after the fire had been extinguished. Even 
that application of the exigency exception was premised on such a 
narrow set of circumstances that it hardly suggests a radical ~~ 
departure from traditional 4th Amendment principles. However, 
the decision apparently has kindled long-burning hopes that the 
Court in time will exempt broad classes of administrative 




1. Administrative Searches Requiring A Warrant: In 
Camara v. Municipal Court of the City & County of San Francisco, 
387 U.S. 523 {1967}, this Court required for the J((rst time that 
officials obtain a search warrant before entering to perform an 
administrative search. That decision overruled Frank v. 
Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), which had limited the warrant 
requirement to criminal searches. Camara held that a housing 
official may not make a warrantless entry into a private 
residence to make a routine area-wide inspection for possible ... 
violations of the municipal housing code. In another decJ..s\i'on 
handed down the same day, the Court held that a fire inspector 
may not make a warrantless entry into a locked commercial 
~
warehouse to conduct a routine investigation for possible 
violations of the municipal fire code. See v. City of Seattle, 
387 u.s. 541 (1967). 
In reaching those decisions, the Court held to the 
premise that "except in certain carefully defined classes of 
cases, a search of priva~e £rO£ert~ without proper consent is -
'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid search 
warrant." 387 U.S. at 528-29. At the same time, the Court 
recognized that administrative searches to enforce municipal 
~~th codes a~e fundamen~~y di~e~ from searches to obtain 
~i?ence of cr1me. No criminal search will be allowed absent a 
~~ing of probable caus~ believe that a crime has been 
~ committed and that evidence may be found on the place to be 
searched. To deny entry for routine inspections under municipal 
health codes absent a showing of probable cause to believe that a 
violation exists would frustrate municipal safety regulations. 
Thus, the Court held that probable cause to issue a warrant to 
conduct such inspections exists "if reasonable legislative or 
lr-
A~~~~ administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are ,~~ ~ 
-~~ 
satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling." 387 U.S. at 
538. The warrant r~quirement in administrative searches, 
therefore, is not to protect the innocent from intrusion, but to 
ensure that intrusion is not arbitrary or used to harrass, and 
that the entry and search are made and conducted in a reasonable 
fashion. 
The Court's decision i~arshall v. Barlow's, 436 U.S. 
307 (1977), emphasized the primacy of the warrant requirement in 
administrative searches. In Barlow's, the Court rejected a 
. ' 
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congressional determination that warrantless safety inspections 
under OSHA's detailed health and safety regulations were 
constitutional. Unlike the warrantless searches in Camara and 
See, the warrantless OSHA inspections were expressly deemed 
necessary by Congress, and Congress had provided some regulations 
to govern those inspections. Nevertheless, the Court rejected 
Congress's determination that these warrantless inspections were 
permissible under the 4th Amendment. 
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1977), was decided the 
~r as Barlow's. As mentioned above, Tyler merely restated 
the proposition that all administrative searches~ntry 
pursuant to a warrant except under certain well defined 
exceptions. Tyler then applied the exigency exception to justify 
warrantless entry not only to fight the fire but to search for 
its cause as well. Having held that officials may enter a 
burning house without a warrant, fight the blaze, and remain for 
a reasonable time thereafter to search for its cause, Tyler also 
held that certain re-entries by fire officials will be considered 
a continuation of the intial entry, while others will be 
considered a new entry requiring a warrant. 
2. Exemptions From Administrative Warrants: In United States 
v.vB iswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (no warrant required for an 
admini trative search of the commerical premises of a licensed 
dealer), and~lonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 
72 (1970) (no warrant required for an administrative 
search of the commerical premises of 
~ the Court exempted from the 
". ' 




administrative searches of heavily regulated businesses. In ~ 
~Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981), the Court applied the 
~~~~~g~lated business exem~ion to an industry that did not 
have a long 1story of federal regulation. In that case, the 
Court held that the warrantless inspections of mines provided for 
in the Federal Mine Safety & Health Act of 1977 were permissible 
under the 4th Amendment. In that Act, Congress had declared a 
substantial interest in ensuring safety in the mining industry. 
The Act announced a detailed regulatory scheme to effect that 
interest. Safety inspections were a crucial aspect of that 
scheme, and Congress had made an express declaration that 
warrantless inspections were necessary to the success of the 
scheme. The Court found that the Act prescribed detailed 
guidelines for such inspections and tried scrupuously to protect 
the privacy interests involved. In light of these safeguards, 
the Court deferred to the express congressional judgment that the 
governmental interest in warrantless safety inspections 
outweighed any privacy interests that were thereby compromised. ~ 
I 
The disti~tion between Barlow's and Dewey lies in the ~-
detail of the regulations governing the search. In Barlow's, the 
Court found that much discretion had been left to the 
investigating officials. 436 U.S. at 323. In Dewey, the Court 
found that the Act set out the permissible scope in specific 
detail. On the basis of that finding, Dewey held that "the -
Court to construct a warrant exemption on totally different 
grounds. 
B. Facts 
This case involves the warrantless search of a private 
dwelling to determine the cause and origin of a fire. Early in 
the morning of Oct. 18, 1980, a fire erupted at the Clifford 
home. The Cliffords were out of town on a camping trip at the 
time. The fire was reported to the Detroit Fire Dept., and fire 
units arrived on the scene within two to three minutes of the 
alarm. The fire was extinguished and the fire units and police 
left at 7:04 a.m. 
At <. oo a.m. that same day, Lt. Beyer, a "certified 
police officer fire investigator," 
to investigate the Clifford fire. 
(J.A.l6) 1 received a request 
.,/ 
The request was made by the 
fire officials who had responded to the alarm. Those officials 
had noted suspected arson as the cause of the blaze and had 
referred the matter to the fire arson unit. Before acting on the 
request, Beyer performed other duties. He and his partner 
a~ed at the Clifford home for the f~~e~J~OO £ .m. on 
Oct. 18. 
On arrival, Beyer saw that men were boarding up the 
house and pumping water from the basement. He assumed that these 
1Lt. Beyer was a member of the Detroit Fire Dept. Apparently, 
arson investigators attend the Police Academy and are sworn in as 
special police officers. They have the authority to make 
arrests. 
men were agents of the owner's insurance carrier. Beyer 
testified that the house was severly damaged and uninhabitable. 
(J.A.6) 2 Both the stairs to the second floor and the kitchen 
floor had collapsed. The windows were broken and the doors were 
open. Beyer testifed that he could not investigate until the 
water had been drained out of the basement. 
While Beyer waited for the water to be drained, he 
questioned the neighbors. A Mr. Mott informed Beyer that he had 
contacted Mr. Clifford and that Mr. Clifford had called his 
insurance agents to come secure the house against trespassers. 3 
When the water was drained, Beyer and his partner entered the 
house and began their investigation. They sought no permission 
to enter the house, but justified the warrantless 
unwritten departmental policy. (J.A.l2) That policy permitted a 
warrantless search of a recently burned building when the owners 
were not present and the building was deemed open to trespass. 
(J.A.7) The policy permitted such warrantless searches only when 
conducted on the day of the fire or on the day following a night 
fire. (J.A.20) 
Beyer began his investigation in the basement (J.A.62) 
and found that the fire had started there. He found 3 fuel cans, 
2on direct examination, Beyer was asked whether the house was 
habitable or inhabitable. He answered that it was inhabitable. 
From the context, I assume that he meant ~inhabitable.~ 
3Resp's brief claims that this information is in Beyer's 
Investigative Report, which Resp claims is in the record but 
which is not included in the Joint Appendix sent to the Court. 
The clerk's office is trying to obtain a copy of this • 
. , 
a crock pot, and a timer with attached wires under the basement 
stairs. The burn pattern indicated that the fire had started 
there from a shortage in the wires attached to the timer. The 
timer was set to go off at 3:45 a.m. and had stopped around 4:30 
a.m. (J.A.60} Beyer and his partner seized this evidence and 
then searched the remainder of the house. 4 (J.A.84} The entire 
search took 3 hours. 
The Cliffords were charged with arson. The evidence 
seized from the basement was offered into evidence during a 
preliminary examination. The Cliffords moved to suppress it on 
the ground that the entry and search were unconstitutional. 
C. Decisions Below 
The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing during 
which Beyer described his search. Following testimony and 
argument, the trial court found that the search was an 
administrative search to determine the cause of the fire. The 
trial court denied the Cliffords's motion to suppress on the 
ground that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry 
and search. (J.A.39} That decision was premised on Tyler. 
The state court of appeals also found that the search 
an administrative search, but reversed the trial court's 
decision on the ground that there were ~exigent circumstances 
justifying a warrantless entry and search. The court of appeals 
4Page 4 of Beyer's Investigative Report is quoted in Resp's 
Brief at 3, and indicates the scope of the house-wide search. 
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found that the entry and search had not been motivated by the 
belief that the evidence might be destroyed or that the fire 
might be rekindled. (Cert. Pet. at 15) The court found further 
that the arson search was not a continuation of the intial entry 
and search made by the firefighters. Because the court found no 
exigency justifying the warrantless entry by Beyer, it held that 
Tyler required exclusion of the evidence found in the search that 
followed. The state Supreme Court refused to review the case. 
The evidentiary ruling is here on an interlocutory order. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Warrantless Entry for Administrative Searches 
Although the facts of this case are strikingly similar ~ 
to those in Tyler, the primary issue here questions the wisdom of 
this Court's decision in Camara. Petr asks that the Court 




requirment all classes of administrative searches where there 
generally can be no showing of traditional probable cause and 
where the government's interest in the search outweighs the 
individual's interest in being free from government intrusion. 
Petr argues that such classes of searches should be subject only 
to the reasonableness requirment of the 4th Amendment. 
Petr's argument is a variation on an old tune, and one 
with which the Court is obviously uncomfortable. The argument 
rests on the premise that the two clauses of the 4th Amendment 
are separate and equal. The first clause states that all 
searches must be reasonable. The second states that all warrants 
• .,. : 'I·~ 
' ~ 
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require a showing of probable cause. Nothing in the 4th 
Amendment requires that all searches be made pursuant to a 
warrant. However, to ensure protection of 4th Amendment rights, 
this Court generally has applied the rule that warrantless 
searches of private property are per se unreasonable. Since 
Camara, the Court has applied that rule to administrative as well 
as criminal searches. Exceptions to the warrant requirement are 
relatively few and are well defined. 
Petr picks no quarrel with the per se rule in the 
criminal context, but argues that such a rule is inappropriate in 
the context of most administrative searches. Petr argues that to 
require a warrant for such searches distorts the probable cause 
requirement. This is the same argument that Justice Stevens made 
in his Barlow's dissent. Petr suggests that the Court adopt the 
following analysis instead. First, determine whether a given 
class of administrative searches normally would be accomplished 
upon a showing of probable cause as traditionally understood. If 
not, then the warrant clause is inapplicable to that class of 
search. Second, determine whether that particular class of 
search is reasonable. This determination, Petr argues, turns on 
whether the government interest in the search outweighs the 
individual's interest in being free from government intrusion. 
If the government's interest is superior, Petr argues that the 
administrative search should be allowed without a warrant and 
should be subject only to the reasonableness requirement of the 
4th Amendment. 
bench memo: Michigan v. Clifford page 14 
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Camara took a different approach. It lowered the 
standard of probable cause, but insisted on a warrant. Camara 
permitted administrative warrants to issue without a showing of 
traditional probable cause for two reasons: first, requiring such 
a showing would lead to an unacceptable level of enforcement in 
an area of substantial public interest; and, second, any 
intrusion on privacy interests would be so minor as to be 
outweighed by the substantial public interest in conducting the 
search. Camara reasoned that administrative searches are less 
intrusive than criminal searches because they are less personal 
and less adversary. 387 u.s. at 537 Both Camara and Petr would 
facilitate administrative searches, but Petr's approach entails 
no prior judicial review. 
Under the Camara analysis, no search may proceed until 
there has been a prior judicial determination that the type of 
search involved normally cannot be justified by traditional 
probable cause and that the public interest in the search 
outweighs any intrusion that might occur. Under Petr's analysis, 
the search may proceed without prior judicial review because no 
warrant is required. Those responsible for the inspection 
determine whether the inspection normally can be justified by 
traditional probable cause. If it can, they must marshall the 
evidence, go to a magistrate, persuade him that the evidence 
constitutes probable cause, obtain the warrant, and return to 
execute it. If the inspectors determine that the inspection 
generally cannot be justified by traditional probable cause, they 
may not obtain a warrant. They nevertheless may inspect if they 
determine that the need to inspect outweighs any intrusion that 
may occur. Such a system provides a clear incentive not to find 
probable cause. Furthermore, there is no prior judicial review 
limiting the scope of the search and ensuring that the public 
interest in the search outweighs any intrusion that might occur. 
Under Petr's analysis, the searches still will be subject to the 
reasonableness requirement of the 4th Amendment, but the searches 
likely will go unchallenged by all but those charged with 
wrongdoing on the basis of evidence seized in such searches. I 
believe that such an approach is unjustified. If we plug this 
particular case into the Court's current approach to 
administrative searches, this becomes clearer. 
The Court has not required a warrant for all 
administrative searches. See Biswell, Colonnade, and Dewey. ~ 
Having determined that an administrative search may proceed 
without traditional probable cause, the Court conducts a second 
balancing test to determine whether that search may proceed 
without a warrant. It is only where the government's interest in 
conducting a warrantless search outweighs privacy interests that 
this Court has allowed entry without a warrant. See Camara, 387 
U.S. at 533. Applying that test to the administrative search at 
issue here, the argument would be that the burden of obtaining a 
warrant to determine the cause of a recent fire is likely to 
frustrate siginificant government interests to a greater degree 
than it is likely to occasion unconstitutional intrusions on 
privacy. I disagree with that general assumption for several ~~ 
reasons. ~~ 
~·r~fv~~~~· 
~ requiring the kind of warrant necessary to 
conduct an administrative search of this nature will not hamper 
the government's interest in ensuring against fire hazard because 
------------~ 
a traditional showing of probable cause is not required. 
Officials need only demonstrate to a neutral and objective 
judicial officer that the requested administrative search is 
reasonable with respect to the particular place to be searched. 
If immediate inspection is necessary to ensure against fire 
hazard, a warrantless search may be proper under the traditional 
exigency exception. 5 
~it is wrong to assume that the administrative 
search of a recently burned building always will be reasonable. 
The reasonableness of an administrative search is premised in 
part on the belief that it will present a minimal intrusion on 
existing privacy rights. The measure of intrusion turns largely 
on the privacy rights in the places or things to be searched. 
Although a fire certainly may decrease one's expectations of 
privacy, the decrease will depend on the amount of fire damage, 
the nature of the structure, the length of the interim between 
fire and search, and the owner's salvage efforts in that interim. 
I believe that this case in particular proves incorrect a general 
assumption that the privacy interests in recently burned premises 
always are minimal and that prior judicial review thus will serve 
no purpose. The fire occurred in a private residence. The blaze 
5The state court specifically found that no exigency existed in 
this case. Cert. Pet. at 15. 
rendered the house uninhabitable, but did not raize it. (J.A.60) 
The primary structure remained intact and the owner's personal 
belongings, such as clothes, pictures, and stereo equipment, 
remained inside. 6 After the blaze was extinguished and the 
firefighters had left, the owner requested that his insurance 
carrier secure the house against trepass. 7 When the arson 
investigators arrived 5 hours later, the house was being secured 
by the owner's insurance carrier. (J.A.6,8) The privacy 
interests in the damaged Clifford residence certainly were more 
pronounced than the privacy interests in the gutted and 
smoldering furniture store in Tyler. 
~ it is often difficult to distinguish between an 
administrative and a criminal search, especially where the 
officials responsible for conducting the administrative search 
are responsible for conducting any criminal search as we11. 8 To 
avoid the risk that officials may mistake a criminal search for 
an administrative one that requires no traditional showing of 
probable cause, it seems preferable to require a prior judicial 
determination of the proper nature and scope of the search. As a 
practical matter, prior judicial review is important not so much 
because officials in good faith may mislabel the object of the 
6This information comes from page 4 of Beyer's Investigative I 
Rept. quoted in Resp's Brief at 3. 
7Again, this comes from Beyer's Investigative Rept. 
8The arson investigators in this case have the power to make 
arrests and are responsible for ferreting out arson as well as 
determining the cause and origin of a fire. 
search, but because the scope of the search may expand beyond 
what is constitutionally permissible. 9 
The quest for criminal evidence under the authority of 
an administrative search is not objectionable merely because the 
object of the investigation becomes the acquisition of criminal 
evidence. Assuming that a constitutional search is already in 
progress, investigators who become suspicious of arson should ot __. 
I~ 
be required to stop that search and obtain a criminal warrant 
before they begin to look for evidence to confirm their 
suspicion. That result would be ridiculous because it would 
protect the privacy of suspected wrongdoers more than that of 
innocent fire victims, and because it would be impossible to 
distinguish the search for cause from the search for evidence of 
arson. However, one justification for permitting the 
administrative search to proceed on less than traditional 
~ probable cause is the belief that the intrusiveness of the search 
will be minor compared to the public interest thereby served. To 
ensure that the balance does not change when the object of the 
search becomes the quest for criminal evidence, arson inspectors 
must not intensify the scope of their administrative search 
without first acquiring a warrant authorizing them to do so. 
9of course, judicial review should also ensure that officials 
do not undertake a search for criminal evidence where they lack 
traditional probable cause by deliberately mislabeling the search 
administrative. There is no evidence here that the arson 
investigators deliberately violated the Cliffords's 4th Amendment 
rights by disguising a criminal search as an administrative 
search. There is no evidence that the Fire Dept. intended its 





The administrative search into the cause of a fire~
should be limited to structural defects, faulty appliances,  
defective wiring, etc. It should not expand under the suspicion 
of arson to rummaging in closets, desks, and drawers - at least 
not without a warrant obtained on a showing of traditional 
probable cause. This case in particular shows the wisdom of 
prior judicial review limiting the scope of the administrative 
search. After entering the Clifford horne without a warrant and 
discovering the cause of the fire in the basement, the 
investigators went on to conduct a warrantless search of 
remainder of the house. This search took 3 hours. The 
investigators rummaged in closets and drawers and inventoried the 
pictures on the wall, the audio-visual equipment in the rooms, 
and the tapes and records in the cabinets. 1° For these three 
reasons, I do not believe that the government's interest in 
warrantless post-fire searches outweighs the interest in 
protecting 4th Amendment rights. 
One may accept the above rationale and still question 
whether the administrative warrant required in Camara will add 
any protection to 4th Amendment rights in this case. The warrant 
requirement in Camara provided prior judicial scrutiny to ensure 
that area-wide searches for housing code violations were not 
~
undertaken arbitrarily or to harrass. There is no such danger 
here. The number of premises subjected to post-fire searches 
10This description of the house-wide search comes from Beyer's 
Investigative Rept. at 4 quoted in Resp's Brief at 3. 
' ' 
will be limited by an objective and readily determinable event -
fire. One could argue, therefore, that a warrant to inspect 
recently burned buildings serves no purpose. The Court properly 
rejected this argument in Tyler. The Court found that prior 
judicial scrutiny of post-fire inspections had other purposes to 
serve. 
As in all administrative searches, it is necessary to 
balance the need to inspect against the possible intrusion. 
Unlike the case in area-wide routine inspections, in post-fire 
inspections this balance will vary from case to case. "In the 
context of investigatory fire searches, which are not 
programmatic but are responsive to individual events, a more 
particularized inquiry may be necessary." Tyler, supra, 436 
u.s. at 507. Factors to be considered in determining the 
reasonableness of a post-fire search include the scope of the 
search, the time of day of the search, the lapse of time between 
fire and search, the continued use of the building, and the 
owner's efforts to secure the building or to make repair. Id. 
Tyler held that the weighting of these factors is best performed 
by prior judicial review. I agree. Absent exigent 
circumstances, I believe that post-fire searches present an even 
stronger case for the warrant requirement than the search in 
Camara because there are more factors to take into the balance 
and those factors vary more widely from search to search than the 
factors involved in Camara. 
Similarly, the case for an exemption from administrative 
warrants is not nearly so strong in this case as it was in either 
Barlow's or Dewey. In both Justice Stevens's dissent in Barlow's 
and the majority opinion in Dewey, the case . for allowing 
warrantless administrative searches was based on the fact that 
those searches were conducted on commercial premises pursuant to 
a statutory scheme wherein Congress had expressly authorized such 
searches and had determined that the government had a substantial 
interest in conducting warrantless searches that outweighed 
privacy interests. The majority in Dewey deferred to this 
congressional determination after concluding that the safeguards 
to privacy interests provided in the Act made the warrantless 
searches reasonable within the meaning of the 4th Amendment. The 
majority also concluded that the detailed guidelines governing 
the search made prior judicial scrutiny less crucial. Such is 
not the case here. 
The Detroit Municipal Fire Prevention Code gives the 
Fire Marshall the authority to investigate the cause of fires 
explosions. If there is reason to believe that arson is the 
cause, the Fire Marshall may "take custody of all physical 
evidence relating to the cause of the fire .•• and .•• continue 
the investigation to conclusion." Ordinance No. 314-H, Sec. 23-1-
3.5. The Municipal Code also provides that before entering a 
private dwelling, fire officials must obtain the consent of the 
occupant or an administrative warrant. Entry may be made without 
either consent or a warrnt in emergency situations where the fire 
official "knows, or has reason to believe" that circumstances 
exist that "reasonably may constitute immediate danger to life 
and property." Sec. 23-1-3.4.1. The only other guidelines 
governing the right of fire officials to enter and search are 
provided in the Fire Dept.'s unwritten policy, which was 
described at the suppression hearing as follows: 
[W]e encourage our investigators to make the scene [of 
the fire] and make the association if at all possible 
where the fire opening is in effect. Our day crew does 
most of the fire scene ivestigation, we tell them to 
make an entry into the property that had a fire the 
previous night if the property is open to trespass. If 
it is severly fire damaged, we tell them to make that 
entry and make the investigation. If the property is 
occupied, or if it is a business place and people are 
trying to conduct business, then we instruct the people 
to ask for consent or to obtain an administrative 
search warrant where appropriate. 
Testimony of Capt. Monroe (JA19) 
B. Exigency Exception under Tyler 
If Camara and progeny remain 
~Wd(_ 
good law~s case becomes 
merely a factual application of the exigency exception recognized 
in Tyler. Tyler held that under the exigency exception 
"officials need no warrant to remain in a building for a 
reasonable time to investigate the cause of the blaze after it 
has been extinguished." 436 U.S. at 510. As with the intial 
entry, what constitutes a reasonable time within which to remain 
and investigate depends on the exigency that creates the 
y 
' 
exception. While the fire is the exigency that justifies the 
entry, "[p]rompt determination of the fire's origin ••• to 
prevent its recurrence •.. [and] to preserve evidence from 
intentional or accidental destruction" is the exigency that 
allows the firemen to remain and search. Id. f'b!' 
As I read Tyler, it requires two things of the ~ 
warrantless administrative search. ~· the search must ~ 
made pursuant to the intial entry justified by the blaze or by ~$ 
some other exigency. Second, the search must be for the purpose -
of spotting the origin of the fire so as to prevent its 
recurrence "through the detection of continuing dangers" or "to 
preserve evidence from intentional or accidental destruction." 11 
Id. The Court found that both conditions were satisfied by the 
early morning search in Tyler. Because the search had begun 
under the intial entry and was completed within a time within 
which it would have been reasonable to remain and search, the 
Court held that "[u]nder the circumstances, we find that the 
morning entries were no more than an actual continuation of the 
first, and the lack of a warrant thus did not invalidate the 
resulting seizure of evidence." 436 U.S. at 511. 
In the present case, the state court made a factual 




challenged search. (Cert. Pet. at 15) The state court also  
~~~ 
11Although the object of the search may later 
for evidence of arson, the motivation for the 
must be to determine the cause of the blaze. 
become the quest 
warrantless search 
See note 10 supra. 
.I 
found that under the facts of this case the re-entry and search 
were not continuations of the first entry and search. Id. The 
facts arguably justify these findings. By 7:04a.m., the 
firefighters had extinguished the blaze and left. On the basis 
of their efforts, the firefighters reported to the arson 
investigators their suspicion of arson. The arson investigators 
arrived on the scene for the first time 6 hours after the fire 
had been extinguished and the firefighters had left. At the time I 
they arrived, the fire was completely extinguished and the house 
was being secured against trespassers by the owner's insurance 
agents. Under these facts, the state court reasonably could 
conclude that the search was not concluded within a time within 
which it would have been reasonable to remain and search. Having 
~~ found no exigency to exempt the entry and search from the warrant 
requirement, the state court held that the seizure of evidence 
was unconstitutional. Accepting the holding of Tyler, I see no J 
reason to disturb the state court's ruling. 12 
C. Good Faith Exception 
Petr argues that the exclusionary rule should not apply 
in this case because the government's conduct, even if viewed as 
improper, was taken in good faith. Petr argues in the 
alternative for a more narrow good faith exception where the 
12Although I believe that the warrantless search of ~s~ 
may have been justified under the exigency exception, I find it 
hard to say that the state court's finding to the contrary is 
clearly erroneous • 
. : ::.~ .. 
~~,~~--·~~~ 
(U,~~~~~~ 
exclusionary rule would not apply absent a finding that the ~r 1J I G-
~~ 
police officer's conduct was taken in bad faith, or on an~~~ 
unreasonable belief that it was authorized, and was a "but for" 
cause for the discovery of the evidence seized. As to these good 
faith issues, Resp has moved to dismiss c: rt as improvidently ~~ 
~ ----------------------------~------- II • J , 
granted. --- I recommend that Resp's motion be granted. ~ /)1AA:> ~ The "but for" argument was first made before the Mich. 
Ct. App., which did not squarely address it. There is a dispute 
over whether the Ct. App. failed to address the issue because it 
had not been raised in the trial court, or whether it rejected 
the argument sub silentio. The broader "good faith" issue was 
not raised below. The facts supporting a "good faith" exemption 
~
in this case are not good in any event. 
The "but for" argument seems to rest on the "inevitable 
discovery" doctrine, under which evidence will not be excluded as 
"fruit of the poisonous tree" if its discovery would have been 
inevitable even without the 4th Amendment violation. Petr's 
argument seems to be that because the evidence would have been 
discovered in a search conducted under a warrant, the warrantless 
search was not the "but for" reason for discovery. This argument 
misapplies the inevitable discovery doctrine. --This is not a good case to create the broader good faith { J 
exception for the reasons Mark pointed out in his Oct. 19, 1982 ~ 
memo to you. Although the arson investigators did not violate 
the Cliffords's 4th Amendment rights deliberately, the violation 
occurred because the investigators were following a policy that 
----------------~-------~ ---was clearly unconstitutional under this Court's decisions 
-----------------~ -
.. ,, 
Camara and Tyler. Applying the exclusionary rule in this case 
might promote deterrence by prompting the Detroit Fire Dept. to 
adopt policies that conform to the constitutional principles 
announced by this Court. Furthermore, there was no exigency or 
other circumstance justifying the failure to obtain a warrant in 
this case. There was an unhurried six-hour delay between the 
fire and the search. The arson investigator testified that a 
warrant could have been obtained in that time. In sum, this is 
not a good case to consider a good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule. 
III. CONCLUSION 
If this Court wants to de-emphasize the primacy of the 
warrant requirement in administrative searches, it should not 
~choose this case to do it. There are three reasons why this case 
~ is not a good means of achieving that goal, all of which are 
related. 
First, the line between an administrative search into 
the cause of a fire and a criminal search for evidence of arson 
is a hazy one. In this case, the arson investigators crossed \ 
that line and undertook an extensive warrantless search in quest 
~ -of criminal evidence. Prior judicial review limiting the scope 
of the administrative search would have prevented that. 
Second, one argument for exempting administrative 
searches from the warrant requirement is that the requirement 
does not provide additional protection to 4th Amendment rights. 
That argument may be true where there are legislative or 
"•. /~ . ,. 
r 
administrative guidelines governing such searches and judicial 
review merely ensures that a particular search conforms to those 
guidelines. The argument is unconvincing in this case where 
there are no legislative guidelines and the only administrative 
guideline is an unwritten policy that leaves much discretion to 
the investigating officials. 
Finally, another argument for exempting administrative 
searches from the warrant requirement is that the privacy 
interests at stake are likely to be less than in criminal 
searches. Because the privacy interests at stake are less, the 
intrusion is not as great and the argument is that there is less 
need to provide added protection in the form of prior judicial 
review. This argument would have been more appealing in Tyler 
than here. In Tyler, the search involved the smoldering remains 
of a furniture store. In this case, the search involved a 
private residence in which private belon 'n s remained and which 
----
had been secured by the owner against trespass. 
t 
The state court may have been wrong to find that the 
arrantless search of the basement in this case did not fit 
ithin the exigency exception recognized in Tyler. However, the 
factual application of Tyler hardly merits this Court's plenary 
review. Discontent with the result in this case should not lead 
the Court to adopt an excessively broad exemption to the 
~ administrative warrant that may not be justified in other 
contexts. 

October 12, 1983 
MEMORANDUM 
RE: Michigan v. Clifford No. 82-357 
opinion in 
our prior conversation I 
justify the warrantless basement search on the basis of 
On re-reading, it seems to me that the primary 
the decision in Tyler was to expand the narrow reading that 
Michigan court had given the fire exigency exception so that fire 
officials need not leave with the dousing of the last flame. 
Thus, this Court held: 
an entry to fight a fire requires no warrant, and ••. 
once in the building, officials may remain there for a 
reasonable time to investigate the cause of the blaze. 
Thereafter, additional entries to investigate the cause 
of the fire must be made pursuant to the warrant 
procedures governing administrative searches." 436 u.s. 
at 511 
Applying this holding to the facts before it) the ~ourt 
sought to illustrate when investigatory searches fall within the 
fire exigency it had just announced and when they require a 
warrant, consent, or some other exigency. The Court pointed out 
that application of the language "remain within the building for 
a reasonable time" must recognize that the circumstances of 
particular fires and the roles of fire officials in combatting 
them varies widely. See 436 u.s. at 510 n.6 For example, a fire 
in "a single-family dwelling that clearly is extinguished at some 
identifiable time presents ffew] complexities" id.: the fire 
officials enter to put out the blaze, remain long enough to 
determine its origin, and leave. All re-entries require an 
administrative warrant, consent, or a new exigency. Fires in 
other structures may present different problems and may require 
that the fire officials remain for a longer period of time, 
entering and re-entering the building. Id. Before a court can 
determine whether a warrantless post-fire investigation is 
justified by the fire exigency, it must balance the particular 
circumstances confronting the fire officials against "the 
individuals' reasonable expectations of privacy." Id. 
With these considerations in mind, the Court in Tyler 
held that the early morning re-entry by fire officals into the 
burned out warehouse was merely a continuation of the intial 
search. Because both the intial search and its continuation 
occurred within a time within which it would have been reasonable 
to remain, the re-entry fell within the fire exigency. ~hus, 
there was no need to obtain an administrative warrant, consent, 
or to identify a new exigency before making that entry. It was 
as if the fire officials had begun the search immediately after 
the blaze was out, discovered that they needed additional tools, 
left to qet them, and had returned immediately. ~he facts in 
this case are distinguishable: they suggest additional 
attenuation between the intial entry to extinguish the fire and 
the entry to search for cause as well as increased expectations 
of privacy in the interim. 
The fire fighters left the Clifford house at 7:04 a.m. 
Their job done, they turned the incident over to the arson 
division. The arson investigators arrived for the first time 6 
hours later. When they arrived they learned that the owner had 
instructed a work crew to secure the house against intrusion. 
The crew was at work when they arrived. Even if the interim 
between fire and search had been of the same duration as in 
Tyler, and some of the same officials had returned to make the 
investigation, I would find this case distinguishable from Tyler 
in two important respects: first, the fire occurred in a private 
residence rather than a commercial warehouse: and, second, in the 
interim between the intial entry to fight the fire and the re-
entry to investigate its origin, the owner had instructed his 
insurance company to secure his home against further trespass. I 
find it very difficult to say that the re-entry in this case was 
a continuation of the intial entry and that it falls within the 
fire exigency exception to the warrant requirement. 
Other exigencies might have justified the warrantless 
entry into the basement, such as preserving evidence from 
imminent destruction or ensuring against the possibility of 
rekindling. However, the state court expressly found that the 
re-entry was not motivated by either of those exigencies: "[The 
arson officials) did not enter the premises for the purposes of 
ensuring that the blaze would not rekindle or to prevent the 
iminent [sic] destruction of evidence." The record supports this 
finding. Lieut. Bever testified that if the owners had been on 
the premises, he would have requested consent before entering and 
lacking that would have obtained an administrative warrant. If 
the house had been boarded up when he arrived, he would have gone 
for an administrative warrant before making the entry. This 
testimony confirms the state court's finding that the entry was 
not made under any new exigency. 
Unless the Court wants to create an exception to the 
warrant requirement that allows fire officials to re-enter the 
premises of a recent fire within a reasonable time to investigate 
its cause, I would affirm the state court's holding that the 
warrantless entry into the basement was unconstitutional in this 
case. 
To my mind, this case illustrates why such an exception 
would be undesirable. If the arson investigators had obtained an 
administrative warrant, the warrant presumably would have 
restricted the scope of the search to a determination of cause. 
This effectively would have limited the search to the basement 
and would have prevented the upstairs intrusion. 
lfp/ss 11/12/83 CLIFF SALLY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Cammie DATE: Nov. 12, 1983 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
82-357 Michigan v. Clifford 
I have read with some care your first draft 
(Nov. 9) of our opinion, and am quite pleased with it. 
You have developed the opinion logically, and it is well 
written. Contrary to what often happens to a first draft, 
I see no reason for substantial substantive changes. I 
have drafted two or three small riders. Statement of the 
Question made need further thought. 
A couple of general observations. Although I 
think this draft will print out into some · 16-18 pages, I 
would be happier if it were shorter without loss of force 
JWr""~ ~ substance. I cannot identify, however, any specific 
~ portion that should be eliminated or substantially 
reduced. 
I do think there is a fair amount of repetitious 
language. I have edited some of this out. Please take a 
close look, with this in mind, at Part II. The facts 
already have been stated, and the framework established 
for the conclusions drawn. I do not think, however, that 
2. 
any real cutting is justified. Possibly my editing 
ff-t.)-1- I I 
suffices. 
At an appropriate point, and probably in a 
footnote, I would 1 ike to emphasize that the reasonable 
expectation of privacy that underlies Fourth Amendment 
analysis varies particularly with the type of building. 
The private residence, of course, is at one end of the 
spectrum. You might cite a case or two (e.g., Payton) 
emphasizing its traditional protection from warrantless 
searches. The other end of the spectrum would include 
business or commercial structures that contain nothing 
personal or private: e.g., various types of warehouses. 
/ The draft distinguishes rather clearly between 
this case and Tyler. Try framing a footnote that 
recognizes that in many cases there will be no bright line 
between the end of the firefighters' function and the 
beginning of the search for evidence of arson. The 
4 ~~-~ ~ circumstances may be more important than the lapse of 
d~'fJ ~ ~ time. In view of the compelling state interest in 
(~1 thorough investigations of the cause of fires ....J/.v.Ju_ LA a_ ~llw_; 
Jl-. ~ ;;;2.-- .. dinvestigations that often are directed entirely to 
~~d ~ ~ noncriminal activity - considerable latitude must be given 
~ d-~f for activity in furtherance of this interest. Tyler is an 
. . AA.~~ -
~#v.- v.JaiJuu4 A:i.t<l-· 
~) ~· ~- 0 a_n;l- k ~ 
+1u_~~~~ --m 
ucJ-J-t~U.~ _A.Lc..t}l~ LA...~t.&l.tJ. ~ . . , 




example where a break in continuity of the investigation 
WpS justifiable. 
If you find appropriate places to transfer 
textual material to footnotes, this would shorten the 
draft to some extent. There may not be many such 
opportunities, but bear the possibility in mind. 
* * * 
The process from here on, as you will remember, 
is as follows: (i} prepare a second draft in light of my 
review, feeling free to edit amy changes and to discuss 
any of this with me; ( i i} to the extent you make changes 
that fairly could be viewed as substantive, I would like 
to see them; also if you draft footnotes along the lines 
suggested above, I would like to see these; (iii} then 
turn the draft over to your editor, still in Atex form; 
(iv} if arguably substantive changes are made, I would, of 
course, like to see them; (v} then move to a printed 
Chambers Draft, with copies to be reviewed by all five of 
us. The two clerks, to whom the draft is new, should feel 
free to suggest editing as well as substantive changes. 
But you remain the responsible clerk, and should try to 
work out any differences before you bring a master copy of 
the Chambers Draft back to me. 
4. 
I would like to circulate this opinion prior to 




lfp/ss 11/12/83 Rider A, p. 1 (Clifford) 
CLIFFl SALLY-POW 
This case presents questions as to the authority 
of arson investigators, in the absence of either exigent 
circumstances or consent, to enter a private residence 
without a warrant to investigate the cause of a recent 
fire. 
lfp/ss 11/12/83 Rider ~ ' Pag~ 4 (Clifford) 
CLIFF4 SALLY-POW 
We granted certiorari to clarify doubt that appears to 
exist as to the application of our decision in Tyler. 
lfp/ss 11/12/83 Rider A, p. 16 (Clifford) 
CLIFF16 SALLY-POW 
The searches of the Clifford horne, at least 
arguably, can be viewed as two separate ones: the delayed 
search of the basement area, extensive 
search of the residential portion of the house. We now 
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Michigan v. Clifford 
Dear Chief, 
Lewis will undertake the opinion 
for the Court in the above. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
, ' / . 
I I I 'I I . 





JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
~u.prtmt Qj:lturlltf tlft ~ttiftb ~bdt:e 
jtas!pnghm. ~. <!J. 2ll.;t~.;l 
November 23, 1983 
Re: No. 82-357 Michigan v. Clifford 
Dear Lewis: 




cc: The Conference 
' I ' 
/ 
C HAM B ERS OF 
JUSTIC E w ... J. BR E NNAN, JR. 
Dear Lewis: 
.fu.prtmt Clflturl llf firt ~b .Jmtt~ 
... ulfhtghnt. ~. <lf. 2!l&i'!~ 
December 2, 1983 
Re: Michigan v. Clifford, No. 82-357 
As I mentioned when we spoke yesterday, I agree with much of 
what you have said in the text of your opinion in the above and I 
will be happy to join. However, I do have some reservations 
about the language of certain footnotes, which seem to me to go 
beyond what is necessary either to decide the present case or to 
clarify the scope of Tyler. 
1. In note 4 at page 6 you offer an explanation of several 
circumstances under which officials may, in the words of the 
Tyler opinion, "remain in a building for a reasonable time to 
investigate the causes of a blaze after it has been 
extinguished." 436 u.S. at 510. It strikes me that your 
explanation is perhaps too broad. May not it suggest to some 
readers that a considerable amount of time may elapse before the 
type of "post-fire search" that you describe is conducted? I 
would be happier with a formulation more along the lines of the 
one stated in !J[ler itself, which suggested more directly that 
such searches must be conducted immediately after the fire has 
been extinguished: "Prompt determination of the fire's origin may 
be necessary to prevent its recurrence, as through the detectio?AJ~~ 
of con tin u);:hg dangers such as faulty wiring or a defective ~y- ,__.}-
furnace. ~Immediate investigation may also be necessary to ~~­
preserve evidence from intentional or accidental destruction . " ~t 
436 u.s. at 510. ~  
2. In note 5 at page 6 you briefly recite the relevant ~ ~ 
standard for securing an administrative warrant. Here again, ~ ·~ 
would not a more detailed explanation, such as that found in 
Tyler, be more helpful? E.g., "To secure a warrant to 
investigate the cause of a fire , an official must show more than . ~ 
the bare fact that a fire has occurred .••. In the context of · ~. 
investigatory fire searches, which are not programmatic but are ~ 
responsive to individual events, a more particularized inquiry 
may be necessary . The number of prior entries, the scope of the 3 ~ 
search, the time of day when it is proposed to be made, the lapse ~~ 
of time since the fire , the continued use of the building, and , ~ 
the owner's efforts to secure it against intruders might all be .v {p · 
relevant factors . Even though a fire victim' s privacy must ~ 
normally yield to the vital social objective of ascertaining the .~ 
cause of the fire, the magistrate can perform the important ~-
function of preventing harassment by keeping that invasion to a 
minimum." 436 U.S. at 507-508. 
3. You also explain in note 6 at page 7 that firemen may, 
after removing rubble at the scene of a fire, seize evidence 
under the plain view doctrine, even though that evidence 
obviously was not literally in "plain view" at the time they 
initiated the search. The question whether the plain view 
doctrine permits fire officials to seize evidence without a 
warrant after sifting through the rubble of a fire or searching 
"other areas where the cause of fires are likely to be found" is 
not before us in this case and I would prefer not to reach out to 
decide this question without the benefit of specific facts and 
briefing that will help to focus our decision. More importantly, 
doesn't your assertion go considerably beyond the scope of 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire? The opinion of the Court in that case 
repeatedly stressed that when law enforcement officials 
"inadvertently come across evidence" that is in plain view they 
may lawfully seize it. 403 U.S. at 465-466 (emphasis added). In 
contrast, it seems to me that your footnote suggests that 
firefighters may intentionally search through rubble and 
unspecified "other areas" until they come across evidence of the 
cause of a fire; doesn't that statement go too far and, in any 
case, isn't it unecessary to decide this case? 
4. The last sentence of note 7 at page 9 seems, in my view, 
open to the reading that commercial warehouses will rarely if 
ever qualify for the protections of the Fourth Amendment. But as 
we said in Tyler, "the basic purpose of the Amendment is to 
safguard the privacy and security of individuals against 
arbitrary invasions by government officials .•.. [This] privacy 
that is invaded may be sheltered by the walls of a warehouse or 
other commercial establishment not open to the public." 436 u.s. 
at 504-505. Perhaps your note could be recast to indicate that 
while commercial premises are certainly entitled to the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment, there may be circumstances 
in which such premises evidence reduced expectations of privacy. 
5. Finally, I am worried that the last sentence of note 9 
at page 10 ("Considerable latitude must be given to the 
compelling state interest in thourough investigations in the 
causes of recent fires") is perhaps too sweeping a statement that 
may be misread by lower courts. 
I' 11 probably be able to go along even if you find no reason 
to make changes. But I'd really be more comfortable if these 





..JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
,ju.prtmt <!fltttrt af t4t ~nittb .Jtalt,tr 
Jfa,gltington, ~. <!f. 2ll.;t,.~ 
November 23, 1983 
No. 82-357 Michigan v. Clifford 
Dear Lewis, 




Copies to the Conference 
necembe r 5 , 1Q83 
82-357 Michigan v . Clifford 
near Ri 11: 
~hAnk vou for vour J.etter oF n~cember 2 ln~icattnq 
vour willinoness to ioin 'TIV o'Oin;nn, h11t i.r!el".tifvinn l::~n­
quaqe in sever a 1 footnot.es thf'lt a i. ves you ~omP conc('lrn. 
T h~VP reviPw@A these not~s with some ~~re, ~n~ 
E>nrlose a markPil UP ~opv of rnv opinion from whi.rh vou \\d11 
observe that T have ma~P somP chf'lnaeq {n PA~h nf the~e 
notes . T hP 1 i ~ve +-re chAnoeq ~rP corno,,.tF:>, v fait~ t 1 , 1 tf1 
'Pvler ani! to l"()urth r...menrlrne~t Cloctr.!nn . l"i res Ao "!"'n~q(:>f'lt 
nnin:ti~ sit. tlf'ltion~. 
We took this caqe to clarify Tvler . In that case 
there was no rourt opinion. nnlv the Ch{ef Justice and t 
joineA PottPr, an<'1 anoarently the Chief anrl ! now read Tyler 
differently as indicated bv his vote and statementR at Con-
F~rE"nce in this case . A1c;o i..n rrvler there were separate 
ooinions bv Byron, Rill Rehnquist and John Stevens . I 
ther~fore think it is nec~ssarv to have these footnotes that 
endeavor to afford somewhat qreater guidance than the Tvler 
onini~n, whirh ~ncoAP~ ryrimarilv on the factA. 
T.f mv chr-no~~ relieve your concerns - and I think 
thPy wi11 - T wi11 recirculate promptly . I apprPciate the 
















From: Justice Rehnquist 
Circulated: /74/£;!; 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-357 
MICHIGAN, PETITIONER v. RAYMOND CLIFFORD 
AND EMMA JEAN CLIFFORD 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MICHIGAN 
[December -, 1983] 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting. 
Six Terms ago in Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499 (1978), 
we first addressed the applicability of the Fourth Amend-
ment's Warrant Clause to the activities of fire fighters and 
inspectors following a fire at a warehouse. A divided Court 
held that the fire itself was an "exigent circumstance" which 
allowed entry to extinguish the fire and authorized investiga-
tors to remain for a reasonable time to investigate the cause 
of the blaze. Id., at 509--510. We also held that a "re-en-
try" a few hours after these officials had departed was an "ac-
tual continuation" of the earlier investigation, but that subse-
quent visits more than three weeks after the fire required an 
administrative warrant. Id., at 511. These precepts of Ty-
ler have not proved easy to apply, and we are told in the 
Court's opinion in this case that "we granted certiorari to 
clarify doubt that appears to exist as to the application of our 
decision in Tyler." Ante, at 2. But that same opinion dem-
onstrates beyond peradventure that if that was our purpose, 
we have totally failed to accomplish it; today's opinion, far 
from clarifying the doubtful aspects of Tyler, sows confusion 
broadside. I would hold that the "exigent circumstances" 
doctrine enunciated in Tyler authorized the search of the 
basement of the Clifford home, although the remaining parts 
of the house could not have been searched without the issu-
ance of a warrant issued upon probable cause. 
82-357-DISSENT 
2 MICHIGAN v. CLIFFORD 
I 
Judging simply by comparison of these facts to those in Ty-
ler, I believe that the basement inspection conducted by Lt. 
Beyer about 1:30 p.m. on October 18th-some six hours after 
the fire was extinguished and the fire officials and police had 
left the Clifford premises-was an "actual continuation" of 
the original entry to fight the fire, as that term is used in Ty-
ler. The fire fighters who fought the blaze at the Clifford 
house had removed a can containing Coleman lantern fuel and 
placed it in the driveway of the home, where it was later 
seized and marked as evidence by the inspectors who arrived 
about 1:00 p.m. Thus here, as in Tyler, the investigation 
into the cause of the fire went on contemporaneously with the 
efforts to fight it, before the fire fighters first left the 
premises in the early morning. I see no reason to treat the 
six-hour delay between the departure of the fire fighters and 
the arrival of the investigators in this case any differently 
than the Court treated the five-hour delay between the de-
parture of the investigators at 4:00a.m. from the Tyler ware-
house and their return to the same premises at 9:00a.m. 
The Court seeks to distinguish the two situations on the 
basis of differences which seem to me both trivial and imma-
terial. It says that in that interim in our case, the Cliffords 
"had taken steps to secure their privacy interests that re-
mained in their residence against further intrusion." Ante, 
at 8. While this may go to the question of whether or not 
there was an invasion of a privacy interest amounting to a 
search, it has no bearing on the question of whether there 
were exigent circumstances which constitute an exception to 
the warrant requirement for what is concededly a search. 
The Court also intimates that the "fire fighters" did nothing 
but fight the fire, and that the arson investigation did not be-
gin until the arson investigators arrived at 1:00 in the after-
noon. Ante, at 8-9. But fire fighting and fire investigation 
are obviously not this neatly compartmentalized, as is shown 
by the fact that the fire fighters themselves had removed the 
82-357-DISSENT 
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Coleman lantern fuel can for inspection by the later team of 
arson investigators. 
The Court also purports to distinguish the facts in Tyler by 
the statement that "the privacy interests in the residence-
particularly after the Cliffords had acted-were significantly 
greater than those in the fire-damaged furniture store. . . . " 
Ante, at 9. But if the furniture store in Tyler is to be char-
acterized as "fire damaged," surely the Clifford's residence 
deserves the same characterization; it too was "fire-dam-
aged." It is also well-established that private commercial 
buildings in this context are as much protected by the Fourth 
Amendment as are private dwellings. See See v. City of Se-
attle, 387 U. S. 541, 542-543 (1967) (citing cases). And cer-
tainly the public interest in determining the cause and origin 
of a fire in a commercial establishment applies with equal, if 
not greater, force to the necessity of determining the cause 
and origin of a fire in a home. 
On the authority of Tyler, therefore, I would uphold the 
search of the Clifford basement and allow use of the evidence 
resulting from that search in the arson trial. 
II 
In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967), and 
See v. City of Seattle, 387 tJ. S. 541 (1967), this Court im-
posed a warrant requirement on city housing and fire inspec-
tors requiring them to obtain an administrative search war-
rant prior to entering a building to inspect for possible health 
or fire code violations. To protect the privacy interests of 
building owners from the unbridled discretion of municipal in-
spectors, the Court held that administrative searches had to 
be conducted pursuant to a warrant obtained from an inde-
pendent magistrate. Camara, 387 U. S., at 534. But in 
light of the important public interest in abating public health 
hazards, the relatively limited invasion of privacy inhering in 
administrative searches, and the essentially non-criminal 
focus of the inspection, a different kind of warrant was estab-
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lished, a warrant described by the dissenters in that case as 
"newfangled." See, 387 U. S., at 547 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
Probable cause to issue this kind of warrant did not sound in 
terms of suspicion of criminal activity, but in terms of reason-
able legislative or administrative standards governing the de-
cision to search a particular building. ld., at 538. 
One may concede the correctness of the Camara-See line of 
cases without agreeing that those cases should be applied to a 
post-fire inspection conducted to determine the cause and ori-
gin of a fire. The practice of investigating the cause and ori-
gin of fires has long-standing and widespread acceptance. 
The public interest in conducting a prompt and careful inves-
tigation of the cause and origin of all fires is also undeniably 
strong. An investigation can reveal whether there is a dan-
ger of the fire rekindling and assess the effectiveness of local 
building codes in preventing and limiting the spread of fire. 
It may bring to light facts suggesting the crime of arson. 
Entry is also necessary because the causes of a fire may also 
not be observable from outside a building or by an unin-
formed occupant. See United States v. Green, 474 F. 2d 
1385, 1388-89 (CA5 1973). Certainly these reasons justify a 
search to determine the cause and origin of a fire. 
The concerns regarding administrative searches expressed 
in Camara and See to justify the imposition of a warrant re-
quirement simply do not apply to a post-fire investigation 
conducted within a reasonable time of a fire. Under the 
emergency doctrine, it is beyond dispute that fire fighters 
may enter a building in order to extinguish the flames. 
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1976). In their ef-
forts to control the blaze fire fighters may knock in doors and 
windows, chop holes in roofs and walls, and generally take 
full control of a structure to extinguish a fire. In the after-
math of a fire an individual is unlikely to have much concern 
over the limited intrusion of a fire inspector coming into his 
premises to learn why there had been a fire. Fire victims, 
unlike occupants at ordinary times, generally expect and wel-
82-357-DISSENT 
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come the intrusions of fire, police, and medical officials in the 
period following a fire. Likewise, as here, relative strangers 
such as insurance agents will frequently have authority to 
enter the structure. In these circumstances, the intrusion of 
the fire inspector is hardly a new or substantially different 
intrusion from that which occurred when the fire fighters 
first arrived to extinguish the flames. Instead, it is analo-
gous to intrusions of medical officials and insurance investiga-
tors who may arrive at the scene of the fire shortly after its 
origin. 
Ample justification exists for a state or municipality to au-
thorize a fire inspection program that would permit fire in-
spectors to enter premises to determine the cause and origin 
of the fire. But in no real sense can the investigation of the 
Cliffords' home be considered the result of the unbridled dis-
cretion of the city fire investigators who came to the Clif-
fords' home. 1 No justification existed to inspect the Clif-
fords' home until there was a fire. The fire investigators 
were not authorized to enter the Cliffords' home until the 
happening of some fortuitous or exigent event over which 
they had no control. Thus, if the warrant requirement ex-
ists to prevent individuals from being subjected to an unfet-
tered power of government officials to initiate a search, a 
warrant is simply not required in these circumstances to limit 
the authority of a fire investigator, so long as his authority to 
inspect is contingent upon the happening of an event over 
1 This is made abundantly clear by the Detroit Fire Department's policy 
regulating post-fire investigations. That policy encourages investigators 
to conduct an investigation as promptly as possible. If the property is oc-
cupied or is a place of business trying to conduct business, inspectors are 
instructed to obtain consent or an administrative warrant. If the 
premises are occupied by children, inspectors must obtain consent from an 
adult before entry. To inspect premises secured from trespass, investiga-
tors must obtain consent or an administrative warrant. Only if the owners 
are away and the building open to trespass may fire investigators enter 
without consent or a warrant. Joint Appendix, at 9a, 12a, 19a (testimony 
of Lt. Beyer and Capt. Monroe). 
82-357-DISSENT 
6 MICHIGAN v. CLIFFORD 
which he has no control. 2 
In my view, the utility of requiring a magistrate to evalu-
ate the grounds for a search following a fire is so limited that 
the incidental protection of an individual's privacy interests 
simply does not justify imposing a warrant requirement. 
Here the inspection was conducted within a short time of 
extinguishing of the flames, while the owners were away 
from the premises, and before the premises had been fully se-
cured from trespass. In these circumstances the search of 
the basement to determine the cause and origin of the fire 
was reasonable. 3 
2 The Tyler majority stated that a major function of the warrant re-
quirement was to provide a property owner with sufficient information to 
reassure him of the legality of the entry. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 
499, 508 (1976). The relationship of this informational function and the 
privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment is not clear. Some 
attempt at notice or proper identification should allay any reasonable fears 
that the inspectors are impostors or lack authority to inspect for the origin 
and cause of the fire. 
3 There may be some justification for requiring the inspectors to notify 
the building's owners of the inspection. Where, as here, the owners were 
out of town, it does not appear unreasonable to have conducted the inspec-
tion without prior notice to the owners. Notice simply informs the build-
ing owners that the building will be entered by persons possessing author-
ity to enter the building. Yet the failure to notify the Cliffords prior to 
entry fails to advance in any significant way the purposes of the exclusion-
ary rule. In point of fact, the fire investigators were told the Cliffords 
were unavailable, that they had gone fishing. J.A., at 16a. Thus, in 
these circumstances the failure to notify the Cliffords seems reasonable. 
The Cliffords can also be deemed to have received constructive notice, be-
cause their agents were on the scene, and a neighbor apparently ascer-
tained the legitimacy of the inspectors' visit. 
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This case is here on certor~ to the Court of 
1\ 
Appeals of Michigan. We granted th1s case to consider the 
application of the Fourth Amendment/to searches for the 
cause of fires, particularly where arson is suspected. 
2. 
The Cliffords' private residenc~/was damaged by an 
early morning fire while they were out of the city. 
Firefighters extinguished the blaz~nd departed shortly 
after 7:00a.m.~ Some five hours later, a team of a~so2. in-
vestigators arrived. 
During this 5-hour interval, / the Cliffords - in-
formed of the fire - had instructed thei r insurance agent to 
board up their home. ~ftewgh -rhe investigators were told 
-r~~ 
of these instructions by neighbors 6 they entered the 
"" premises~without either an administrative or a criminal war-
rant, j and conducted an extensive search of the entire house. 
Evidence of arson~nd of intent' to commit arson ylwere 




.The Cliffords, ' charged with arson, (moved to sup-
~ 
press this evidence. Although the trial court denied the 
motion, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed. 
Firefighters, of course, have a duty to extinguish 
a fire, and also to make an immediate determination of its 
cause. If evidence of arson is found by the firefighters/ 
in the course of their duties, this rwrmzt:t.:y.. would be 
admissible. 
In Michigan v. Tyler, decided in 1978, we recog-
nized a distinction between the role of firefighters;(and 
that of arson investigators who normally come in later. 
In Tyler, although the firefighters' investigation 
was interrupted for several hours. We held that their re-
turn - under the facts in that case - was a continuation of 
their original investigation. 
f 
The situation in the present case /differed sub-
stantially. The second warrantless searc~as made by arson 
investigators,jwho first arrived five hours after the 
firefighters had completed their duties and left the scene. 
The fire involved a private residenc~ather than a furni-
1 
ture store. And the owners of the residence~/by arranging 
to have their home boarded up;~had evidenced a continued 
expectation of privacy. 
/ 
. 
ford residence~violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights. Accordingly, we affirm that part of the judg--- - -
ment of the Michigan cour yfthat exc~uded evidence seized 
within the house. Other evidence, Jdiscovered in plain view 
outside of the residence ,jwas ad~~-s~ible, and we reverse the 
judgment as to it. 
My opinion was joined by Justices Brennan, White 
and Marshall. Justice Stevens has filed a concurring opin-
ion, in which he joins the judgment. 
Justice Rehnquist has filed a dissenting opinion 
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RE: Cases Held for Michigan v. Clifford, No. 82-357 
TO: The Conference 
FROM: Justice Powell 
Three cases were held for Michigan v. Clifford, No. 82-
357, and will be discussed at the January 20, 1984 Conference. 
CONNECTICUT v. ZINDROS, No. 82-1800 (Cert. to Supreme Court of 
Connecticut) 
2 
A fire severly damaged a restaurant on February 12, 
1977. At the time of the fire, the building was owned by one 
party, but leased and occupied by another. After the fire, the 
landlord boarded up the building, replaced the door, and kept the 
door locked and the building secure from trespass. The tenant's 
private property (valued at $6750 after the fire) remained within 
the building, he continued to pay rent, had access to the 
building, and stated on several occasions that he intended to 
reopen the restaurant. 
On February 23, 1977, 11 days after the fire, the 
landlord consented to a warrantless search of the premises by 
arson investigators. The search revealed evidence of arson for 
which the tenant was charged. Prior to trial, the tenant 
successfully moved to suppress evidence obtained in the search on 
the ground that the search violated his rights under the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. The TC found that there were no 
exigencies justifying this post-fire search, that the tenant 
retained both subjective and legitimate expectations of privacy, 
and that the landlord could not give valid consent for the 
search. The Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed. 
Under Clifford, I believe that the state court properly 
concluded that the tenant had legitimate expectations of privacy 
in the fire-damaged premises. Although the building here is not 
a private residence, the expectations of privacy exist because of 
3 
the significant efforts to secure the building against trespass, 
and the fact that the tenant continued for eleven days after the 
fire to house valuable private property there. The primary issue 
seems to be whether the landlord's consent was valid. That issue 
is factbound and not certworthy. 
I recommend that the Court deny No. 82-1800. 
4 
CONNECTICUT v. SCHONAGEL, No. 82-2117 (Cert. to Supreme Court of 
Connecticut) 
An early morning fire broke out at a tire dealership on 
September 23, 1977. Because the fire damage was so great, the 
building was ordered demolished. Demolition was completed and 
the debris hauled away on September 26, 1977. At noon that day, 
police learned that arsonists probably set the fire with 
gasoline. They immediately sent officers to search the building 
site for the remains of gasoline cans. These were found and the 
next day samples of dirt and brick were taken. Respondent was 
charged with arson and moved to suppress the evidence as fruit of 
an illegal search. The TC denied the motion and Resp. was 
convicted of arson. On appeal, the Conn. Supreme Court held that 
the evidence should have been suppressed and reversed. The State 
seeks cert. on that issue. 
The Conn. Supreme Court found that the TC had made an 
"implicit finding" that resp retained a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the building's ruins. It then held that because there 
were no exigencies justifying the warrantless search, the search 
was unconstitutiona1. 1 On the facts presented here, I believe 
that there were no legitimate expectations of privacy. At the 
time of the search, the building had been reduced to rubble and 
1Because resp had not contested the expectation of privacy 
finding on appeal, the state supreme court reviewed under a 
plainly erroneous standard. 
< '. 
5 
all its contents were ash and ruin and exposed to public view. 
Society should hardly be expected to respect privacy interests in 
such a situation. 
I recommend that the Court GVR No. 82-2117 in light of 
Clifford. 
ZEISLER v. ILLINOIS, No. 83-5165 (Cert. to Appellate Court of 
Illinois (3d District)) 
' ' ' ' I 
extinguished by 2: 
apartment complex were told that it was safe to re-enter. 
Immediately after the fire was extinguished, the fire marshall 
began a search into its origin. Because he was a novice and 
needed assistance in the investigation, he stopped his search 
until such assistance could be obtained. 2 He left the scene and 
later called for assistance at 6:30 a.m. A State Deputy Fire 
Marshall arrived at noon and the two men drove to the apartment. 
6 
Before they entered, the Deputy Fire Marshall suggested that they 
obtain a warrant. They then drove 16 miles to the State 
Attorney's Office, where they were told that they did not need a 
warrant. They drove back and searched the apartment. Arson was 
not suspected at that time. As soon as the search began to 
disclose evidence of arson, the fire marshalls stopped their 
search and obtained a criminal search warrant. 
On the basis of the evidence found in the two searches, 
petitioner was charged with arson. He moved to suppress the 
evidence on the ground that the first search by the fire 
marshalls was unconstitutional. Because probable cause to obtain 
the criminal search warrant was based on the first search, the 
2The fire occurred in a very small community and the fire 
marshall was only a part-time fireman • 
. , ' 
second search also was unconstitutional. The TC denied the 
motion to suppress, petr was convicted of arson, and the state 
supreme court affirmed. 
7 
There were no exigent circumstances and there was every 
opportunity to obtain an administrative warrant. In any event, 
it may be appropriate to afford the Illinois Court an opportunity 
to review this case in light of Clifford. 
I recommend that we GVR No. 83-5165 in light of 
Clifford. 
DRAFT OPINION (November 9, 1983) ~ / 
Michigan v. Clifford No. 82-357 
POWELL, Associate Justice 
This case presents the question whether, in th 
L 
absence of either exigent circumstances or consent, arson 
7 
• 
investigators must obtain an administrative warrant before 
entering a private residence to investigate the cause of 
ecent fire. 
Court o resolve some 
in Michigan 
u.s. 499 (1978), to official entries 
2 • 
I 
Respondents, Raymond and Emma Jean Clifford, were 
arrested and charged with arson in connection with a fire 
at their private residence. At the preliminary 
examination held to establish probable cause for the 
alleged offense, the State introduced various pieces of 
physical evidence, most of which was obtained through a 
warrantless and nonconsensual search of the Clifford's 
fire-damaged horne. Respondents moved to suppress this 
evidence on the ground that it was obtained in violation 
of their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. That motion was denied and respondents were 
bound over for trial. Before trial, they again moved to 
suppress the evidence obtained during 
3. 
search. The Trial Court conducted an evidentiary hearing 
and denied that motion on the ground that exigent 
L lo~ vJt. .. hd\) circumstances justified The court certified 
its evidentiary ruling for interlocutory appeal and the 
Michigan Court of Appeals reversed. 
That court held that there were no exigent 
circumstances justifying the search. Instead, it found 
that the warrantless entry and search of the Clifford 
residence was conducted pursuant to a policy of the Arson 
Division of the Detroit Fire Department that sanctioned 
such searches as long as the owner was not present, the 
premises were open to trespass, and the search occur red 
within a reasonable time of the fire. The Court of 
Appeals held that this policy was inconsistent with ~r<? 
(tLf~, 




that the warrantless nonconsensual search of the 
Cliffords' residence violated their rights under the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. ---------------------~ 
~ /4 
II 
In the early morning hours of October 18, 1980, a 
fire erupted at the Clifford home. The Cliffords were out 
of town on a camping trip at the time. The fire was 
reported to the Detroit Fire Department, and fire units 
arrived on the scene around 5:42 a.m. The fire was 
extinguished and all fire officials and police left the 
premises at 7:04 a.m. 
At 8:00 a.m. on the morning of the fire, 
Lieutenant Beyer, a fire investigator with the arson 
section of the Detroit Fire Department, received 
5. 
instructions to investigate the Clifford fire. He was 
informed that the Fire Department suspected arson. 
~~ UiMA ~ l-o ~)--<--~ ) 
- ~Lieutenant Beyer d1d not proceed immediately to the 
Clifford residence~ and his partner ~preeeo•ed ey 
~. w::·::: :"a .prisotJe,, ~~:; a mult~;::: · 
~ '-"' - A _ w ~"- - bn cl>, ~ arnvJ" at the ~~ 
. ·. 
~~ 1\ 1\ 
~ 1:00 p.m. on October 18 • 
.-1 
When the arson investigators arrived at the 
Clifford residence, they found a work crew on the scene. 
The crew was boarding up the house and pumping water out 
c::z,. 
of the basement. 0~ o~ tAQ Cl~fora' ~ neighbor y told the 
investigators 
~ . 
that he had AGo~tastQg f6i, . Cl1fford and t~:hatr--
~ ~~#f~~-~~ 
had ..\instructed +H:-6 1\insufance agent to send 
a_ 
~ crew out to secure the house against trespass. The 
j\ 
~ 
neighbor also iRfor~ea eA&m 
1\ 
s 
that ;r: Cliffor~ did not plan 
6. 
~~k1~ 
to return to tb~>•e seeAe that day. While~ waited 
for the water to be pumped out, too imres&..i:'~a'l!ors/1 found a 
~' J.-t,..J-~ 
Coleman fuel can in the driv~QJ A i'+!e-r seized t-Aat car?--
as evidence .U 
By 1:30 p.m., the water had been pumped out of 
the basement and Lieutenant Beyer and his partner) ~ 
g.ple obtaining 
consent or an administrative warrant, 
(~ 
c:' 'I 
j_nvestigato~s entered the Clifford residence and began 
Pjs 
their investigation into the cause of the fire. Their 
search began in the. basement and they quickly discovered 
that the fire had originated beneath the basement 
1The can had been found in the basement by the fire 
officials who had fought the blaze. The firemen removed 
the can and put it by the side door where Lieutenant Beyer 





~ a~son investi~ tected a strong odor 
.-1 
of fuel throughout the basement, and ~ found two more 
Coleman fuel cans beneath the ~airs. As they 
- -,k~ 
dug through the debris b@neaeh the stai H3 1 r.j euten,ant 
1\ 
J-t-<._ ~A--~~ 
BQ¥Qr and his p&u:: tner 1 found a crock pot with attached 
wires leading to an electrical timer that was plugged into 
an outlet a few feet away. The timer was set to turn on 
at approximately 3:45 a.m. and to turn back off at 
approximately 9:00 a.m. It had stopped somewhere between 
r2L.L~~~ 
4:00 and 4:30 a.m. ~~e iRvestigator• seizeg the two 
~~.-..,A~. 




the concerning their search ·~ 
After determining that the fire had originated in 
the basement, Lieutenant Beyer and his partner searched 
the remainder of the house. The warrantless search that 
followed was extensive and thorough. The investigators 
called in a photographer to take pictures throughout the 
house. They searched through drawers and closets and 
found them full of old clothes. They looked through all 
rooms :i..n the b.om:e 
• and noted that there were nails on 
the walls but no pictures. They found wiring and 
cassettes for a selectavision video tape machine but no 
A ~~~-~ 
machine. l[ Respondents moved to excude al~ testimony based 
I ~· on the up~i~~ search. They claim that the entire search 
"' 




search to gather evidence of arson, that it was conducted 
without a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances, and 
that it therefore was per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. Petitioner, on the other hand, 
~fwJ... 
argues that the search was reasonable and should be exempt 
1\ 
from the warrant requirement. 
III 
In its petition for certiorari c;;;;;-~n oral 
argument before this Courl 
~ 
the State -d±d not challenge 
" 
the state court's finding that there were no exigent 
circumstances justifying the search of the Clifford horne. 
Instead, it asks us to exempt from the warrant requirement 
10. 
all administrative investigations into the cause and 
origin of a fire. 
~~f-S" 
In Tyler, we restated our £irm position that 
"\ 
administrative searches generally require warrants. See 
504-508. See Marshall v. Barlows, 436 u.s. ~ ~' 4 3 6 U.S. at r 307 (1978) • Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 
t. ~ .... 
(1967): See v. City of Seattle, 387 u.s. 541 (1967). We 
~ 
reaffirm that !i>Oe-±t-ion again today. Except in certain 
carefully defined classes of cases, the nonconsensual 
entry and search of property protected by the Fourth and 
Fourteenth 
authorized 
Amendments is unreasonable 
by a valid warrant.~ 
unless it has been 
ft:is does end the inquiry. The 
constitutionality nonconsensual en~ 
onto fire-damaged turns on several factors. The 
.. 
11. 
first is whether there are any legitimate privacy 
~ interests in the fire-damaged 
) 
p rope r t y ....-------=i:;J:~FI'-;:;vt:iJ)~,_JTf.,-h_e___.;?~ ? 
., 
) prap~t, ~no~~;~a ~ the Fourth Amendment.froffi anyl_ 
( qover mttent trn:ras io-r?."- The second is whether exigent 
circumstances justify the government intrusion regardless 
~
of ~.n:y lil~i:~im~e expectations of privacy. The third is 
1\ 
whether the object of the search is to determine the cause 
of the fire or to gather 
~ 
We observed in 
~~ ~t~r e~ts may remain in 
'\ 
evidence of criminal activity. 
Tyler 
~
that le~itiffiate privacy 
1\ 
fire-damaged premises. "People 
may go on living in their homes or working in their 
offices after a fire. Even when that is impossible, 
private effects often remain on the fire-damaged 
premises." Tyler, 436 u.s. at 505 
o~ ~Nz.a.gy in fire-damaged property wi 11 vary with the 
b 
~~. 'r • 
12. 
~ ~Ju_ rf ~~ ;~ 
amount of damage, the prior and continued use of the 
_f.. 
~~~ 
premises, and the owner 1 s efforts to secure it against 
-1 
intruders. Some fires may be so devastating that no 
~
~giti~.te privacy interests remain in the ash and ruins, 
regardless of the owner 1 s subjective expectations. The 
~'-f._;> 
test of -3:e'!Ji:tiJHatQ priuacy iRt9rests i"(an objective one: 
~ L-v 
~~society~epared to respect and protect those interests 
~~he particular circumstances in which they arise~See 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., 
~
concurring). If ],.e~itimate privacy interests remain in 
the fire-damaged property, the warrant requirement 
applies, and any official entry onto ~t prep~rt¥ must be 
made pursuant to a warrant, consent, or exigent 
circumstances. 
that justifies a warrantless entry by fire officials to 
fight the blaze. Moreover, in Tyler we held that once in 
the building, officials need no warrant to remain for "a 
reasonable time to investigate the cause of the blaze 
after it has been extinguised." 436 u.s. at 510 He\~e·;,er~ 
Wt l~~~ 
ere J{ l-e~iti~a-te expectations of privacy remain in the 
fire-damaged property, additional investigations begun 
after the fire has been extinguished and fire and police 
officials have left the scene generally must be made 
pursuant to a warrant or the identification of some new 
exigency. 
Determining the cause and origin of a fire serves 
a compelling public interest to ensure against future fire 
hazard. The aftermath of a fire often presents exigencies 
' ~~oro .... 
'. 
14. 
that will not tolerate the delay necessary to obtain ar 
admi~ve warrant or to secure the owner's consent to 
inspect fire-damaged premises. In such cases, the warrant 
~ 
requirement ~1 not apply. 2 
-If there are no exigent 
nonconsensual search of . the property must be 
L~ ~ OL~~~ ~~~~ J~--:o/~---=:...---~ 
toA~ warrant. If the object ef th~ seare~is to determine 
the cause and origin of a recent fire, an administrative 
warrant must be obtained. To obtain such a warrant, fire 
officials need show only that a fire of undetermined 
origin has occurred on the premises, that the scope of the 
2For example, an immediate threat that the blaze might 
rekindle presents an exigency that would justify a 
warrantless and nonconsensual post-fire investigation. 
Similarly, a post-fire search made to prevent the imminent 
destruction of evidence might be exempt from the warrant 
requirement. 
15. 
proposed search is reasonable and will not intrude 
unnecessarily on the fire victim's privacy, and that the 
search will be executed at a reasonable and convenient 
time. ~}rf the object of the search is to gather evidence 
of criminal activity, a warrant may be obtained only on a 
showing of probable cause to believe that oriiftinal SL_ 
'd ~b) . ev1 ence t\ w1ll e found 1n the place to be searched. If 
evidence of criminal activity is discovered during the 
course of a valid administrative search, it may be seized 
under the "plain view• doctrine~dence then may 
be used to establish probable cause to obtain a criminal 
search warrant. 
('1 ~-~. 
H~ -tire officials may not rely on 
"t 
this evidence to expand the scope of their administrative 
search without first making a successful showing of 
probable cause to an independent judicial officer. 
16. 
The object of the search is important even if 
exigent circumstances exist. E~i~ent ~ rcumstances that 
justify a warrantless search for the cause of a fire may 
not justify a search to gather evidence of criminal 
activity once that cause has been determined. If, for 
example, the administrative search is ~ustified by the 
immediat~- need to ensure against rekindling, the scope of 
.... 
~
the search may be no broader than necessary to achieve its 
A 
~ 
end , anoe ffttHii-~--~ -em::~ ~~ ~nd i!t ael:li~wQd-;- ARY search 
-1 
to gather evidence of criminal activity not in plain view 
~ 
must be made pursuant to a criminal warrant ~ a 
'1 
traditional showing of probable cause. J Applying these / 
{ 
( hree factors to the facts of this case, we must determine \ 





The Clifford home was a two-and-a-half story brick 
and frame residence. Although there was extensive damage 
~ 
to the interior structure, the exterior of the house ~ 
largely undamaged by the fire. The firemen had 
broken out one of the doors and most of the windows in 
fighting the blaze. At the time Lieutenant Beyer and his 
partner arrived, the c~z~~ home was uninhabitable. 
_l5u..,-f 
t'Re -Gl: Hforee-' personal belongings remained) ~ 1\. . 
~, and~ Clifford had arranged to have the house 
secured against intrusion in his absence. Under these 
18. 
circumstances, and in light of the especially strong 
a_ 
expectations of privacy connected with ~ home, we hold 
1\ 
~a-bk 
that the Cliffords retained l9gitiJRate privacy interests 
~ 
in their fire-damaged residence and that 4l,Qy post-fire 
investigations were subject to the warrant requirement. 
Thus, the warrantless and 
~r.~ 
nonconsensual search~ ofA the 
~ 
~ basement and tRe ~r~R ef the upstairs r.QgioRs 
~ 
of the house ~ valid only if exigent circumstances 
/\ 
justified the object and the scope of each. 
is not entirely clear whether the post-fire 
basement was an administrative 
.• 
19. 
search to determine the cause of the fire or a search to 
gather evidence of arson. Respondents contend that the 
firefighters had made a preliminary investigation into the 
cause and origin of the fire, that they had determined 
that it had begun in the basement, and that they had 
identified its cause as probable arson. They argue that 
the sole purpose of Lieutenant Beyer's subsequent search 
was to gather evidence of the suspected arson. At oral 
argument, the State conceded that the firefighters had 
made a preliminary investigation and had determined that 
the fire had begun in the basement and that arson was 
~
likely. Its position seems to be that the 
4
investigation 
~ ~ ~ a+kw-H...t-~h~ ~~ 
c'h-.5lkR<)eo btS~ was undertaken for a dual purpose - to 
"' 
determine the cause of the fire and to seize evidence of 
a..-1- ~~~- ~) ~ 





the warrant requirement. The Sta~~ -has eet:~cQde.il that tl::la 
~l"leORBelisaa:l search of the basement was not made pursuant 
to either an administrative or a criminal warrant, and it 
~~~t .~t ~ . t-'f . t-h h 
~re 110 ex1gen c1rcums ances JUS,YlR9'i &tBa:tc • 
~ . . 
J P.M .. -
-'flia~ ~ hold that the warrantless entry and search of the 
1 A 
basement of the Clifford residence 
~ 
updqr the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 3 
In Tyler we upheld a warrantless post-fire search 
of a furniture store, despite the absence of exigent 
3The search was made pursuant to a policy of the Arson 
Divison that allowed nonconsensual warrantless entries 
onto fire-damaged premises as long as they were made 
within a reasonable time after the fire, the owner was not 
present, and . the premises were open to trespass. This 
policy did not attempt to identify exigent circumstances, 
but focused more on the question whether there were 
legitimate expectations of privacy in the premises. As 
applied here, the polic. _ 
~ consistent with o r ~ interpretations 
'0 Fourth Amendment. ,-6 
the scene to begin their search six hours after the 
firefighters had extinguished the fire and left the scene. 
· 7@-
~ 
In the interim, the Cliffords had taken effor~s to secure 
the privacy interests that remained in their private 
~~esidence . against further 





from that made J to 
distinguish? this se..arch ....__"' 
Uf3Aeld i:-A +¥~ At least where a homeowner has taken 
significant steps to secure his fire-damaged horne after 
the blaze has been extinguished and the fire and police 
units have left the scene, we hold that a post-fire search 
must be conducted pursuant to a warrant, consent, or the 
So .L.vn-t ~ ~ 
identification of some new exigency. 4/~
A~~~~ 
~ ~ ~ ~ 1f-cAu-, 
A--. 4"2 dt-c. .. -L~~ 
~~
Footnote(s) 4 will appear on following pag~s. 7 
B. »Wst~s Se~h 
(1.7~~ 
23. 
After they had located the origin of the fire and 
/ 
etermined its cause, the arson investi ~rs undertook an 
search of the of the house. They 
rummaged in pictures throughout 
the house, the pictures on the wall, the 
in the rooms, and the tapes and 
in the cabinets. 
l ~~~~~~~ ~I 




11..£ ~4+U. i'f He.-. ~ e 4;~~· 
evidence of the crime of arson. A Absent exigent 
4This is not to suggest that individual expectations of 
privacy may prevail over interests of public safety. For 
example, when fire breaks out in an apartment unit of an 
apartment complex, the exigency exception may allow 
warrantless post-fire investigations where necessary to 
ensure against an immediate fire hazard. 
24. 
circumstances, such a search requires a criminal warrant , 
Even if 
~-ditta~ 
the 1\ basement search had been a valid 
administrative search, it would not have justified the 
upstairs search. As soon as the investigators determined 
that the fire had originated in the basement and had been 
.f)~ caused by the crock pot and timer found beneath the 
v~~ basement stairs, the scope of their search was limited to 
the basement area. Although the investigators could have 
used whatever evidence they discovered in the basement to 
establish probable cause to search the remainder of the 
house, . they could not~r~earch without a 
prior judicial determination that a successful showing of 
probable cause had been made. Because there were no 
exigent circumstances justifying the upstairs search, and 
25. 
it was without a prior showing of probable 
cause before an independent judicial officer, we hold that 
unreasonable under the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, regardless of the validity of the 
~ Ft-N'~ 
basement search. L 
The warrantless intrusion into the upstairs 
regions of the Clifford house presents a telling 
illustration of the importance of prior judicial review of 
proposed administrative searches. An administrative 
search into the cause of a recent fire does not give fire 
officials licence to roam freely through the fire victim's 
private residence. If an administrative warrant had been 
obtained in this case, it presumably would have limited 
the scope of the proposed investigation and would have 
t .,'11' 
26. 
prevented the warrantless intrusion into the upper rooms 
of the Clifford horne. 
v 
J( 
The onx pieces of physical evidence that have 
been challenged on this interlocutory appeal are the three 
empty fuel cans, the electric crock pot, and a timer and 
attached cord. Respondents also have challenged the 
testimony of the investigators concerning the warrantless 
search of both the basement and the upstairs portions of 
the Clifford horne. Two of the fuel cans, the crock pot, 
the timer and cord, and the investigators' testimony were 
discovered as a result of the unconstitutional post-fire 
search of the Clifford's residence. Thus, we affirm that 
27. 
portion of the judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals 
that excluded that evidence. One of the fuel cans was 
discovered in plain view in the Cliffords' driveway. 
Seizure of this evidence was proper. To the extent that 
the Michigan Court of Appeals excluded that evidence, we 
reverse. 
'• 
lfp/ss 11/12/83 Rider A, p. 1 (Clifford) 
CLIFFl SALLY-POW 
This case presents questions as to the authority 
of arson investigators, in the absence of either exigent 
circumstances or consent, to enter a private residence 
without a warrant to investigate the cause of a recent 
fire. 
lfp/ss 11/12/83 Rider ~ , Page 4 (Clifford) 
CLIFF4 SALLY-POW 
We granted certiorari to clarify doubt that appears to 
exist as to the application of our decision in Tyler. 
" } r. •' 
lfp/ss 11/12/83 Rider A, p. 16 (Clifford) 
CLIFF16 SALLY-POW 
The searches of the Clifford home, at least 
arguably, can be viewed as two separate ones: the delayed 
~~ . 
search of the basement area, acg tQePQafter the extens1ve 
/1 
search of the residential portion of the house. We now 
apply the principles outlined above to each of these 
searches. 
21. 
circumstances, on the grounds that it was a continuation 
of a valid search begun immediately after the fire. As 
the State conceded at oral argument, this case is 
\ \-\ ~ (.,..-\--~ fk~ j 
distinguishable ·1 In Tyler, fire officials began their 
investigation into the cause of the fire as the last 
flames were being doused. That investigation was 
interrupted by smoke and darkness, but was completed as 
soon as the smoke had cleared and daylight had dawned. 
Because the immediate post-fire search was interrupted for 
~ ~~ ~~ 4!4"fh4d 
only a shor ~ period of time, a-Ad the owoQr Rae made -AG.. ) "-.J <.. 
~ 1 )';~f~t~ t<> """"'"e !tis pr tvacy i~• iA ~ ~ 
~ ~ held that the early morning search was merely a 
~ continuation of the valid sear;:egun earlier. r-y; ·IJ-
~ ~; tbe me here~ ~r v-~8 ~~~ ~ 
wfo v-<-~~ ~ . .Ju- ~yr · .u4'wr ~,. ) 
~w- ~ ~J: r y J r'vrf~ ~ ~ 
~,yt:~ ~.r>-.~.~~./ ,J~\~~k~~0C11/ Y.) 
_prw W u ~ ~ ~ ;.;x ~· ~ ~~ rJf cK 
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DRAFT OPINION (November 14, 1983) 
Michigan v. Clifford No. 82-357 
I ' ' 




2,'-l- z 7, ;- r 
This case presents questions as to the authority 
of arson investigators, in the absence of either exigent 
circumstances or consent, to enter a private residence 
without a warrant to investigate the cause of a recent 
fire. 
I 
Respondents, Raymond and Emma Jean Clifford, were 
arrested and charged with arson in connection with a fire 
2. 
at their private residence. At the preliminary 
examination held to establish probable cause for the 
alleged offense, the State introduced various pieces of 
physical evidence, most of which was obtained through a 
warrantless and nonconsensual search of the Clifford's 
fire-damaged home. Respondents moved to suppress this 
evidence on the ground that it was obtained in violation 
of their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. That motion was denied and respondents were 
bound over for trial. Before trial, they again moved to 
suppress the evidence obtained during the search. The 
Trial Court conducted an evidentiary hearing and denied 
that motion on the ground that exigent circumstances 
justified the search. The court certified its evidentiary 
., ~ ~ ' 
3. 
ruling for interlocutory appeal and the Michigan Court of 
Appeals reversed. 
That court held that there were no exigent 
circumstances justifying the search. Instead, it found 
that the warrantless entry and search of the Clifford 
residence was conducted pursuant to a policy of the Arson 
Division of the Detroit Fire Department that sanctioned 
such searches as long as the owner was not present, the 
premises were open to trespass, and the search occurred 
within a reasonable time of the fire. The Court of 
Appeals held that this policy was inconsistent with 
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 u.s. 499 (1978), and that the 
warrantless nonconsensual search of the Cliffords' 
residence violated their rights under the Fourth and 
[Fourteenth Amendments. We granted certiorari to clarify 
4. 
doubt that appears to exist as to the application of our 
decision in Tyler. 
II 
In the early morning hours of October 18, 1980, a 
fire erupted at the Clifford home. The Cliffords were out 
of town on a camping trip at the time. The fire was 
reported to the Detroit Fire Department, and fire units 
arrived on the scene around 5:42 a.m. The fire was 
extinguished and all fire officials and police left the 
premises at 7:04 a.m. 
At 8:00 a.m. on the morning of the fire, 
Lieutenant Beyer, a fire investigator with the arson 
section of the Detroit Fire Department, received 
instruct ions to investigate the Clifford fire. He was 
5. 
informed that the Fire Department suspected arson. 
Because he had other assignments, Lieutenant Beyer did not 
proceed immediately to the Clifford residence. He and his 
partner finally arrived at the scene of the fire about 
1:00 p.m. on October 18. 
When they arrived, they found a work crew on the 
scene. The crew was boarding up the house and pumping 
~~/.1.0<'~~ 
j water out of the basement. A neighbor told the 
investigators that he had called Clifford and had been 
instructed to ~e Clifford insurance agent to send 
1\ 
a boarding crew out to secure the house. The neighbor 
also advised that the Cliffords did not plan to return 
that day. While the investigators waited for the water to 
be pumped out, they found a Coleman fuel can in the 
driveway that was seized and marked as evidence. 1 
Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages. 
' . . 
6. 
By 1:30 p.m., the water had been pumped out of 
the basement and Lieutenant Beyer and his partner, without 
obtaining consent or an administrative warrant, entered 
the Clifford residence and began their investigation into 
the cause of the fire. Their search began in the basement 
and they quickly discovered that the fire had originated 
beneath the basement stairway. They detected a strong 
odor of fuel throughout the basement, and found two more 
Coleman fuel cans beneath the stairway. As they dug 
through the debris, the investigators also found a crock 
pot with attached wires leading to an electrical timer 
that was plugged into an outlet a few feet away. The 
1The can had been found in the basement by the fire 
officials who had fought the blaze. The firemen removed 
the can and put it by the side door where Lieutenant Beyer 
discovered it on his arrival. 
7. 
timer was set to turn on at approximately 3:45 a.m. and to 
turn back off at approximately 9:00 a.m. It had stopped 
somewhere between 4:00 and 4:30 a.m. All of this evidence 
was seized and marked. 
After determining that the fire had originated in 
the basement, Lieutenant Beyer and his partner searched 
the remainder of the house. The warrantless search that 
followed was extensive and thorough. The investigators 
called in a photographer to take pictures throughout the 
house. They searched through drawers and closets and 
found them full of old clothes. They inspected the rooms 
and noted that there were nails on the walls but no 
pictures. They found wiring and cassettes for a 




Respondents moved to excude all exhibits and 
testimony based on the basement and upstairs searches on 
the ground that they were searches to gather evidence of 
arson, that they were conducted without a warrant, 
consent, or exigent circumstances, and that they therefore 
were per se unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that 
the entire search was reasonable and should be exempt from 
the warrant requirement. 
III 
In its petition for certiorari, the State does 
not challenge the state court's finding that there were no 
exigent circumstances justifying the search of the 
{' ' ' ' 
't 
9. 
Clifford horne. Instead, it asks us to exempt from the 
warrant requirement all administrative investigations into 
the cause and origin of a fire. We decline to do so. 
In Tyler, we restated the Court's position that 
administrative searches generally require warrants. 436 
U.S. at 504-508. See Marshall v. Barlows, 436 u.s. 307 
(1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 u.s. 523 (1967); 
See v. City of Seattle, 387 u.s. 541 (1967). We reaffirm 
that view again today. Except in certain carefully 
defined classes of cases, the nonconsensual entry and 
search of property protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments is unreasonable unless it has been authorized 
by a valid warrant. 2 
2The Court has recognized the legality of warrantless 
administrative searches in certain carefully ee£iued y 
Footnote continued on next page. 
(,~~~ 





This does not, however, end the inquiry. The 
constitutionality of warrantless and nonconsensual entries 
onto fire-damaged premi~n several factors: 
1\ 
whether there are legitimate privacy 
interests in the fire-damaged property that are protected 
by the Fourth Amendment ) T~ whether exigent 
circumstances justify the government intrusion regardless 
~ 
of any reasonable expectations of privacy j .!:Phe thir~ i~ 
1\ 
whether the object of the search is to determine the cause 
of the fire or to gather evidence of criminal activity. 
circumstances. See, e.g., Donovon v. Dewey, 452 u.s. 594 
(1981) (heavily regul~ted business): United States v. 
Biswell, 406 u.s. 311 (1972) (same): Colonnade v. United 
States, 397 u.s. 72 (1970) (same). The exceptions to the 
administrative warrant recognized in these cases are not 
applicable to the warrantless search in this case. 
11. 
A. 
We observed in Tyler that reasonable privacy 
expectations may remain in fire-damaged premises. "People 
may go on living in their homes or working in their 
offices after a fire. Even when that is impossible, 
private effects often remain on the fire-damaged 
premises." Tyler, 436 u.s. at 505 Privacy expectations 
will vary with the type of property, the amount of fire 
damage, the prior and continued use of the premises, and 
in some cases the owner 1 s efforts to secure it against 
intruders. Some fires may be so devastating that no 
reasonable privacy interests remain in the ash and ruins, 
regardless of the owner 1 s subjective expectations. The 
test essentially is an objective one: whether "the 
12. 
expectation [is] one that society is prepared to recognize 
as 'reasonable.'" Katz v. United States, 389 u.s. 347, 
361 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Smith v. Maryland, 
442 u.s. 735, 739-41 (1979). If reasonable privacy 
interests remain in the fire-damaged property, the warrant 
requirement applies, and any official entry must be made 
pursuant to a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances. 
B. 
A burning building -of course creates an exigency 
that justifies a warrantless entry by fire officials to 
fight the blaze. Moreover, in Tyler we held that once in 
' _j 
the building, officials need no warrant to remain for "a 
reasonable time to investigate the cause of the blaze 
... ~ .. 
. ,·· ... ~, .. 
13. 
after it has been extinguised." 436 U.S. at 510 Where, 
however, reasonable expectations of privacy remain in the 
fire-damaged property, additional investigations begun 
after the fire has been extinguished and fire and police 
officials have left the scene) generally must be made 
pursuant to a warrant or the identification of some new 
exigency. 
The aftermath of a fire often presents exigencies 
that will not tolerate the delay necessary to obtain a 
warrant or to secure the owner's consent to inspect fire-
damaged premises.3 Because determining the cause and 
3For example, an immediate threat that the blaze might 
rekindle presents an exigency that would justify a 
warrantless and nonconsensual post-fire investigation. 
Similarly, a post-fire search made to prevent the imminent 




origin of a fire serves a compelling public interest, the 
warrant requirement does not apply in such cases. 
c. 
If a warrant is necessary, the object of the 
search determines the type of warrant required. If the 
.r object is to determine the cause and origin of a recent 
vpJ 
~· 7 
fire, an administrative warrant will suffice. To obtain 
such a warrant, fire officials need show only that a fire 
of undetermined origin has occurred on the premises, that 
the scope of the proposed search is reasonable and will 
not intrude unnecessarily on the fire victim's privacy, 







If the~ject of the search is to gather evidence 
of criminal activity, a warrant may be obtained only on a 
showing of probable cause to believe that criminal 
evidence will be found in the place to be searched. If 
evidence of criminal activity is discovered during the 
course of a valid administrative search, it may be seized 
under the "plain view" doctrine. Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 u.s. 443, 465-66 (1971) This evidence then 
may be used to establish probable cause to obtain a 
criminal search warrant. Fire officials may not, however, 
rely on this evidence to expand the scope of their 
administrative search without first making a successful 
showing of probable cause to an independent judicial 
officer. 
16. 
The object of the search is important even if 
exigent circumstances exist. Circumstances that justify a 
warrantless search for the cause of a fire may not justify 
a search to gather evidence of criminal activity once that 
cause has been determined. If, for example, the 
administrative search is justified by the immediate need 
to ensure against rekindling, the scope of the search may 
be no broader than reasonably necessary to achieve its 
end. A search to gather evidence of criminal activity not 
in plain view must be made pursuant to a criminal warrant 
upon a traditional showing of probable cause. ~ 
The searches of the Clifford horne, at least 
arguably, can be viewed as two separate ones: the delayed 
search of the basement area, followed by the extensive 
search of the residential portion of the house. We now 
17. 
apply the principles outlined above to each of these 
searches. 
IV 
The Clifford home was a two-and-a-half story brick 
and frame residence. Although there was extensive damage 
~ 
to the interior s ure, the exterior of the house was ~ 
.1'1 ~r--- ·~ w c<..A u~ .• ~ .. ~ 
by the firel The firemen had broken out~ 
one of the doors and most of the windows in fighting the 
blaze. At the time Lieutenant Beyer and his partner 
arrived, the home was uninhabitable. But personal 
belongings remained, and Clifford had arranged to have 
the house secured against intrusion in his absence. Under 
these circumstances, and in light of the especially strong 
18. 
expectations of privacy connected with a home, we hold 
that the Cliffords retained reasonable privacy interests 
in their fire-damaged residence and that the post-fire 
investigations were subject to the warrant requirement. 
Thus, the war rant less and nonconsensual searches of both 
the basement and the upstairs areas of the house were 
valid only if exigent circumstances justified the object 
and the scope of each. 
A. 
It is not entirely clear whether the post-fire 
search of the basement was an administrative search to 
determine the cause of the fire or a search to gather 




firefighters had made a preliminary investigation into the 
cause and origin of the fire, that they had determined 
J-
~A. had begun in the basement, and that they had 
identified its cause as probable arson. They argue that 
the sole purpose of Lieutenant Beyer's subsequent search 
was to gather evidence of the suspected arson. At oral 
argument, the State conceded that the firefighters had 
made a preliminary investigation and had determined that 
arson was likely. Its position seems to be that the 
basement investigation some six hours after the 
firefighters had departed was undertaken for a dual 
purpose - to determine the cause of the fire and to seize 
evidence of arson. Whatever its object at that time, this 
search was subject to the warrant requirement. As noted 
above, the search of the basement was not made pursuant to 
20. 
either an administrative or a criminal warrant, and it was 
not justified by exigent circumstances. We therefore hold 
that the 1:00 p.m. war rant less entry and search of the 
basement of the Clifford residence did not comport with 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 4 
In Tyler we upheld a warrantless post-fire search 
of a furniture store, despite the absence of exigent 
circumstances, on the ground that it was a continuation of 
a valid search begun immediately after the fire. As the 
State conceded at oral argument, this case is 
4The search was made pursuant to a policy of the Arson 
Divison that allowed nonconsensual warrantless entries 
onto fire-damaged premises as long as they were made 
within a reasonable time after the fire, the owner was not 
present, and the premises were open to trespass. This 
policy did not attempt to identify exigent circumstances, 
but focused more on the question whether there were 
reasonable expectations of privacy in the premises. As 
applied here, the policy is not consistent with our 
interpretations of the Fourth Amendment. 
21. 
distinguishable. In Tyler, fire officials began their 
investigation into the cause of the fire as the last 
flames were being doused. That investigation was 
interrupted by smoke and darkness, but was completed ~ 
~~he~~ had cleared and daylight had dawned. 
1\ 
Because the immediate post-fire search was interrupted for 
only a short period of time, and for reasons that were 
evident, we held that the early morning search was "no 
more than an actual continuation of the first, and the 
lack of a warrant thus did not invalidate the resulting 
seizure of evidence." 436 u.s. at 511 This case is 
distinguishable for several reasons. 
First, the challenged search was not a 
continuation of an earlier search. Lieutenant Beyer and 




investigation six hours after the firefighters had 
extinguished the fire and left the scene. In the interim, 
the Cliffords had taken steps to secure the privacy 
interests that remained in their private residence against 
further intrusion. These efforts separate the entry made 
to extinguish the blaze from that made later to 
investigate its origin. Second, the privacy interests in 
the Clifford residence were greater than those in the 
fire-damaged furniture store. Even apart from Clifford's 
post-fire efforts to secure his home, the reasonableness 
of the six hour delay in beginning the post-fire search is 
more questionable than the reasonableness of the five hour 
interruption of the search upheld in Tyler.5 These facts 





the two separate entries and the heightened privacy 
interests in the home - distinguish this case from Tyler. 
At least where a homeowner has taken significant steps to 
secure his fire-damaged home after the blaze has been 
extinguished and the fire and police units have left the 
scene, we hold that a post-fire search must be conducted 
pursuant to a warrant, consent, or the identification of 
some new .exigency. 6 So long as the primary purpose is to 
building involved. At one end of the spectrum is the 
private residence, where reasonable expectations will be 
particularly strong and where government intrusion should 
be kept to a minimum. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 
U.S. 537, 589-90 (1980); United States v. United States 
District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). At the other 
end of the spectrum are commercial structures, such as 
commercial warehouses, that are unlikely to contain much 
that is personal or private. A post-fire search that 
covers a five hour span may be reasonable in the latter 
but not in the former. Other considerations affecting the 
reasonableness of a post-fire search in a particular type 
of building 1\irf"e the scope of the search, the time of day 
it is performed, the lapse of time between fire and 
search, the extent of the fire damage, and the owner's 
efforts to secure the building against intrusion. 
Footnote(s) 6 will appear on following pages. 
24. 




Because the cause of the fire was known, the 
J\ 
search of the upper portions of the house, described 
above, could only have been a search to gather evidence of 
the crime of arson. Absent exigent circumstances, such a 
search requires a criminal warrant. 
Even if the mid-day basement search had been a 
6This is not to suggest that individual expectations of 
privacy may prevail over interests of public safety. For 
example, when fire breaks out in an apartment unit of an 
apartment complex, the exigency exception may allow 
warrantless post-fire investigations where necessary to 
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valid administrative search, it would not have justified 
the upstairs search. As soon as the investigators 
determined that the fire had originated in the basement 
and had been caused by the crock pot and timer found 
beneath the basement stairs, the scope of their search was 
limited to the basement area. Although the investigators --
~ .> 
could have used whatever evidence they discovered in the 
basement to establish probable cause to search the 
remainder of the house, they could not lawfully undertake 
that search without a prior judicial determination that a 
successful showing of probable cause had been made. 
Because there were no exigent circumstances justifying the 
upstairs search, and it was undertaken without a prior 
showing of probable cause before an independent judicial 
officer, we hold that this search of a home was 
i', , l 
26. 
unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
regardless of the validity of the basement search. 7 
The warrantless intrusion into the upstairs 
regions of the Clifford house presents a telling 
illustration of the importance of prior judicial review of 
proposed administrative searches. An administrative 
search into the cause of a recent fire does not give fire 
officials licence to roam freely through the fire victim's 
7 In many cases, there will be no bright line separating 
the firefighters' investigation into the cause of a fire 
from a search for evidence of arson. The distinction will 
vary with the circumstances of the particular fire and 
generally will involve more than the lapse of time or the 
number of entries and re-entries. For example, once the 
cause of a fire in a single-family dwelling is determined, 
the adminsitrative search should end and any broader 
investigation should be made pursuant to a criminal 
warrant. A fire in an apartment complex, on the other 
hand, presents complexities that may make it necessary for 
officials to conduct more expansive searches, to remain on 
the premises for longer periods of time, and to make 
repeated entries and re-entries into the building. See 
Tyler, 436 U.S. at 510 n.6. Considerable latitude must be 
given to the compelling state interest in thorough 
investigations into the causes of recent fires. 
27. 
private residence. If an administrative warrant had been 
obtained in this case, it presumably would have 1 imi ted 
the scope of the proposed investigation and would have 
prevented the warrantless intrusion into the upper rooms 
of the Clifford home. 
v 
The only pieces of physical evidence that have 
been challenged on this interlocutory appeal are the three 
empty fuel cans, the electric crock pot, and a timer and 
attached cord. Respondents also have challenged the 
testimony of the investigators concerning the warrantless 
search of both the basement and the upstairs portions of 
lZ..L~~ · 
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the timer and cord, a-nd/\ the investigators ~ testimony A were 
~·Att- J4.-<_ ~~.ae n o't?''-
J\ r segv-ered eS .....a reH~l \,.=A f ~Re unconstitutional post-fire 
~arch of the Clifford's residence. Thus, we affirm that 
portion of the judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals 
that excluded that evidence. One of the fuel cans was 
discovered in plain view in the Cliffords' driveway. 
Seizure of this evidence was proper. To the extent that 
the Michigan Court of Appeals excluded that evidence, we 
reverse. 
It is so ordered. 
' ~ ·• 
lfp/ss 11/15/83 Rider A, p. 16 (Clifford) 
CLIFFN SALLY-POW 
Cammie: I think it desirable at some appropriate place 
(possibly keyed to the last sentence in the first full 
paragraph on p. 16) , to add a note along the following 
lines: 
The plain-view doctrine must be applied in light 
of the special circumstances that frequently accompany 
fire damage. In searching solely to ascertain the cause, 
firemen customarily must remove rubble or search other 
areas where the cause of fires are likely to be found. At 
the outset of such activities the evidence may not be, and 
often is not, in "plain view" in the literal sense of that 
Term. 
,. 
lfp/ss 11/15/83 Rider A, p. 12 (Clifford) 
CLIFF12 SALLY-POW 
Consider adding a footnote along the following lines: 
We do not suggest that firemen fighting a fire 
normally remain within a building. The circumstances, of 
course, vary. In many situations actual entry may be too 
hazardous until the fire has been wholly extinguished, and 
even then the danger of collapsing walls may exist. Thus, 
the effort to ascertain the cause of a fire may extend 
over a period of time with entry and reentry. The 
critical inquiry object of the search 
primarily is to use whatever it may be, 
rather criminal conviction. 
Potential Footnote 
[The dissent argues that the 6 inches of water in the 
basement hindered the post-fire investigation to the same extent 
as did the smoke and darkness in Tyler and that the cases 
therefore are indistinguishable. We disagree.] In Tyler, the 
search began pursuant to the intial entry to fight the fire and 
was completed within a reasonable time after the fire was 
extinguished. Because the interruption in the search was not 
sufficient to separate the two entries, it fell within the 
excigency created by the blaze itself. In this case, there is no 
evidence that the basement water interrupted any post-fire 
search. The fact that the 6 inches of water in the basement may 
have prevented an immediate post-fire search if one had been 
attempted is not determinative here. The fact still remains that 
between the time the blaze was extinguished and the investigators 
finally entered to make their investigation, Clifford had taken 
significant steps to secure his private residence. These 
'·Ji ., 
intervening circumstances were sufficient to manifest his 
subjective expectations of privacy. Because the property was a 
horne, these expectations also were reasonable under any objective 
test, and therefore were protected under the Fourth Amendment. 
• "·:'_\-II. 
DRAFT OPINION (November 14, 1983) 
Michigan v. Clifford No. 82-357 
POWELL, Associate Justice 
This case presents questions as to the authority 
of arson investigators, in the absence of either exigent 
circumstances or consent, to enter a private residence 
without a warrant to investigate the cause of a recent 
fire. 
I 
Respondents, Raymond and Emma Jean Clifford, were 
arrested and charged with arson in connection with a fire 
~-
2. 
at their private residence. At the preliminary 
examination held to establish probable cause for the 
alleged offense, the State introduced various pieces of 
physical evidence, most of which was obtained through a 
warrantless and nonconsensual search of the Clifford's 
fire-damaged horne. Respondents moved to suppress this 
evidence on the ground that it was obtained in violation 
of their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. That motion was denied and respondents were 
bound over for trial. Before trial, they again moved to 
suppress the evidence obtained during the search. The 
Trial Court conducted an evidentiary hearing and denied 
that motion on the ground that exigent circumstances 
justified the search. The court certified its evidentiary 
( 
3. 
ruling for interlocutory appeal and the Michigan Court of 
Appeals reversed. 
That court held that there were no exigent 
circumstances justifying the search. Instead, it found 
that the warrantless entry and search of the Clifford 
residence was conducted pursuant to a policy of the Arson 
Division of the Detroit Fire Department that sanctioned 
such searches as long as the owner was not present, the 
premises were open to trespass, and the search occur red 
within a reasonable time of the fire. The Court of 
Appeals held that this policy was inconsistent with 
M i c h i g an v • Ty 1 e r , 4 3 6 U • S • 4 9 9 ( 19 7 8 ) , and t h at the 
warrantless nonconsensual search of the Cliffords' 
residence violated their rights under the Fourth and 
l Fourteenth Amendments. We granted certiorari to clarify 
.1, ... 1( 
4. 
\ doubt that appears to exist as to the application of our 
L decision in Tyler. 
II 
In the early morning hours of October 18, 1980, a 
fire erupted at the Clifford horne. The Cliffords were out 
of town on a camping trip at the time. The fire was 
reported to the Detroit Fire Department, and fire units 
arrived on the scene around 5:42 a.m. The fire was 
extinguished and all fire officials and pol ice left the 
premises at 7:04 a.m. 
At 8:00 a.m. on the morning of the fire, 
Lieutenant Beyer, a fire investigator with the arson 
section of the Detroit Fire Department, received 
instructions to investigate the Clifford fire. He was 
• ... 1' 
' ' 
5. 
informed that the Fire Department suspected arson. 
Because he had other assignments, Lieutenant Beyer did not 
proceed immediately to the Clifford residence. He and his 
partner finally arrived at the scene of the fire about 
1:00 p.m. on October 18. 
When they arrived, they found a work crew on the 
scene. The crew was boarding up the house and pumping 
water out of the basement. A neighbor told the 
investigators that he had called Clifford and had been 
instructed to contact the Clifford insurance agent to send 
a boarding crew out to secure the house. The neighbor 
also advised that the Cliffords did not plan to return 
that day. While the investigators waited for the water to 
be pumped out, they found a Coleman fuel can in the 
driveway that was seized and marked as evidence. 1 




By 1:30 p.m., the water had been pumped out of 
the basement and Lieutenant Beyer and his partner, without 
obtaining consent or an administrative warrant, entered 
the Clifford residence and began their investigation into 
the cause of the fire. Their search began in the basement 
and they quickly discovered that the fire had originated 
beneath the basement stairway. They detected a strong 
odor of fuel throughout the basement, and found two more 
Coleman fuel cans beneath the stairway. As they dug 
through the debris, the investigators also found a crock 
pot with attached wires leading to an electrical timer 
that was plugged into an outlet a few feet away. The 
1The can had been found in the basement by the fire 
officials who had fought the blaze. The firemen removed 
the can and put it by the side door where Lieutenant Beyer 
discovered it on his arrival. 
7. 
timer was set to turn on at approximately 3:45 a.m. and to 
turn back off at approximately 9:00 a.m. It had stopped 
somewhere between 4:00 and 4:30 a.m. All of this evidence 
was seized and marked. 
After determining that the fire had originated in 
the basement, Lieutenant Beyer and his partner searched 
the remainder of the house. The warrantless search that 
followed was extensive and thorough. The investigators 
called in a photographer to take pictures throughout the 
house. They searched through drawers and closets and 
found them full of old clothes. They inspected the rooms 
and noted that there were nails on the walls but no 
pictures. They found wiring and cassettes for a 
selectavision video tape machine but no machine. 
,, 
8. 
Respondents moved to excude all exhibits and 
testimony based on the basement and upstairs searches on 
the ground that they were searches to gather evidence of 
arson, that they were conducted without a warrant, 
consent, or exigent circumstances, and that they therefore 
were per se unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that 
the entire search was reasonable and should be exempt from 
the warrant requirement. 
III 
In its petit ion for certiorari, the State does 
not challenge the state court's finding that there were no 
exigent circumstances justifying the search of the 
9. 
Clifford home. Instead, it asks us to exempt from the 
warrant requirement all administrative investigations into 
the cause and origin of a fire. We decline to do so. 
In Tyler, we restated the Court's position that 
administrative searches generally require warrants. 436 
u.s. at 504-508. See Marshall v. Barlows, 436 u.s. 307 
(1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 u.s. 523 (1967); 
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). We reaffirm 
that view again today. Except in certain carefully 
defined classes of cases, the nonconsensual entry and 
search of property protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments is unreasonable unless it has been authorized 
by a valid warrant. 2 
2The Court has recognized the legality of warrantless 
administrative searches in certain carefully defined 
Footnote continued on next page. 
10. 
This does not, however, end the inquiry. The 
constitutionality of warrantless and nonconsensual entries 
onto fire-damaged premises turns on several factors. The 
first is whether there are any legitimate privacy 
interests in the fire-damaged property that are protected 
by the Fourth Amendment. The second is whether exigent 
circumstances justify the government intrusion regardless 
of any reasonable expectations of privacy. The third is 
whether the object of the search is to determine the cause 
of the fire or to gather evidence of criminal activity. 
circumstances. See, e.g., Donovon v. Dewey, 452 u.s. 594 
(1981) (heavily regulated business): United States v. 
Biswell, 406 u.s. 311 (1972) (same): Colonnade v. United 
States, 397 u.s. 72 (1970) (same). The exceptions to the 
administrative warrant recognized in these cases are not 




We observed in Tyler th~t reasonable privacy 
expectations may remain in fire-damaged premises. "People 
may go on living in their homes or working in their 
offices after a fire. Even when that is impossible, 
private effects often remain on the fire-damaged 
--~ premises." Tyler, 436 u.s. at 505 4~ctations will 
~I 
vary with the type of property, the amount of~damage, the 
prior and continued use of the premises, and in some cases 
the owner's efforts to secure it against intruders. Some 
fires may be so devastating that no reasonable privacy 
interests remain in the ash and ruins, regardless of the 
owner's subjective expectations. The test essentially is 
an objective one: whether "the expectation ris] one that 
12. 
society is prepared to recognize as 1 reasonable. 1 " Katz 
v. United States, 389 u.s. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., 
concurring). See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 u.s. 735, 
739-41 (1979). If reasonable privacy interests remain in 
the fire-damaged property, the warrant requirement 
applies, and any official entry must be made pursuant to a 
warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances. 
B. 
A burning building of course creates an exigency 
that justifies a warrantless entry by fire officials to 
fight the blaze. Moreover, in Tyler we held that once in 
the building, officials need no warrant to remain for "a 
reasonable time to investigate the cause of the blaze 
'· 
13. 
after it has been extinguised." 436 u.s. at 510 Where, 
however, reasonable expectations of privacy remain in the 
fire-damaged property, additional investigations begun 
after the fire has been extinguished and fire and police 
officials have left the scene generally must be made 
pursuant to a warrant or the identification of some new 
exigency. 
The aftermath of a fire often presents exigencies 
that will not tolerate the delay necessary to obtain a 
warrant or to secure the owner's consent to inspect fire-
damaged premises. 3 Because determining the cause and 
3For example, an immediate threat that the blaze might 
rekindle presents an exigency that would justify a 
warrantless and nonconsensual post-fire investigation. 
Similarly, a post-fire search made to prevent the imminent 






origin of a fire serves a compelling public interest, the 
warrant requirement does not apply in such cases. 
c. 
If a warrant is necessary, the object of the 
search determines the type of warrant required. If the 
object is 
/ fire, an 
to determine the cause and origin of a recent 
w.U ~~C.:.. • 
administrative warrant mtlst be obtatne~ To 
obtain such a warrant, fire officials need show only that 
a fire of undetermined origin has occurred on the 
premises, that the scope of the proposed search is 
reasonable and will not intrude unnecessarily on the fire 
victim's privacy, and that the search will be executed at 
a reasonable and convenient time. 
15. 
If the object of the search is to gather evidence 
of criminal activity, a warrant may be obtained only on a 
showing of probable cause to believe that criminal 
evidence will be found in the place to be searched. If 
evidence of criminal activity is discovered during the 
course of a valid administrative search, it may be seized 
under the "plain view" doctrine. Coolidge v. New 
-7 Hampshire, 403 u.s. 443, 465-66 (191{) This evidence then -
may be used to establish probable cause to obtain a 
criminal search warrant. Fire officials may not, however, 
rely on this evidence to expand the scope of their 
administrative search without first making a successful 




The object of the search is important even if 
exigent circumstances exist. Circumstances that justify a 
warrantless search for the cause of a fire may not justify 
a search to gather evidence of criminal activity once that 
cause has been determined. If, for example, the 
administrative search is justified by the immediate need 
to ensure against rekindling, the scope of the search may 
be no broader than reasonably necessary to achieve its 
end. A search to gather evidence of criminal activity not 
in plain view must be made pursuant to a criminal warrant 
upon a traditional showing of probable cause. 
The searches of the Clifford horne, at least 
arguably, can be viewed as two separate ones: the delayed 
search of the basement area, followed by the extensive 
search of the residential portion of the house. We now 
17. 
apply the principles outlined above to each of these 
searches. 
IV 
The Clifford home was a two-and-a-half story brick 
and frame residence. Although there was extensive damage 
to the interior structure, the exterior of the house was 
largely undamaged by the fire. The firemen had broken out 
one of the doors and most of the windows in fighting the 
blaze. At the time Lieutenant Beyer and his partner 
arrived, the home was uninhabitable. But personal 
belongings remained, and Clifford had arranged to have 
the house secured against intrusion in his absence. Under 
these circumstances, and in light of the especially strong 
. . ~. ·: ... 
18. 
expectations of privacy connected with a home, we hold 
that the Cliffords retained reasonable privacy interests 
in their fire-damaged residence and that the post-fire 
investigations were subject to the warrant requirement. 
Thus, the warrantless and nonconsensual searches of both 
the basement and the upstairs areas of the house were 
valid only if exigent circumstances justified the object 
and the scope of each. 
A. 
It is not entirely clear whether the post-fire 
search of the basement was an administrative search to 
determine the cause of the fire or a search to gather 
evidence of arson • Respondents contend that the 
. ~ 
19. 
firefighters had made a preliminary investigation into the 
cause and origin of the fire, that they had determined 
that it had begun in the basement, and that they had 
identified its cause as probable arson. They argue that 
the sole purpose of Lieutenant Beyer's subsequent search 
was to gather evidence of the suspected arson. At oral 
argument, the State conceded that the firefighters had 
made a preliminary investigation and had determined that 
arson was likely. Its position seems to be that the 
basement investigation some six hours after the 
firefighters had departed was undertaken for a dual 
purpose - to determine the cause of the fire and to seize 
evidence of arson. Whatever its object at that time, this 
search was subject to the warrant requirement. As noted 
above, the search of the basement was not made pursuant to 
20. 
either an administrative or a criminal warrant, and it was 
not justified by exigent circumstances. We therefore hold 
that the 1:00 p.m. warrantless entry and search of the 
basement of the Clifford residence did not comport with 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 4 
In Tyler we upheld a warrantless post-fire search 
of a furniture store, despite the absence of exigent 
~ircumstances, on the ground~that it was a continuation 
of a valid search begun immediately after the fire. As 
the State conceded at oral argument, this case is 
4The search was made pursuant to a pol icy of the Arson 
Divison that allowed nonconsensual warrantless entries 
onto fire-damaged premises as long as they were made 
within a reasonable time after the fire, the owner was not 
present, and the premises were open to trespass. This 
policy did not attempt to identify exigent circumstances, 
but focused more on the question whether there were 
-ieiji~imat!~ expectations of privacy in the premises. As 
applied here, the policy is not consistent with our 
interpretations of the Fourth Amendment. 
21. 
distinguishable. In Tyler, fire officials began their 
investigation into the cause of the fire as the last 
flames were being doused. That investigation was 
interrupted by smoke and darkness, but was completed as 
soon as the smoke had cleared and daylight had dawned. 
Because the immediate post-fire search was interrupted for 
only a short period of time, and for reasons that were 
evident, we held that the early morning search was "no 
more than an actual continuation of the first, and the 
lack of a warrant thus did not invalidate the resulting 
seizure of evidence." 436 u.s. at 511 This case is 
distinguishable for several reasons. 
First, the challenged search was not a 
continuation of an earlier search. Lieutenant Beyer and 
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22. 
;_.,_~~sh-oe) 
~ ix hours after the firefighters had extinguished 
the fire and left the scene. In the interim, the 
Cliffords had taken steps to secure the privacy interests 
that remained in their private residence against further 
intrusion. These efforts separate the entry made to 
extinguish the blaze from that made later to investigate 
its origin. Second, the privacy interests in the Clifford 
residence were greater than those in the fire-damaged 
furniture store. ~t~~'%e~~4he ~ 
reasonableness of the six hour delay in beginning 
post-fire search is more questionable than the 
reasonableness of the five hour interruption of the search 
upheld in Tyler. 5 These facts - the two separate entries 
5Reasonable expectations of privacy in fire-damaged 
premises will vary depending particularly on the type of 





and the heightened privacy interests in the home 
distinguish this case from Tyler. At least where a 
homeowner has taken significant steps to secure his fire-
damaged home after the blaze has been extinguished and the 
fire and police units have left the scene, we hold that a 
post-fire search must be conducted pursuant to a warrant, 
consent, or the identification of some new exigency.6 So 
building involved. At one end of the spectrum is the 
private residence, where reasonable expectations will be 
particularly strong and where government intrusion should 
be kept to a minimum. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 
u.s. 537, 589-90 (1980); United States v. United States 
District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 ( 19~) . At the other 
end of the spectrum are commercial structures, such as 
commercial warehouses, that are unlikely to contain much 
that is personal or private. A post-fire search that 
covers a five hour span may be rea.sonable in the latter 
bu t no~ in the former. D~ ~rF?:· .t. IVI...t..Lc..l-~"1(~ 
{\ ~ ~-fi;J-'4.1"' cJ.....J W- ~ f ~c.u.l.tfcA. -h..rP.-L iJ. d.f\. V Y ~ 
t6This is not to suggest that inaJ.Ovid~ exp~ctations of 
privacy may prevail over interests of public safety. For 
example, when fire breaks out in an apartment unit of an 
apartment complex, the exigency exception may allow 
warrantless post-fire investigations where necessary 
ensure against an immediate fire hazard. ~ 
~
24. 
long as the primary purpose is to assertain the cause of 
the fire, an administrative warrant will suffice. 
B. 
Because the cause of the fire was known, the 
search of the upper portions of the house, described 
above, could only have been a search to gather evidence of 
the crime of arson. Absent exigent circumstances, such a 
search requires a criminal warrant. 
Even if the mid-day basement search had been a 
valid administrative search, it would not have justified 
the upstairs search. As soon as the investigators 
determined that the fire had originated in the basement 






beneath the basement stairs, the scope of their search was 
limited to the basement area. Although the investigators 
could have used whatever evidence they discovered in the 
basement to establish probable cause to search the 
remainder of the house, they could not lawfully undertake 
that search without a prior judicial determination that a 
successful showing of probable cause had been made. 
Because there were no exigent circumstances justifying the 
upstairs search, and it was undertaken without a prior 
showing of probable cause before an independent judicial 
officer, we hold that this search of a horne was 
unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
regardless of the validity of the basement search. 7 
7In many cases, there will be no bright line separating 
the firefighters' investigation into the cause of a fire 
Footnote continued on next page • 
26. 
The warrantless intrusion into the upstairs 
regions of the Clifford house presents a telling 
illustration of the importance of prior judicial review of 
proposed administrative searches. An administrative 
search into the cause of a recent fire does not give fire 
officials licence to roam freely through the fire victim's 
private residence. If an administrative warrant had been 
obtained in this case, it presumably would have 1 imi ted 
from a search for evidence of arson. The distinction will 
vary with the circumstances of the particular fire and 
generally will involve more than the lapse of time or the 
number of entries and re-entries. For example, once the 
cause of a fire in a single-family dwelling is determined, 
the adminsitrative search should end and any broader 
investigation should be made pursuant to a criminal 
warrant. A fire in an apartment complex, on the other 
hand, presents complexities that may make it necessary for 
officials to conduct more expansive searches, to remain on 
the premises for longer periods of time, and to make 
repeated entries and re-entries into the building. See 
Tyler, 436 u.s. at 510 n.6. Considerable latitude mustt>"e 
given to the compelling state interest in thorough 
investigations into the causes of recent fires. 
27. 
the scope of the proposed investigation and would have 
prevented the warrantless intrusion into the upper rooms 
of the Clifford hom~. 
v 
The only pieces of physical evidence that have 
been challenged on this interlocutory appeal are the three 
empty fuel cans, the electric crock pot, and a timer and 
attached cord. Respondents also have challenged the 
testimony of the investigators concerning the warrantless 
search of both the basement and the upstairs portions of 
the Clifford home. Two of the fuel cans, the crock pot, 
the timer and cord, and the investigators' testimony were 
discovered as a result of the unconstitutional post-fire 
' . 
28. 
search of the Clifford's residence. Thus, we affirm that 
portion of the judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals 
that excluded that evidence. One of the fuel cans was 
discovered in plain view in the Cliffords' driveway. 
Seizure of this evidence was proper. To the extent that 
the Michigan Court of Appeals excluded that evidence, we 
reverse. 





1. $ 0 3 S ') t!r) -:2$ 03St-r a,_-f DRAFT OPINION (November 16, 1983) 
Michigan v. Clifford No. 82-357 
POWELL, Associate Justice 
This case presents questions as to the authority 
of arson investigators, in the absence of either exigent 
circumstances or consent, to enter a private residence 
without a warrant to investigate the cause of a recent 
fire. 
I 
Respondents, Raymond and Emma Jean Clifford, were 
arrested and charged with arson in connection with a fire 
2. 
at their private residence. At the preliminary 
examination held to establish probable cause for the 
alleged offense, the State introduced various pieces of 
physical evidence, most of which was obtained through a 
warrantless and nonconsensual search of the Clifford's 
fire-damaged horne. Respondents moved to suppress this 
evidence on the ground that it was obtained in violation 
of their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. That motion was denied and respondents were 
bound over for trial. Before trial, they again moved to 
suppress the evidence obtained during the search. The 
trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and denied 
the motion on the ground that exigent circumstances 
justified the search. The court certified its evidentiary 
3 0 
ruling for interlocutory appeal and the Michigan Court of 
Appeals reversed. 
That court held that there were no exigent 
circumstances justifying the search. Instead, it found 
that the warrantless entry and search of the Clifford 
residence was conducted pursuant to a policy of the Arson 
Division of the Detroit Fire Department that sanctioned 
such searches as long as the owner was not present, the 
premises were open to trespass, and the search occur red 
within a reasonable time of the fire. The Court of 
Appeals held that this policy was inconsistent with 
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978), and that the 
warrantless nonconsensual search of the Cliffords' 
residence violated their rights under the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. We granted certiorari to clarify 
4. 
doubt that appears to exist as to the application of our 
decision in Tyler. 
II 
In the early morning hours of October 18, 1980, a 
fire erupted at the Clifford home. The Cliffords were out 
of town on a camping trip at the time. The fire was 
reported to the Detroit Fire Department, and fire units 
arrived on the scene at about 5:42 a.m. The fire was 
extinguished and all fire officials and pol ice left the 
premises at 7:04 a.m. 
At 8:00 a.m. on the morning of the fire, 
Lieutenant Beyer, a fire investigator with the arson 
section of the Detroit Fire Department, received 
instructions to investigate the Clifford fire. He was 
5. 
informed that the Fire Department suspected arson. 
Because he had other assignments, Lieutenant Beyer did not 
proceed immediately to the Clifford residence. He and his 
partner finally arrived at the scene of the fire about 
1:00 p.m. on October 18. 
When they arrived, they found a work crew on the 
scene. The crew was boarding up the house and pumping 
some six inches of water out of the basement. A neighbor 
told the investigators that he had called Clifford and had 
been instructed to request the Cliffords' insurance agent 
to send a boarding crew out to secure the house. The 
neighbor also advised that the Cliffords did not plan to 
return that day. While the investigators waited for the 
water to be pumped out, they found a Coleman fuel can in 
the driveway that was seized and marked as evidence. 1 
Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages. 
6. 
By 1:30 p.m., the water had been pumped out of 
the basement and Lieutenant Beyer and his partner, without 
obtaining consent or an administrative warrant, entered 
the Clifford residence and began their investigation into 
the cause of the fire. Their search began in the basement 
and they quickly discovered that the fire had originated 
beneath the basement stairway. They detected a strong 
odor of fuel throughout the basement, and found two more 
Coleman fuel cans beneath the stairway. As they dug 
through the debris, the investigators also found a crock 
pot with attached wires leading to an electrical timer 
that was plugged into an outlet a few feet away. The 
1The can had been found in the basement by the fire 
officials who had fought the blaze. The firemen removed 
the can and put it by the side door where Lieutenant Beyer 
discovered it on his arrival. 
7. 
timer was set to turn on at approximately 3:45 a.m. and to 
turn back off at approximately 9:00 a.m. It had stopped 
somewhere between 4:00 and 4:30 a.m. All of this evidence 
was seized and marked. 
After determining that the fire had originated in 
the basement, Lieutenant Beyer and his partner searched 
the remainder of the house. The warrantless search that 
followed was extensive and thorough. The investigators 
called in a photographer to take pictures throughout the 
house. They searched through drawers and closets and 
found them full of old clothes. They inspected the rooms 
and noted that there were nails on the walls but no 
pictures. They found wiring and cassettes for a video 
tape machine but no machine. 
8. 
Respondents moved to excude all exhibits and 
testimony based on the basement and upstairs searches on 
the ground that they were searches to gather evidence of 
arson, that they were conducted without a warrant, 
consent, or exigent circumstances, and that they therefore 
were per se unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that 
the entire search was reasonable and should be exempt from 
the warrant requirement. 
III 
In its petition for certiorari, the State does 
not challenge the state court's finding that there were no 
exigent circumstances justifying the search of the 
9. 
Clifford home. Instead, it asks us to exempt from the 
warrant requirement all administrative investigations into 
the cause and origin of a fire. We decline to do so. 
In Tyler, we restated the Court's position that 
administrative searches generally require warrants. 436 
u.s. at 504-508. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 
307 (1978): Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 u.s. 523 
(1967): See v. City of Seattle, 387 u.s. 541 (1967). We 
reaffirm that view again today. Except in certain 
carefully defined classes of cases, 2 the nonconsensual 
entry and search of property is governed by the warrant 
2see e.g. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 u.s. 594 (1981) (heavily 
regulated business): United States v. Biswell, 406 u.s. 
311 (1972) (same): Colonnade v. United States, 397 u.s. 72 
(1970) (same). The exceptions to the administrative 
warrant recognized in these cases are not applicable to 
the warrantless search in this case. 
10. 
requirement of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The 
constitutionality of warrantless and nonconsensual entries 
onto fire-damaged premises, therefore, normally turns on 
several factors: whether there are legitimate privacy 
interests in the fire-damaged property that are protected 
by the Fourth Amendment: whether exigent circumstances 
justify the government intrusion regardless of any 
reasonable expectations of privacy: and, whether the 
object of the search is to determine the cause of the fire 
or to gather evidence of criminal activity. 
A. 
We observed in Tyler that reasonable privacy 
expectations may remain in fire-damaged premises. "People 
. . " 
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may go on living in their homes or working in their 
offices after a fire. Even when that is impossible, 
private effects often remain on the fire-damaged 
premises." Tyler, 436 U.S. at 505 Privacy expectations 
will vary with the type of property, the amount of fire 
damage, the prior and continued use of the premises, and 
in some cases the owner 1 s efforts to secure it against 
intruders. Some fires may be so devastating that no 
reasonable privacy interests remain in the ash and ruins, 
regardless of the owner 1 s subjective expectations. The 
test essentially is an objective one: whether "the 
expectation [is] one that society is prepared to recognize 
as 1 reasonable. 1 " Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 u.s. 735, 739-41 (1979). If reasonable 
. : 
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privacy interests remain in the fire-damaged property, the 
warrant requirement applies, and any official entry must 
be made pursuant to a warrant, consent, or exigent 
circumstances. 
B. 
A burning building of course creates an exigency 
that justifies a warrantless entry by fire officials to 
fight the blaze. Moreover, in Tyler we held that once in 
the building, officials need no warrant to remain 3 for "a 
3we do not suggest that firemen fighting a fire normally 
remain within a building. The circumstances, of course, 
vary. In many situations actual entry may be too 
hazardous until the fire has been wholly extinguished, and 
even then the danger of collapsing walls may exist. Thus, 
the effort to ascertain the cause of a fire may extend 
over a period of time with entry and re-entry. The 
critical inquiry is whether reasonable expectations of 




reasonable time to investigate the cause of the blaze 
after it has been extinguished." 436 u.s. at 510. Where, 
however, reasonable expectations of privacy remain in the 
fire-damaged property, additional investigations begun 
after the fire has been extinguished and fire and police 
officials have left the scene, generally must be made 
pursuant to a warrant or the identification of some new 
exigency. 
The aftermath of a fire often presents exigencies 
that will not tolerate the delay necessary to obtain a 
warrant or to secure the owner's consent to inspect fire-
damaged premises. 4 Because determining the cause and 
privacy exist in the fire-damaged premises at a particular 
time, and if so, whether exigencies justify the re-
entries. 
Footnote(s) 4 will appear on following pages. 
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origin of a fire serves a compelling public interest, the 
warrant requirement does not apply in such cases. 
c. 
If a warrant is necessary, the object of the 
search determines the type of warrant required. If the 
primary object is to determine the cause and origin of a 
recent fire, an administrative warrant will suffice. To 
obtain such a warrant, fire officials need show only that 
a fire of undetermined origin has occurred on the 
4For example, an immediate threat that the blaze might 
rekindle presents an exigency that would justify a 
warrantless and nonconsensual post-fire investigation. 
Similarly, a post-fire search made to prevent the imminent 
destruction of evidence may be exempt from the warrant 
requirement. 
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premises, that the scope of the proposed search is 
reasonable and will not intrude unnecessarily on the fire 
victim's privacy, and that the search will be executed at 
a reasonable and convenient time. 
If the primary object of the search is to gather 
evidence of criminal activity, a warrant may be obtained 
only on a showing of probable cause to believe that 
criminal evidence will be found in the place to be 
searched. If evidence of criminal activity is discovered 
during the course of a valid administrative search, it may 
be seized under the "plain view" doctrine. Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-466 (1971). This evidence 
then may be used to establish probable cause to obtain a 
criminal search warrant. Fire officials may not, however, 
rely on this evidence to expand the scope of their 
't 
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administrative search without first making a successful 
showing of probable cause to an independent judicial 
officer. 
The object of the search is important even if 
exigent circumstances exist. Circumstances that justify a 
warrantless search for the cause of a fire may not justify 
a search to gather evidence of criminal activity once that 
cause has been determined. If, for example, the 
administrative search is justified by the immediate need 
to ensure against rekindling, the scope of the search may 
be no broader than reasonably necessary to achieve its 
end. A search to gather evidence of criminal activity not 
in plain view must be made pursuant to a criminal warrant 
upon a traditional showing of probable cause. 5 
Footnote(s) 5 will appear on following pages. 
.. :"· 
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The searches of the Clifford horne, at least 
arguably, can be viewed as two separate ones: the delayed 
search of the basement area, followed by the extensive 
search of the residential portion of the house. We now 
apply the principles outlined above to each of these 
searches. 
IV 
The Clifford horne was a two-and-one-half story 
brick and f rarne residence. Although there was extensive 
5The plain view doctrine must be applied in light of the 
special circumstances that frequently accompany fire 
damage. In searching solely to ascertain the cause, 
f irernen custornar ily must remove rubble or search other 
areas where the cause of fires are likely to be found. At 
the outset of such activities the evidence may not be, and 
often is not, in "plain view" in the literal sense of that 
term . 
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damage to the lower interior structure, the exterior of 
the house and some of the upstairs rooms were largely 
undamaged by the fire, although there was some smoke 
damage. The firemen had broken out one of the doors and 
most of the windows in fighting the blaze. At the time 
Lieutenant Beyer and his partner arrived, the horne was 
uninhabitable. But personal belongings remained, and the 
Cliffords had arranged to have the house secured against 
intrusion in their absence. Under these ci rcurnstances, 
and in light of the strong expectations of privacy 
connected with a horne, we hold that the Cliffords retained 
reasonable privacy interests in their fire-damaged 
residence and that the post-fire investigations were 
subject to the warrant requirement. Thus, the warrantless 




upstairs areas of the house were valid only if exigent 
circumstances justified the object and the scope of each. 
A. 
As noted, the State does not claim that exigent 
circumstances justified its post-fire search of the 
basement. The State argues that we should either exempt 
post-fire searches from the warrant requirement or modify 
Tyler to justify the warrantless search in this case. We 
have rejected the State's first argument and turn now to 
its second. 
In Tyler we upheld a warrantless post-fire search 
of a furniture store, despite the absence of exigent 




a valid search begun immediately after the fire. The 
investigation was begun as the last flames were being 
doused, but was interrupted by smoke and darkness. 
Nevertheless, the search was completed promptly after the 
smoke cleared and daylight dawned. Because the immediate 
post-fire search was interrupted for a reasonable period 
of time, and for reasons that were evident, we held that 
the early morning search was "no more than an actual 
continuation of the first, and the lack of a warrant thus 
did not invalidate the resulting seizure of evidence." 436 
u.s. at 511. 
As the State conceded at oral argument, this case 
is distinguishable for several reasons. First, the 
challenged search was not a continuation of an earlier 
search. Between the time the firefighters had 
',, . . 
-· 
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extinguished the blaze and left the scene and the arson 
investigators first arrived to begin their investigation, 
the Cliffords had taken steps to secure the privacy 
interests that remained in their residence against further 
intrusion. These efforts separate the entry made to 
extinguish the blaze from that made later to investigate 
its origin. Second, the privacy interests in the 
residence - particularly after the Cliffords had acted -
were significantly greater than those in the fire-damaged 
furniture store, making the six-hour delay between the 
fire and the mid-day search unreasonable absent a warrant, 
consent, or exigent circumstances. We frequently have 
noted that privacy interests are especially strong in a 
private residence. 6 These facts - the interim efforts to 




secure the burned-out premises and the heightened privacy 
interests in the home - distinguish this case from Tyler. 
At least where a homeowner has made a reasonable effort to 
secure his fire-damaged home after the blaze has been 
extinguished and the fire and police units have left the 
scene, we hold that a subsequent post-fire search must be 
conducted pursuant to a warrant, consent, or the 
identification of some new exigency. 7 So long as the 
6see e.g. Payton v. New York, 445 u.s. 537, 589-90 
(1980); United States v. United States District Court, 407 
u.s. 297, 313 (1972). Reasonable expectations of privacy 
in fire-damaged premises will vary depending particularly 
on the type of building involved. At one end of the 
spectrum is the private residence, where reasonable 
expectations will be particularly strong and where 
government intrusion should be kept to a minimum. At the 
other end of the spectrum are commercial structures, such 
as commercial warehouses, that are unlikely to contain 
much that is personal or private. 
7This is not to suggest that individual expectations of 
privacy may prevail over interests of public safety. For 
example, when fire breaks out in an apartment unit of an 
apartment complex, the exigency exception may allow 
warrantless post-fire investigations where necessary to 
Footnote continued on next page • 
~-
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primary purpose is to ascertain the cause of the fire, an 
administrative warrant will suffice. 
B. 
Because the cause of the fire was then known, the 
search of the upper portions of the house, described 
above, could only have been a search to gather evidence of 
the crime of arson. Absent exigent circumstances, such a 
search requires a criminal warrant. 
Even if the mid-day basement search had been a 
valid administrative search, it would not have justified 
the upstairs search. The scope of such a search is 
ensure against any immediate danger of future fire hazard. 
24. 
limited to that reasonably necessary to determine the 
cause and origin of a fire and to ensure against 
rekindling. As soon as the investigators determined that 
the fire had originated in the basement and had been 
caused by the crock pot and timer found beneath the 
basement stairs, the scope of their search was limited to 
the basement area. Although the investigators could have 
used whatever evidence they discovered in the basement to 
establish probable cause to search the remainder of the 
house, they could not lawfully undertake that search 
without a prior judicial determination that a successful 
showing of probable cause had been made. Because there 
were no exigent circumstances justifying the upstairs 
search, and it was undertaken without a prior showing of 
probable cause before an independent judicial officer, we 
25. 
hold that this search of a horne was unreasonable under the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, regardless of the 
validity of the basement search. 8 
The warrantless intrusion into the upstairs 
regions of the Clifford house presents a telling 
illustration of the importance of prior judicial review of 
proposed administrative searches. If an adrninistrat i ve 
warrant had been obtained in this case, it presumably 
8 In many cases, there wi 11 be no bright 1 ine separating 
the firefighters' investigation into the cause of a fire 
from a search for evidence of arson. The distinction will 
vary with the circumstances of the particular fire and 
generally will involve more than the lapse of time or the 
number of entries and re-entries. For example, once the 
cause of a fire in a single-family dwelling is determined, 
the administrative search should end and any broader 
investigation should be made pursuant to a criminal 
warrant. A fire in an apartment complex, on the other 
hand, may present complexities that make it necessary for 
officials to conduct more expansive searches, to remain on 
the premises for longer periods of time, and to make 
repeated entries and re-entries into the building. See 
Tyler, 436 u.s. at 510 n.6. Considerable latitude must be 
given to the compelling state interest in thorough 
investigations into the causes of recent fires. 
26. 
would have limited the scope of the proposed investigation 
and would have prevented the warrantless intrusion into 
the upper rooms of the Clifford horne. An administrative 
search into the cause of a recent fire does not give fire 
officials license to roam freely through the fire victim's 
private residence. 
v 
The only pieces of physical evidence that have 
been challenged on this interlocutory appeal are the three 
empty fuel cans, the electric crock pot, and the timer and 
attached cord. Respondents also have challenged the 
testimony of the investigators concerning the warrantless 





the Clifford horne. The discovery of two of the fuel cans, 
the crock pot, the timer and cord as well as the 
investigators' related testimony -were the product of the 
unconstitutional post-fire search of the Clifford's 
residence. Thus, we affirm that portion of the judgment 
of the Michigan Court of Appeals that excluded that 
evidence. One of the fuel cans was discovered in plain 
view in the Cliffords' driveway. This can was seen in 
plain view during the intial investigation by the 
firefighters. It would have been admissible whether it 
had been seized in the basement by the firefighters or in 
the driveway by the arson investigators. Exclusion of 
this evidence should be reversed. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82--357 
MICHIGAN, PETITIONER v. RAYMOND CLIFFORD 
AND EMMA JEAN CLIFFORD 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
MICHIGAN 
[November-, 1983] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion for the Court. 
This case presents questions as to the authority of arson 
investigators, in the absence of ~r exigent circumstances -(} 
or consent, to enter a private residence without a warrant to 
investigate the cause of a recent fire. 
I 
Respondents, Raymond and Emma Jean Clifford, were ar-
rested and charged with arson in connection with a fire at 
their private residence. At the preliminary examination 
held to establish probable cause for the alleged offense, the 
State introduced various pieces of physical evidence, most of 
which was obtained through a warrantless and nonconsensual 
search of the Clifford's fire-damaged home. Respondents 
moved to suppress this evidence on the ground that it was 
obtained in violation of their rights under the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. That motion was denied and re-
spondents were bound over for trial. Before trial, they 
again moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the 
search. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing 
and denied the motion on the ground that exigent circum-
stances justified the search. The court certified its eviden-
tiary ruling for interlocutory appeal and the Michigan Court 
of Appeals reversed. 
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That court held that there were no exigent circumstances 
justifying the search. Instead, it found that the warrantless 
entry and search of the Clifford residence was conducted pur-
suant to a policy of the Arson Division of the Detroit Fire De-
partment that sanctioned such searches as long as the owner 
was not present, the premises were open to trespass, and the 
search occurred within a reasonable time of the fire. The 
Court of Appeals held that this policy was inconsistent with 
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499 (1978), and that the war-
rantless nonconsensual search of the Cliffords' residence vio-
lated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. We granted certiorari to clarify doubt that appears 
to exist as to the application of our decision in Tyler. 
II 
In the early morning hours of October 18, 1980, a fire 
erupted at the Clifford home. The Cliffords were out of 
town on a camping trip at the time. The fire was reported to 
the Detroit Fire Department, and fire units arrived on the 
scene at about 5:42 a.m. The fire was extinguished and all 
fire officials and police left the premises at 7:04 a.m. 
At 8:00a.m. on the morning of the fire, Lieutenant Beyer, 
a fire investigator with the arson section of the Detroit Fire 
Department, received instructions to investigate the Clifford 
fire. He was informed that the Fire Department suspected 
arson. Because he had other assignments, Lieutenant 
Beyer did not proceed immediately to the Clifford residence. 
He and his partner finally arrived at the scene of the fire 
about 1:00 p.m. on October 18. 
When they arrived, they found a work crew on the scene. 
The crew was boarding up the house and pumping some six 
inches of water out of the basement. A neighbor told the in-
vestigators that he had called Clifford and had been in-
structed to request the Cliffords' insurance agent to send a 
boarding crew out to secure the house. The neighbor also 
advised that the Cliffords did not plan to return that day. 
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While the investigators waited for the water to be pumped 
out, they found a Coleman fuel can in the driveway that was 
seized and marked as evidence. 1 
By 1:30 p.m., the water had been pumped out of the base-
ment and Lieutenant Beyer and his partner, without obtain-
ing consent or an administrative warrant, entered the Clif-
ford residence and began their investigation into the cause of 
the fire. Their search began in the basement and they /./ _ . _ 
quickly ~ that the fire had originatedl'beneath the . ~
basement stairway. They detected a strong odor of fuel 
throughout the basement, and found two more Coleman fuel 
cans beneath the stairway. As they dug through the debris, 
the investigators also found a crock pot with attached wires 
leading to an electrical timer that was plugged into an outlet 
a few feet away. The timer was set to turn on at approxi-
mately 3:45 a.m. and to turn back off at approximately 9:00 
a.m. It had stopped somewhere between 4:00 and 4:30a.m. 
All of this evidence was seized and marked. 
After determining that the fire had originated in the base-
ment, Lieutenant Beyer and his partner searched the re-
mainder of the house. The warrantless search that followed 
was extensive and thorough. The investigators called in a 
photographer to take pictures throughout the house. They 
searched through drawers and closets and found them full of 
old clothes. They inspected the rooms and noted that there 
were nails on the walls but no pictures. They found wiring 
and cassettes for a video tape machine but no machine. 
Respondents moved to excude all exhibits and testimony 
based on the basement and upstairs searches on the ground 
that they were searches to gather evidence of arson, that 
they were conducted without a warrant, consent, or exigent 
circumstances, and that they therefore were per se unreason-
able under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Peti-
' The can had been found in the basement by the fire officials who had 
fought the blaze. The firemen removed the can and put it by the side door 
where Lieutenant Beyer discovered it on his arrival. 
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tioner, on the other hand, argues that the entire search was 
reasonable and should be exempt from the warrant 
requirement. 
III 
In its petition for certiorari, the State does not challenge 
the state court's finding that there were no exigent circum-
stances justifying the search of the Clifford home. Instead, 
it asks us to exempt from the warrant requirement all admin-
istrative investigations into the cause and origin of a fire. 
We decline to do so. 
In Tyler, we restated the Court's position that adminis-
trative searches generally require warrants. 436 U. S., at 
504-508. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307 
(1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967); 
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967). We reaffirm 
that view again today. Except in certain carefully defined 
classes of cases, 2 the nonconsensual entry and search of prop-
erty is governed by the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. The constitutionality of war-
rantless and nonconsensual entries onto fire-damaged 
premises, therefore, normally turns on several factors: 
whether there are legitimate privacy interests in the fire-
damaged property that are protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment; whether exigent circumstances justify the government 
intrusion regardless of any reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy; and, whether the object of the search is to determine 
the cause of the fire or to gather evidence of criminal activity. 
A 
We observed in Tyler that reasonable privacy expectations 
may remain in fire-damaged premises. "People may go on 
living in their homes or working in their offices after a fire. 
2 See e. g. Donovon v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594 (1981) (heavily regulated 
business); United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972) (same); Colon-
nade v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970) (same). The exceptions to the 
administrative warrant recognized in these cases are not applicable to the 
warrantless search in this case. 
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Even when that is impossible, private effects often remain on 
the fire-damaged premises." Tyler, 436 U. S., at 505 Pri-
vacy expectations will vary with the type of property, the 
amount of fire damage, the prior and continued use of the 
premises, and in some cases the owner's efforts to secure it 
against intruders. Some fires may be so devastating that no 
reasonable privacy interests remain in the ash and ruins, re-
gardless of the owner's subjective expectations. The testes-
sentially is an objective one: whether "the expectation [is] 
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" 
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring). See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 
739-741 (1979). If reasonable privacy interests remain in 
the fire-damaged property, the warrant requirement applies, G 1--t.L 
and any official entry must be made pursuant to a warran~ 1..-iA-
conse~ or exigent circumstances. ~ ~ 
B 
A burning building of course creates an exigency that justi-
fies a warrantless entry by fire officials to fight the blaze. 
Moreover, in Tyler we held that once in the building, officials 
need no warrant to remain 3 for "a reasonable time to investi-
gate the cause of the blaze after it has been extinguished." 
436 U. S., at 510. Where, however, reasonable expectations 
of privacy remain in the fire-damaged property, additional in-
vestigations begun after the fire has been extinguished and 
fire and police officials have left the scene, generally must be 
made pursuant to a warrant or the identification of some new 
exigency. 
3 We do not suggest that firemen fighting a fire normally remain within 
a building. The circumstances, of course, vary. In many situations ac-
tual entry may be too hazardous until the fire has been wholly extin-
guished, and even then the danger of collapsing walls may exist. Thus, 
the effort to ascertain the cause of a fire may extend over a period of time 
with entry and re-entry. The critical inquiry is whether reasonable expec-
tations of privacy exist in the fire-damaged premises at a particular time, 
and if so, whether exigencies justify the re-entries. 
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The aftermath of a fire often presents exigencies that will 
not tolerate the delay necessary to obtain a warrant or to se-
cure the owner's consent to inspect fire-damaged premises. 4 
Because determining the cause and origin of a fire serves a 
compelling public interest, the warrant requirement does not 
apply in such cases. c 
If a warrant is necessary, the object of the search deter-
mines the type of warrant required. If the primary object is 
to determine the cause and origin of a recent fire, an adminis-
trative warrant will suffice. To obtain such a warrant, fire 
officials need show only that a fire of undetermined origin has 
occurred on the premises, that the scope of the proposed 
search is reasonable and will not intrude unnecessarily on the 
fire victim's privacy, and that the search will be executed at a 
reasonable and convenient time. 
If the primary object of the search is to gather evidence of 
criminal activity, a warrant may be obtained only on a show-
ing of probable cais'e to believe that cri~nal evidence will be 
found in the place to be searched. If evidence of criminal ac-
tivity is discovered during the course of a valid adminis-
trative search, it may be seized under the "plain view" doc-
trine. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 465-466 
(1971). This evidence then may be used to establish proba-
ble cause to obtain a criminal search warrant. Fire officials 
may not, however, rely on this evidence to expand the scope 
of their administrative search without first making a success-
ful showing of probable cause to an independent judicial 
officer. 
The object of the search is important even if exigent cir-
cumstances exist. Circumstances that justify a warrantless 
' For example, an immediate threat that the blaze might rekindle 
presents an exigency that would justify a warrantless and nonconsensual 
post-fire investigation. Similarly, a post-fire search made to prevent 
the imminent destruction of evidence may be exempt from the warrant 
requirement. 
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search for the cause of a fire may not justify a search to 
gather evidence of criminal activity once that cause has been 
determined. If, for example, the administrative search is 
justified by the immediate need to ensure against rekindling, 
the scope of the search may be no broader than reasonably 
necessary to achieve its end. A search to gather evidence of 
criminal activity not in plain view must be made pursuant to a 
criminal warrant upon a traditional showing of probable 
cause. 5 
The searches of the Clifford home, at least arguably, can be 
viewed as two separate ones: the delayed search of the base-
ment area, followed by the extensive search of the residential 
portion of the house. We now apply the principles outlined 
above to each of these searches. 
IV 
The Clifford home was a two-and-one-half story brick and 
frame residence. Although there was extensive damage to 
the lower interior structure, the exterior of the house and 
some of the upstairs rooms were largely undamaged by the 
fire, although there was some smoke damage. The firemen 
had broken out one of the doors and most of the windows in 
fighting the blaze. At the time Lieutenant Beyer and his 
partner arrived, the home was uninhabitable. But personal 
belongings remained, and the Cliffords had arranged to have 
the house secured against intrusion in their absence. Under 
these circumstances, and in light of the strong expectations 
of privacy ~d with a home, we hold that the Cliffords 
retained reasonable privacy interests in their fire-damaged 
residence and that the post-fire investigations were subject 
to the warrant requirement. Thus, the warrantless and 
5 The plain view doctrine must be applied in light of the special circum-
stances that frequently accompany fire damage. In searching solely to as-
certain the cause, firemen customarily must remove rubble or search other 
areas where the cause of fires are likely to be found. At the outset of such 
activities the evidence may not be, and often is not, in "plain view" in the 
literal sense of that term. 
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nonconsensual searches of both the basement and the up-
stairs areas of the house,._we!'e valid only if exigent circum-
stances justified the object and the scope of each. 
fi. 
A 
As noted, the State does not claim that exigent circum-
J f 
stances justified its post-fire search" of. tH.e basemeat. ~ 
A~ argues that we~feithe~exempt post-fire searches 
from the warrant requirement or modify Tyler to justify the 
s warrantless search" in this case. We have rejected the 
State's first argument and turn now to its second. 
In Tyler we upheld a warrantless post-fire search of a fur-
niture store, despite the absence of exigent circumstances, on 
the ground that it was a continuation of a valid search begun 
immediately after the fire. The investigation was begun as 
the last flames were being doused, but<\~
·, smoke and darkness . .....)'ffl:~,<ertll~lesst _pie search w~ 
~ A~ promptly after the smoke c1eared and daylight 
dawned. Because th ~eaiat~post-fire search was inter-
rupted.(Mt a rea~onssle ~eriGa ef -time, a"Adlfor reasons that 
....... ~ere evident, we held that the early morning search was "no 
more than an actual continuation of the first, and the lack of a 
warrant thus did not invalidate the resulting seizure of evi-
dence. " 436 U. S., at 511. 
As the State conceded at oral argument, this case is distin-
guishable for several reasons. First, the challenged search 
was not a continuation of an earlier search. Between the 
.s . 
time the firefighters had extinguished the blaze and left the_ ~!­
scene and the arson investigators first arrived J o begin their 
investigation, the Cliffords had taken steps to secure the pri-
vacy interests that remained in their residence against fur-
ther intrusion. These efforts separate the entry made to ex-
tinguish the blaze from that made later to investigate its 
origin. Second, the privacy interests in the residence-par-
ticularly after the Cliffords had acted-were significantly 
greater than those in the fire-damaged furniture store, mak-
I P/11 
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ing the six-hour delay between the fire and the mid-day 
search unreasonable absent a warrant, consent, or exigent 
circumstances. We frequently have noted that privacy in-
terests are especially strong in a private residence. 6 These 
facts-the interim efforts to secure the burned-out premises 
and the heightened privacy interests in the home-distin-
guish this case from Tyler. At least where a homeowner has 
made a reasonable effort to secure his fire-damaged home 
after the blaze has been extinguished and the fire and police 
units have left the scene, we hold that a subsequent post-fire 
search must be conducted pursuant to a warrant, consent, or 
the identification of some new exigency. 7 So long as the pri-
mary purpose is to ascertain the cause of the fire, an adminis-
trative warrant will suffice. 
B 
Because the cause of the fire was then known, the search of 
the upper portions of the house, described above, could only 
have been a search to gather evidence of the crime of arson. 
Absent exigent circumstances, such a search requires a crim-
inal warrant. 
Even if the mid-day basement search had been a valid ad-
ministrative search, it would not have justified the upstairs 
search. The scope of such a search is limited to that reason-
s See e. g. Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 537, 589-90 (1980); United 
States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). Reason-
able expectations of privacy in fire-damaged premises will vary depending 
particularly on the type of building involved. At one end of the spectrum 
is the private residence, where reasonable expectations will be pal'tiel:l:lePly ,..,-----~ 
strong and where government intrusion should be kept to a minimum. At 
the other end of the spectrum are commercial structures, such as commer-
cial warehouses, that are unlikely to contain much that is personal or 
private. 
7 This is not to suggest that individual expectations of privacy may 
prevail over interests of public safety. For example, when fire breaks out 
in an apartment unit of an apartment complex, the exigency exception may 
allow warrantless post-fire investigations where necessary to ensure 
against any immediate danger of future fire hazard. 
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ably necessary to determine the cause and origin of a fire and 
to ensure against rekindling. As soon as the investigators 
determined that the fire had originated in the basement and 
had been caused by the crock pot and timer found beneath 
the basement stairs, the scope of their search was limited to 
the basement area. Although the investigators could have 
used whatever evidence they discovered in the basement to 
establish probable cause to search the remainder of the 
house, they could not lawfully undertake that search without 
a prior judicial determination that a successful showing of 
probable cause had been made. Because there were no exi-
gent circumstances justifying the upstairs search, and it was 
undertaken without a prior showing of probable cause before 
an independent judicial officer, we hold that this search of a 
home was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, regardless of the validity of the basement 
search. 8 
The warrantless intrusion into the upstairs regions of the 
Clifford house presents a telling illustration of the importance 
of prior judicial review of proposed administrative searches. 
If an administrative warrant had been obtained in this case, 
it presumably would have limited the scope of the proposed 
investigation and would have prevented the warrantless in-
trusion into the upper rooms of the Clifford home. An ad-
8 In many cases, there will be no bright line separating the firefighters' 
investigation into the cause of a fire from a search for evidence of arson. 
The distinction will vary with the circumstances of the particular fire and 
generally will involve more than the lapse of time or the number of entries 
and re-entries. For example, once the cause of a fire in a single-family 
dwelling is determined, the administrative search should end and any 
broader investigation should be made pursuant to a criminal warrant. A 
fire in an apartment eemp!Qx, on the other hand, may present complexities 
that make it necessary for officials to conduct more expansive searches, to 
remain on the premises for longer periods of time, and to make repeated 
entries and re-entries into the building. See Tyler, 436 U. S. at 510 n. 6. 
Considerable latitude must be given to the compelling state interest in 
thorough investigations into the causes of recent fires . 
,, 
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ministrative search into the cause of a recent fire does not 
give fire officials license to roam freely through the fire vic-
tim's private residence. 
v 
The only pieces of physical evidence that have been chal-
lenged on this interlocutory appeal are the three empty fuel 
cans, the electric crock pot, and the timer and attached cord. 
Respondents also have challenged the testimony of the inves-
tigators concerning the warrantless search of both the base-
ment and the upstairs portions of the Clifford home. The 
discovery of two of the fuel cans, the crock pot, the timer and 
cord-as well as the investigators' related testimony-were 
the product of the unconstitutional post-fire search of the 
Clifford's residence. Thus, we affirm that portion of the 
judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals that excluded 
that evidence. One of the fuel cans was discovered in plain 
view in the Cliffords' driveway. This can was seen in plain 
view during the intial investigation by the firefighters. It 
would have been admissible whether it had been seized in the 
basement by the firefighters or in the driveway by the arson 
investigators. Exclusion of this evidence should be 
reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
v 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Syllabus 
MICHIGAN v. CLIFFORD ET AL. 
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MICHIGAN 
No. 82---357. Argued October 5, 1983--Decided 
Respondents' private residence was damaged by an early morning fire 
while they were out of town. Firefighters extinguished the blaze at 7:04 
a.m., at which time all fire officials and police left the premises. Five 
hours later, a team of arson investigators arrived at the residence for the 
first time to investigate the cause of the blaze. They found a work crew 
on the scene boarding up the house and pumping water out of the base-
ment. The investigators learned that respondents had been notified of 
the fire and had instructed their insurance agent to send the crew to se-
cure the house. Nevertheless, the investigators entered the residence 
and conducted an extensive search without obtaining either consent or 
an administrative warrant. Their search began in the basement where 
they found two Coleman fuel cans and a crock pot attached to an electri-
cal timer. The investigators determined that the fire had been caused 
by the crock pot and timer and had been set deliberately. After seizing 
and marking the evidence found in the basement, the investigators ex-
tended their search to the upper portions of the house where they found 
additional evidence of arson. Respondents were charged with arson and 
moved to suppress all the evidence seized in the warrantless search on 
the ground that it was obtained in violation of their rights under the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Michigan trial court denied 
the motion on the ground that exigent circumstances justified the 
search. On interlocutory appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals found 
that no exigent circumstances existed and reversed. 
Held: The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
J USTICE POWELL, joined by JUSTICE BRENNAN, J USTICE WHITE, and 
J USTICE MARSHALL, concluded that where reasonable expectations of 
privacy remain in fire-damaged premises, administrative searches into 
the cause and origin of a fire are subject to the warrant requirement of 
the Fourth Amendment absent consent or exigent circumstances. 
,. 
II MICHIGAN v. CLIFFORD 
Syllabus 
There are especially strong expectations of privacy in a private residence 
and respondents here retained significant privacy interests in the their 
fire-damaged home. Because the warrantless search of the basement 
and upper areas of respondents' home was authorized ?either by consent 
nor exigent circumstances, the evidence seized in that search was ob-
tained in violation of respondents' rights under the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments and must be suppressed. Pp. 4-11. 
(a) Where a warrant is necessary to search fire-damaged premises, 
an administrative warrant suffices if the primary object of the search is 
to determine the cause and origin of the fire, but a criminal search war-
rant, obtained upon a showing of probable cause, is required if the pri-
mary object of the search is to gather evidence of criminal activity. Pp. 
4-7. 
(b) The search here was not a continuation of an earlier search, and 
the privacy interests in the residence made the delay between the fire 
and the midday search unreasonable absent a warrant, consent, or exi-
gent circumstances. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, distinguished. 
Because the cause of the fire was lrnown upon search of the basement, 
the search of the upper portions of the house could only have been a 
search to gather evidence of arson requiring a criminal warrant absent 
exigent circumstances. Even if the basement search had been a valid 
administrative search, it would not have justified the upstairs search, 
since as soon as it had been determined that the fire originated in the 
basement, the scope of the search was limited to the basement area. 
Pp. 8-11. 
JUSTICE STEVENS concluded that the search of respondents' home was 
unreasonable in contravention of the Fourth Amendment because the in-
vestigators made no effort to provide fair advance notice of the inspec-
tion to respondents. A nonexigent, forceful, warrantless entry cannot 
be reasonable unless the investigator has made some effort to give the 
owner significant notice to be present while the investigation is made. 
Pp. fr7. 
POWELL, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opin-
ion, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined. STEVENS, 
J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. REHNQUIST, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., and BLACKMUN and O'CON-
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~DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-357 
MICHIGAN, PETITIONER v. RAYMOND CLIFFORD 
AND EMMA JEAN CLIFFORD 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
MICHIGAN 
[November -, 1983] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion for the Court. 
This case presents questions as tQ.{~uthority of arson 
investigators, in the absence of~igent circumstances 
or consent, to enter a private residence without a warrant to 
investigate the cause of a recent fire. 
I 
Respondents, Raymond and Emma Jean Clifford, were ar-
rested and charged with arson in connection with a fire at 
their private residence. At the preliminary examination 
held to establish probable cause for the alleged offense, the 
State introduced various pieces of physical evidence, most of 
which was obtained through a warrantless and nonconsensual 
search of the Clifford's fire-damaged home. Respondents 
moved to suppress this evidence on the ground that it was 
obtained in violation of their rights under the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. That motion was denied and re-
spondents were bound over for trial. Before trial, they 
again moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the 
search. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing 
and denied the motion on the ground that exigent circum-
stances justified the search. The court certified its eviden-
tiary ruling for interlocutory appeal and the Michigan Court 
of Appeals reversed. 
...: 
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That court held that there were no exigent circumstances 
justifying the search. Instead, it found that the warrantless 
entry and search of the Clifford residence was conducted pur-
suant to a policy of the Arson Division of the Detroit Fire De-
partment that sanctioned such searches as long as the owner 
was not present, the premises were open to trespass, and the 
search occurred within a reasonable time of the fire. The 
Court of Appeals held that this policy was inconsistent with 
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499 (1978), and that the war-
rantless nonconsensual search of the Cliffords' residence vio-
lated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. We granted certiorari to clarify doubt that appears 
to exist as to the application of our decision in Tyler. 
II 
In the early morning hours of October 18, 1980, a fire 
erupted at the Clifford home. The Cliffords were out of 
town on a camping trip at the time. The fire was reported to 
the Detroit Fire Department, and fire units arrived on the 
scene at about 5:42 a.m. The fire was extinguished and all 
fire officials and police left the premises at 7:04 a.m. 
At 8:00a.m. on the morning of the fire, Lieutenant Beyer, 
a fire investigator with the arson section of the Detroit Fire 
Department, received instructions to investigate the Clifford 
fire. He was informed that the Fire Department suspected 
arson. Because he had other assignments, Lieutenant 
Beyer did not proceed immediately to the Clifford residence. 
He and his partner finally arrived at the scene of the fire 
about 1:00 p.m. on October 18. 
When they arrived, they found a work crew on the scene. 
The crew was boarding up the house and pumping some six 
inches of water out of the basement. A neighbor told the in-
vestigators that he had called Clifford and had been in-
structed to request the Cliffords' insurance agent to send a 
boarding crew out to secure the house. The neighbor also 
advised that the Cliffords did not plan to return that day. 
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While the investigators waited for the water to be pumped 
out, they found a Coleman fuel can in the driveway that was 
seized and marked as evidence. 1 
By 1:30 p.m., the water had been pumped out of the base-
ment and Lieutenant Beyer and his partner, without obtain-
ing consent or an administrative warrant, entered the Clif-
ford residence and began their investigation into the cause of 
rf ~ the fire. Their search began in the basement and the ·~.~~~----..,q=m~cT:Tki~.Qisee•rere~that the fire had originated eneath the - basement stairway. They detected a strong odor of fuel 
throughout the basement, and found two more Coleman fuel 
cans beneath the stairway. As they dug through the debris, 
the investigators also found a crock pot with attached wires 
leading to an electrical timer that was plugged into an outlet 
a few feet away. The timer was set to turn on at approxi-
mately 3:45 a.m. and to turn back off at approximately 9:00 
a.m. It had stopped somewhere between 4:00 and 4:30a.m. 
All of this evidence was seized and marked. 
After determining that the fire had originated in the base-
ment, Lieutenant Beyer and his partner searched the re-
mainder of the house. The warrantless search that followed 
was extensive and thorough. The investigators called in a 
photographer to take pictures throughout the house. They 
searched through drawers and closets and found them full of 
old clothes. They inspected the rooms and noted that there 
were nails on the walls but no pictures. They found wiring 
/ and cassettes for a video tape machine but no machine. 
v/ Respondents moved to exc.pde all exhibits and testimony 
based on the basement and upstairs searches on the ground 
that they were searches to gather evidence of arson, that 
they were conducted without a warrant, consent, or exigent 
circumstances, and that they therefore were per se unreason-
able under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Peti-
' The can had been found in the basement by the fire officials who had 
fought the blaze. The firemen removed the can and put it by the side door 
where Lieutenant Beyer discovered it on his arrival. 
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tioner, on the other hand, argues that the entire search was 
reasonable and should be exempt from the warrant 
requirement. 
III 
In its petition for certiorari, the State does not challenge 
the state court's finding that there were no exigent circum-
stances justifying the search of the Clifford home. Instead, 
it asks us to exempt from the warrant requirement all admin-
istrative investigations into the cause and origin of a fire. 
We decline to do so. 
In Tyler, we restated the Court's position that adminis-
trative searches generally require warrants. 436 U. S., at 
504-508. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307 
(1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967); 
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967). We reaffirm 
that view again today. Except in certain carefully defined 
classes of cases, 2 the nonconsensual entry and search of prop-
erty is governed by the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. The constitutionality of war-
rantless and nonconsensual entries onto fire-damaged 
premises, therefore, normally turns on several factors: 
whether there are legitimate privacy interests in the fire-
damaged property that are protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment; whether exigent circumstances justify the government 
intrusion regardless of any reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy; and, whether the object of the search is to determine 
the cause of the fire or to gather evidence of criminal activity. 
A 
We observed in Tyler that reasonable privacy expectations 
may remain in fire-damaged premises. "People may go on 
living in their homes or working in their offices after a fire. 
j 
2 See e. g. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594 (1981) (heavily regulated 
business); United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972) (same); Colon-
~ -~r::!..._~~~}!,~~~~~ States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970) (same). The exceptions to the 
warran~recognized in these cases are not applicable to the 
warrantless search in tnis case. 
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/ 
Even when that is impossible, private effects often remain on 
the fire-damaged premises." Tyler, 436 U. S., at 5050 Pri- (;) 
vacy expectations will vary with the type of property, the 
amount of fire damage, the prior and continued use of the 
premises, and in some cases the owner's efforts to secure it 
against intruders. Some fires may be so devastating that no 
reasonable privacy interests remain in the ash and ruins, re-
gardless of the owner's subjective expectations. The testes-
sentially is an objective one: whether "the expectation [is] 
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' " 
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring). See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 
739-741 (1979). If reasonable privacy interests remain in 
the fire-damaged property, the warrant requirement applies~- ~ J 
_,JRd any official entry must be made pursuant to a warrant ~ tH 
V consent~gent circumstances. ()..,- ~ CL- D 
B 
A burning building of course creates an exigency that justi-
fies a warrantless entry by fire officials to fight the blaze. 
Moreover, in Tyler we held that once in the building, officials 
need no warrant to remain 3 for "a reasonable time to investi-
gate the cause of the blaze after it has been extinguished." 
436 U. S., at 510. Where, however, reasonable expectation's 
of privacy remain in the fire-damaged property, additional in-
vestigations begun after the fire has been extinguished and 
fire and police officials have left the scene, generally must be 
made pursuant to a warrant or the identification of some new 
exigency. 
3 We do not suggest that firemen fighting a fire normally remain within 
a building. The circumstances, of course, vary. In many situations ac-
tual entry may be too hazardous until the fire has been wholly extin-
guished, and even then the danger of collapsing walls may exist. Thus, 
the effort to ascertain the cause of a fire may extend over a period of time 
with entry and re-entry. The critical inquiry is whether reasonable expec-
tations of privacy exist in the fire-damaged premises at a particular time, 
and if so, whether exigencies justify the re-entries. 
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The aftermath of a fire often presents exigencies that will 
not tolerate the delay necessary to obtain a warrant or to se-
cure the owner's consent to inspect fire-damaged premises. 4 
Because determining the cause and origin of a fire serves a 
!compelling public interest, the warrant requirement does not J apply in such cases. c 
If a warrant is necessary, the object of the search deter-
mines the type of warrant required. If the primary object is 
to determine the cause and origin of a recent fire an a 
trative warrant will suffice. To obtain such a warrant, fire 
officials need show only that a fire of undetermined origin has 
occurred on the premises, that the scope of the proposed 
search is reasonable and will not intrude unnecessarily on the 
fire victim's privacy, and that the search will be executed at a 
reasonable and convenient time. 
If the primary object of the search is to gather evidence of 
cr1mma activity, a arrant may eo ame on yon as ow-
ing of probable cau e to believe that et"iminM: ev1 ence WI e 
found in the place to be searched. If eviden e of criminal ac-
tivity is discovered during the course of a valid adminis-
trative search, it may be seized under the "plain view" doc-
trine. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 465-466 
(1971). This evidence then may be used to establish proba-
ble cause to obtain a criminal search warrant. Fire officials 
may not, however, rely on this evidence to expand the scope 
of their administrative search without first making a success-
ful showing of probable cause to an independent judicial 
officer. 
The object of the search is important even if exigent cir-
cumstances exist. Circumstances that justify a warrantless 
'For example, an immediate threat that the blaze might rekindle 
presents an exigency that would justify a warrantless and nonconsensual 
post-fire investigation. Similarly, a post-fire search made to prevent 
the imminent destruction of evidence may be exempt from the warrant 
requirement. 
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search for the cause of a fire may not justify a search to 
gather evidence of criminal activity once that cause has been 
determined. If, for example, the administrative search is 
justified by the immediate need to ensure against rekindling, 
the scope of the search may be no broader than reasonably 
necessary to achieve its end. A search to gather evidence of 
criminal activity not in plain view must be made pursuant to a 
criminal warrant upon a traditional showing of probable 
Vcaus~ ~ 
The searches of the Clifford home, at least arguably, can be 
viewed as two separate ones: the delayed search of the base-
ment area, followed by the extensive search of the residential 
portion of the house. We now apply the principles outlined 
above to each of these searches. 
IV 
The Clifford home was a two-and-one-half story brick and 
frame residence. Although there was extensive damage to 
the lower interior structure, the exterior of the house and 
some of the upstairs rooms were largely undamaged by the 
fire, although there was some smoke damage. The firemen 
had broken out one of the doors and most of the windows in 
fighting the blaze. At the time Lieutenant Beyer and his 
partner arrived, the home was uninhabitable. But personal 
belongings remained, and the Cliffords had arranged to have 
the house secured against intrusion in their absence. Under 
these circumstances and in light of the strong expectations 
p-----....---:--- 'th a home, we hold that the Cliffords 
retained asonable privacy interests in their fire-damaged 
residence and that the post-fire investigations were subject 
to the warrant requirement. Thus, the warrantless and 
~ Ahe plain view doctrine must be applied in light of the special circum-
stances that frequently accompany fire damage. In searching solely to as-
certain the cause, firemen customarily must remove rubble or search other 
areas where the cause of fires are likely to be found. At the outset of such 
activities the evidence may not be, and often is not, in "plain view" in the 
literal sense of that term. 
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nonconsensual searches of both the basement and the 
stairs areas of the house ~ va 1d only if exigent circum-
s ances ·ustified the object an the scope of each. 
A 
As noted, the State does not claim that exigent circum-
~ ~s justified its ost-fire search UL ~ 
 ~lrgues that we should either exempt post-fire searches 
from the warrant requirement or modify Tyler to justify the 
~rrantless searchSin this case. We have rejected the 
. State's first argume~t and turn now to its second. 
In Tyler we upheld a warrantless post-fire search of a fur-
niture store, despite the absence of exigent circumstances, on 
the ground that it was a continuation of a valid search begun 
immediately after the fire. The investigation was begun as 
the last flames were being doused, but rwas lfttef'f'l:lptea a#= 
smoke and darkness. Ne v erifieli~ ;:)lie search was eem-
.1'-----=~:-::-::r• romptly after the s~ cleared and daylight 
dawn . Because the immeaiatClpost-fire search was inter-
rupted fop a FeaseRable peFioa af time, aru1'1or reasons that 
were evident, we held that the early morning search was "no 
more than an actual continuation of the first, and the lack of a 
warrant thus did not invalidate the resulting seizure of evi-
dence." 436 U. S., at 511. 
As the State conceded at oral argument, this case is distin-
guishable for several reasons. First, the challenged search 
was not a •continuation of an earlier search. Between the 
time the firefighters had extinguished the blaze and left the 
scene and the arson investigators first arrivedi to begin their 
investigation, the Cliffords had taken steps to secure the pri-
vacy interests that remained in their residence against fur-
ther intrusion. These efforts separate the entry made to ex-
tinguish the blaze from that made later to investigate its 
origin. Second, the privacy interests in the residence-par-
ticularly after the Cliffords had acted-were significantly 
greater than those in the fire-damaged furniture store, mak-
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/ ing the ~ delay between the fire and the mid-day 
search unreasonable absent a warrant, consent, or exigent 
circumstances. We frequently have noted that privacy in-
terests are especially strong in a private residence:::: These 
facts-the interim efforts to secure the burned-out premises 
and the heightened privacy interests in the home-distin-
guish this case from Tyler. At least where a homeowner has 
made a reasonable effort to secure his fire-damaged home 
after the blaze has been extinguished and the fire and police 
units have left the scene, we hold that a subsequent post-fire 
search must be conducted pursuant to a ~arrant, consent, or 
the identification of some new exigencr.... So long as the pri- <[> 
mary purpose is to ascertain the cause ofthe fire, an adminis- " 
trative warrant will suffice. 
B 
Because the cause of the fire was then known, the search of 
the upper portions of the house, described above, could only 
have been a search to gather evidence of the crime of arson. 
Absent exigent circumstances, such a search requires a crim-
inal warrant. 
Even if the mid-day basement search had been a valid ad-
ministrative search, it would not have justified the upstairs 
search. The scope of such a search is limited to that reason-
*"} /see e. g. Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 537, 589-90 (1980); United 
States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). Reason-
able expectations of privacy in fire-damaged premises will vary depending 
particularly on the type of building involved. At one end of the spectrum 
is the private residence, where reasonable expectations vnll ee f'!triieYlaFly--9-A ~ 
strong and where government intrusion should be kept to a minimum. At 
the other end of the spectrum are commercial structures, such as commer-
cial warehouses, that are unlikely to contain much that is personal or 
private. 
~ ,/'rhis is not to suggest that individual expectations of privacy may 
prevail over interests of public safety. For example, when fire breaks out 
in an apartment unit of an apartment complex, the exigency exception may 
allow warrantless post-fire investigations where necessary to ensure 
against any immediate danger of future fire hazard. 
,• 
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ably necessary to determine the cause and origin of a fire and 
to ensure against rekindling. As soon as the investigators 
determined that the fire had originated in the basement and 
had been caused by the crock pot and timer found beneath 
the basement stairs, the scope of their search was limited to 
the basement area. Although the investigators could have 
used whatever evidence they discovered in the basement to 
establish probable cause to search the remainder of the 
house, they could not lawfully undertake that search without 
a prior judicial determination that a successful showing of 
probable cause had been made. Because there were no exi-
gent circumstances justifying the upstairs search, and it was 
undertaken without a prior showing of probable cause before 
an independent judicial officer, we hold that this search of a 
home was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
flylendments, regardless of the validity of the basement 
V search~q 
The wariantless intrusion into the upstairs regions of the 
Clifford house presents a telling illustration of the importance 
of prior judicial review of proposed administrative searches. 
If an administrative warrant had been obtained in this case, 
it presumably would have limited the scope of the proposed 
investigation and would have prevented the warrantless in-
trusion into the upper rooms of the Clifford home. An ad-
/ '1 / In many cases, there will be no bright line separating the firefighters' 
investigation into the cause of a fire from a search for evidence of arson. 
The distinction will vary with the circumstances of the particular fire and 
generally will involve more than the lapse of time or the number of entries 
and re-entries. For example, once the cause of a fire in a single-family 
dwelling is determined, the administrative search should end and any 
broader investigation should be made pursuant to a criminal warrant. A 
fire in an apartment~ the other hand, may present complexities 
that make it necessary for officials to conduct more expansive searches, to 
remain on the premises for longer periods of time, and to make repeated 
entries and re-entries into the building. See Tyler, 436 U. S_;, at 51~ n. 6. 
Considerable latitude must be given to the compelling state interest in 
thorough investigations into the causes of recent fires. 
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ministrative search into the cause of a recent fire does not 
give fire officials license to roam freely through the fire vic-
tim's private residence. v 
The only pieces of physical evidence that have been chal-
lenged on this interlocutory appeal are the three empty fuel 
cans, the electric crock pot, and the timer and attached cord. 
Respondents also have challenged the testimony of the inves-
tigators concerning the warrantless search of both the base-
ment and the upstairs portions of the Clifford home. The 
discovery of two of the fuel cans, the crock pot, the timer and 
ft-as well as the investigators' related testimony-were pr~uct of the unconstitutional post-fire search of the liffor ' residence. Thus, we affirm that portion of the 
judgme of the Michigan Court of Appeals that excluded 
that evidence. One of the fuel cans was discovered in plain 
view in the Cliffords' driveway. This can was seen in plain 
view during the intial investigation by the firefighters. It 
would have been admissible whether it had been seized in the 
basement by the firefighters or in the driveway by the arson 
investigators. Exclusion of this evidence should be 
reversed. 
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This case presents questions as to the authority of arson 
investigators, in the absence of exigent circumstances or con-
sent, to enter a private residence without a warrant to inves-
tigate the cause of a recent fire. 
I 
Respondents, Raymond and Emma Jean Clifford, were ar-
rested and charged with arson in connection with a fire at 
their private residence. At the preliminary examination 
held to establish probable cause for the alleged offense, the 
State introduced various pieces of physical evidence, most of 
which was obtained through a warrantless and nonconsensual 
search of the Clifford's fire-damaged home. Respondents 
moved to suppress this evidence on the ground that it was 
obtained in violation of their rights under the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. That motion was denied andre-
spondents were bound over for trial. Before trial, they 
again moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the 
search. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing 
and denied the motion on the ground that exigent circum-
stances justified the search. The court certified its eviden-
tiary ruling for interlocutory appeal and the Michigan Court 
of Appeals reversed. 
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That court held that there were no exigent circumstances 
justifying the search. Instead, it found that the warrantless 
entry and search of the Clifford residence was conducted pur-
suant to a policy of the Arson Division of the Detroit Fire De-
partment that sanctioned such searches as long as the owner 
was not present, the premises were open to trespass, and the 
search occurred within a reasonable time of the fire. The 
Court of Appeals held that this policy was inconsistent with 
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499 (1978), and that the war-
rantless non consensual search of the Cliffords' residence vio-
lated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. We granted certiorari to clarify doubt that appears 
to exist as to the application of our decision in Tyler. 
II 
In the early morning hours of October 18, 1980, a fire 
erupted at the Clifford home. The Cliffords were out of 
town on a camping trip at the time. The fire was reported to 
the Detroit Fire Department, and fire units arrived on the 
scene at about 5:42a.m. The fire was extinguished and all 
fire officials and police left the premises at 7:04 a.m. 
At 8:00a.m. on the morning of the fire, Lieutenant Beyer, 
a fire investigator with the arson section of the Detroit Fire 
Department, received instructions to investigate the Clifford 
fire. He was informed that the Fire Department suspected 
arson. Because he had other assignments, Lieutenant 
Beyer did not proceed immediately to the Clifford residence. 
He and his partner finally arrived at the scene of the fire 
about 1:00 p.m. on October 18. 
When they arrived, they found a work crew on the scene. 
The crew was boarding up the house and pumping some six 
inches of water out of the basement. A neighbor told the in-
vestigators that he had called Clifford and had been in-
structed to request the Cliffords' insurance agent to send a 
boarding crew out to secure the house. The neighbor also 
advised that the Cliffords did not plan to return that day. 
(' 
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While the investigators waited for the water to be pumped 
out, they found a Coleman fuel can in the driveway that was 
seized and marked as evidence. 1 
By 1:30 p.m., the water had been pumped out of the base-
ment and Lieutenant Beyer and his partner, without obtain-
ing consent or an administrative warrant, entered the Clif-
ford residence and began their investigation into the cause of 
the fire. Their search began in the basement and they 
quickly confirmed that the fire had originated there beneath 
the basement stairway. They detected a strong odor of fuel 
throughout the basement, and found two more Coleman fuel 
cans beneath the stairway. As they dug through the debris, 
the investigators also found a crock pot with attached wires 
leading to an electrical timer that was plugged into an outlet 
a few feet away. The timer was set to turn on at approxi-
mately 3:45 a.m. and to turn back off at approximately 9:00 
a.m. It had stopped somewhere between 4:00 and 4:30a.m. 
All of this evidence was seized and marked. 
After determining that the fire had originated in the base-
ment, Lieutenant Beyer and his partner searched the re-
mainder of the house. The warrantless search that followed 
was extensive and thorough. The investigators called in a 
photographer to take pictures throughout the house. They 
searched through drawers and closets and found them full of 
old clothes. They inspected the rooms and noted that there 
were nails on the walls but no pictures. They found wiring 
and cassettes for a video tape machine but no machine. 
Respondents moved to exclude all exhibits and testimony 
based on the basement and upstairs searches on the ground 
that they were searches to gather evidence of arson, that 
they were conducted without a warrant, consent, or exigent 
circumstances, and that they therefore were per se unreason-
able under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Peti-
' The can had been found in the basement by the fire officials who had 
fought the blaze. The firemen removed the can and put it by the side door 
where Lieutenant Beyer discovered it on his arrival. 
82--357-0PINION 
4 MICHIGAN v. CLIFFORD 
tioner, on the other hand, argues that the entire search was 
reasonable and should be exempt from the warrant 
requirement. 
III 
In its petition for certiorari, the State does not challenge 
the state court's finding that there were no exigent circum-
stances justifying the search of the Clifford home. Instead, 
it asks us to exempt from the warrant requirement all admin-
istrative investigations into the cause and origin of a fire. 
We decline to do so. 
In Tyler, we restated the Court's position that adminis-
trative searches generally require warrants. 436 U. S., at 
504-508. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307 
(1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967); 
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967). We reaffirm 
that view again today. Except in certain carefully defined 
classes of cases, 2 the nonconsensual entry and search of prop-
erty is governed by the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. The constitutionality of war-
rantless and nonconsensual entries onto fire-damaged 
premises, therefore, normally turns on several factors: 
whether there are legitimate privacy interests in the fire-
damaged property that are protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment; whether exigent circumstances justify the government 
intrusion regardless of any reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy; and, whether the object of the search is to determine 
the cause of the fire or to gather evidence of criminal activity. 
A 
We observed in Tyler that reasonable privacy expectations 
may remain in fire-damaged premises. "People may go on 
living in their homes or working in their offices after a fire. 
2 See e. g. Donovon v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594 (1981) (heavily regulated 
business); United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972) (same); Colon-
nade v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970) (same). The exceptions to the 
warrant requirement recognized in these cases are not applicable to the 
warrantless search in this case. 
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Even when that is impossible, private effects often remain on 
the fire-damaged premises." Tyler, 436 U. S., at 505. Pri-
vacy expectations will vary with the type of property, the 
amount of fire damage, the prior and continued use of the 
premises, and in some cases the owner's efforts to secure it 
against intruders. Some fires may be so devastating that no 
reasonable privacy interests remain in the ash and ruins, re-
gardless of the owner's subjective expectations. The testes-
sentially is an objective one: whether "the expectation [is] 
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" 
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring). See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 
739-741 (1979). If reasonable privacy interests remain in 
the fire-damaged property, the warrant requirement applies, 
and any official entry must be made pursuant to a warrant, in 
the absence of consent or exigent circumstances. 
B 
A burning building of course creates an exigency that justi-
fies a warrantless entry by fire officials to fight the blaze. 
Moreover, in Tyler we held that once in the building, officials 
need no warrant to remain 3 for "a reasonable time to investi-
gate the cause of the blaze after it has been extinguished." 
436 U. S., at 510. Where, however, reasonable expectations 
of privacy remain in the fire-damaged property, additional in-
vestigations begun after the fire has been extinguished and 
fire and police officials have left the scene, generally must be 
made pursuant to a warrant or the identification of some new 
exigency. 
3 We do not suggest that firemen fighting a fire normally remain within 
a building. The circumstances, of course, vary. In many situations ac-
tual entry may be too hazardous until the fire has been wholly extin-
guished, and even then the danger of collapsing walls may exist. Thus, 
the effort to ascertain the cause of a fire may extend over a period of time 
with entry and re-entry. The critical inquiry is whether reasonable expec-
tations of privacy exist in the fire-damaged premises at a particular time, 
and if so, whether exigencies justify the re-entries. 
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The aftermath of a fire often presents exigencies that will 
not tolerate the delay necessary to obtain a warrant or to se-
cure the owner's consent to inspect fire-damaged premises. 4 
Because determining the cause and origin of a fire serves a 
compelling public interest, the warrant requirement does not 
apply in such cases. 
c 
If a warrant is necessary, the object of the search deter-
mines the type of warrant required. If the primary object is 
to determine the cause and origin of a recent fire, an adminis-
trative warrant will suffice. 6 To obtain such a warrant, fire 
officials need show only that a fire of undetermined origin has 
occurred on the premises, that the scope of the proposed 
search is reasonable and will not intrude unnecessarily on the 
fire victim's privacy, and that the search will be executed at a 
reasonable and convenient time. 
If the primary object of the search is to gather evidence of 
criminal activity, a criminal search warrant may be obtained 
only on a showing of probable cause to believe that relevant 
evidence will be found in the place to be searched. If evi-
dence of criminal activity is discovered during the course of a 
valid administrative search, it may be seized under the "plain 
view'' doctrine. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 
465-466 (1971). This evidence then may be used to establish 
probable cause to obtain a criminal search warrant. Fire of-
ficials may not, however, rely on this evidence to expand the 
scope of their administrative search without first making a 
• For example, an immediate threat that the blaze might rekindle 
presents an exigency that would justify a warrantless and nonconsensual 
post-fire investigation. Similarly, a post-fire search made to prevent 
the imminent destruction of evidence may be exempt from the warrant 
requirement. 
6 Probable cause to issue an administrative warrant exists if reasonable 
legislative, administrative, or judicially prescribed standards for conduct-
ing an inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. See 
Tyler, 436 U. S., at 508; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S., at 538. 
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successful showing of probable cause to an independent judi-
cial officer. 
The object of the search is important even if exigent cir-
cumstances exist. Circumstances that justify a warrantless 
search for the cause of a fire may not justify a search to 
gather evidence of criminal activity once that cause has been 
determined. If, for example, the administrative search is 
justified by the immediate need to ensure against rekindling, 
the scope of the search may be no broader than reasonably 
necessary to achieve its end. A search to gather evidence of 
criminal activity not in plain view must be made pursuant to a 
criminal warrant upon a traditional showing of probable 
cause.6 
The searches of the Clifford home, at least arguably, can be 
viewed as two separate ones: the delayed search of the base-
ment area, followed by the extensive search of the residential 
portion of the house. We now apply the principles outlined 
above to each of these searches. 
IV 
The Clifford home was a two-and-one-half story brick and 
frame residence. Although there was extensive damage to 
the lower interior structure, the exterior of the house and 
some of the upstairs rooms were largely undamaged by the 
fire, although there was some smoke damage. The firemen 
had broken out one of the doors and most of the windows in 
fighting the ·blaze. At the time Lieutenant Beyer and his 
partner arrived, the home was uninhabitable. But personal 
belongings remained, and the Cliffords had arranged to have 
'"'- the house secured against intrusion in their absence. Under 
these circumstances, and in light of the strong expectations 
6 The plain view doctrine must be applied in light of the special circum-
stances that frequently accompany fire damage. In searching solely to as-
certain the cause, firemen customarily must remove rubble or search other 
areas where the cause of fires are likely to be found. At the outset of such 
activities the evidence may not be, and often is not, in "plain view'' in the 
literal sense of that term. 
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of privacy associated with a home, we hold that the Cliffords 
retained reasonable privacy interests in their fire-damaged 
residence and that the post-fire investigations were subject 
to the warrant requirement. Thus, the warrantless and 
nonconsensual searches of both the basement and the up-
stairs areas of the house would havew been valid only if exi-




As noted, the State does not claim that exigent circum- e_ 
stances justified its post-fire searchs. It argues that we 
either should exempt post-fire search~ from the warrant re-
quirement or modify Tyler to justify the warrantless 
searches in this case. We have rejected the State's first ar-
gument and turn now to its second. 
In Tyler we upheld a warrantless post-fire search of a fur-
niture store, despite the absence of exigent circumstances, on 
the ground that it was a continuation of a valid search begun 
immediately after the fire. The investigation was begun as 
the last flames were being doused, but could not be com-
pleted because of smoke and darkness. The search was re-
sumed promptly after the smoke cleared and daylight 
dawned. Because the post-fire search was interrupted for 
reasons that were evident, we held that the early morning 
search was "no more than an actual continuation of the first, 
and the lack of a warrant thus did not invalidate the resulting 
seizure of evidence." 436 U. S., at 511. 
As the State conceded at oral argument, this case is distin-
guishable for several reasons. First, the challenged search 
was not a continuation of an earlier search. Between the 
time the firefighters had extinguished the blaze and left the 
scene and the arson investigators first arrived about 1:00 
p.m. to begin their investigation, the Cliffords had taken 
steps to secure the privacy interests that remained in their 
residence against further intrusion. These efforts separate 
the entry made to extinguish the blaze from that made later 
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to investigate its origin. Second, the privacy interests in the 
residence-particularly after the Cliffords had acted-were 
significantly greater than those in the fire-damaged furniture 
store, making the delay between the fire and the mid-day 
search unreasonable absent a warrant, consent, or exigent 
circumstances. We frequently have noted that privacy in-
terests are especially strong in a private residence. 7 These 
facts-the interim efforts to secure the burned-out premises 
.and the heightened privacy interests in the home-distin-
guish this case from Tyler. At least where a homeowner has 
made a reasonable effort to secure his fire-damaged home 
after the blaze has been extinguished and the fire and police 
units have left the scene, we hold that a subsequent post-fire 
search must be conducted pursuant to a warrant, consent, or " 
the identification of some new exigency. 8 So long as the pri-
mary purpose is to ascertain the cause of the fire, an adminis-
trative warrant will suffice. 
B 
Because the cause of the fire was then known, the search of 
the upper portions of the house, described above, could only 
have been a search to gather evidence of the crime of arson. 
Absent exigent circumstances, such a search requires a crim-
inal warrant. 
7 See e. g. Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 537, 58~90 (1980); United 
States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). Reason-
able expectations of privacy in fire-damaged premises will vary depending 
particularly on the type of building involved. At one end of the spectrum 
is the private residence, where reasonable expectations are strong and 
where government intrusion should be kept to a minimum. At the other 
end of the spectrum are commercial structures, such as commercial ware-
houses, that are unlikely to contain much that is personal or private. 
8 This is not to suggest that individual expectations of privacy may 
prevail over interests of public safety. For example, when fire breaks out 
in an apartment unit of an apartment complex, the exigency exception may 
allow warrantless post-fire investigations where necessary to ensure 
against any immediate danger of future fire hazard. 
.r 
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Even if the mid-day basement search had been a valid ad-
ministrative search, it would not have justified the upstairs 
search. The scope of such a search is limited to that reason-
ably necessary to determine the cause and origin of a fire and 
to ensure against rekindling. As soon as the investigators 
determined that the fire had originated in the basement and 
had been caused by the crock pot and timer found beneath 
the basement stairs, the scope of their search was limited to 
the basement area. Although the investigators could have 
used whatever evidence they discovered in the basement to 
establish probable cause to search the remainder of the 
house, they could not lawfully undertake that search without 
a prior judicial determination that a successful showing of 
probable cause had been made. Because there were no exi-
gent circumstances justifying the upstairs search, and it was 
undertaken without a prior showing of probable cause before 
an independent judicial officer, we hold that this search of a 
home was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, regardless of the validity of the basement 
search. 9 
The warrantless intrusion into the upstairs regions of the 
Clifford house presents a telling illustration of the importance 
of prior judicial review of proposed administrative searches. 
If an administrative warrant had been obtained in this case, 
9 In many cases, there will be no bright line separating the firefighters' 
investigation into the cause of a fire from a search for evidence of arson. 
The distinction will vary with the circumstances of the particular fire and 
generally will involve more than the lapse of time or the number of entries 
and re-entries. For example, once the cause of a fire in a single-family 
dwelling is determined, the administrative search should end and any 
broader investigation should be made pursuant to a criminal warrant. A 
fire in an apartment, on the other hand, may present complexities that 
make it necessary for officials to conduct more expansive searches, to re-
main on the premises for longer periods of time, and to make repeated en-
tries and re-entries into the building. See Tyler, 436 U. S., at 510, n. 6. 
Considerable latitude must be given to the compelling state interest in 
thorough investigations into the causes of recent fires. 
J 
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-it presumably would have limited the scope of the proposed 
investigation and would h~ve prevented the warrantless in-
trusion into the upper rooms of the Clifford home. An ad-
ministrative search into the cause of a recent fire does not 
give fire officials license to roam freely through the fire vic-
J tim's private residence. v 
_ ; The only pieces of physical evidence that have been chal-
~enged on this interlocutory appeal are the three empty fuel 
cans, the electric crock pot, and the timer and attached cord. 
Respondents also have challenged the testimony of the inves-
tigators concerning the warrantless search of both the base-
ment and the upstairs portions of the Clifford home. The 
discovery of two of the fuel cans, the crock pot, the timer and 
cord-as well as the investigators' related testimony-were 
the product of the unconstitutional post-fire search of the 
Cliffords' residence. Thus, we affirm that portion of the 
judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals that excluded 
that evidence. One of the fuel cans was discovered in plain 
view in the Cliffords' driveway. This can was seen in plain 
view during the intial investigation by the firefighters. It 
would have been admissible whether it had been seized in the 
basement by the firefighters or in the driveway by the arson 
investigators. Exclusion of this evidence should be 
reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion for the Court. 
This case presents questions as to the authority of arson 
investigators, in the absence of exigent circumstances ·or con-
sent, to enter a private residence without a warrant to inves-
tigate the cause of a recent fire. 
I 
Respondents, Raymond and Emma Jean Clifford, were ar-
rested and charged with arson in connection with a fire at 
their private residence. At the preliminary examination 
held to establish probable cause for the alleged offense, the 
State introduced various pieces of physical evidence, most of 
which was obtained through a warrantless and nonconsensual 
search of the Clifford's fire-damaged home. Respondents 
moved to suppress this evidence on the ground that it was 
obtained in violation of their rights under the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. That motion was denied and re-
spondents were bound over for trial. Before trial, they 
again moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the 
search. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing 
and denied the motion on the ground that exigent circum-
stances justified the search. · The court certified its eviden-
tiary ruling for interlocutory appeal and the Michigan Court 
of Appeals reversed. 
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That court held that there were no exigent circumstances 
·justifying the search. Instead, it found that the warrantless 
entry and search of the Clifford residence was conducted pur-
suant to a policy of the Arson Division of the Detroit Fire De-
partment that sanctioned such searches as long as the owner 
was not present, the premises were open to trespass, and the 
search occurred within a reasonable time of the fire. The 
Court of Appeals held that this policy was inconsistent with 
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499 (1978), and that the war-
rantless nonconsensual search of the Cliffords' residence vio-
lated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. We granted certiorari to clarify doubt that appears 
to exist as to the application of our decision in Tyler. 
n, 
In the early morning hours of October 18, 1980, a fire 
erupted at the Clifford home. The Cliffords . were out of 
town on a camping trip at the time. The fire was reported to 
the Detroit Fire Department, and fire units arrived on the 
scene at about 5:42 a. m. The fire was extinguished and all 
fire officials and police left the premises at 7:04 a. m. 
At 8:00 a. m. on the morning of the fire, Lieutenant Beyer, 
a fire investigator with the arson section of the Detroit Fire 
Department, received instructions to investigate the Clifford 
fire. He was informed that the Fire Department suspected 
arson. Because he had other assignments, Lieutenant 
Beyer did not proceed immediately to the Clifford residence. 
He and his partner finally arrived at the scene of the fire 
about 1:00 p. m. on October 18. 
When they arrived, they found a work crew on the scene. 
The crew was boarding up the house and pumping some six 
inches of water out of the basement. A neighbor told the in-
vestigators that he had called Clifford and had been in-
structed to request the Cliffords' insurance agent to send a 
boarding crew out to secure the house. The neighbor also 
advised that the Cliffords did not plan to return that day. 
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While the investigators waited for the water to be pumped 
out, they found a Coleman fuel can in the driveway that was 
seized and marked as evidence. 1 
By 1:30 p. m., the water had been pumped out of the base-
ment and Lieutenant Beyer and his partner, without obtain-
ing consent or an administrative warrant, entered the Clif-
ford residence and began their investigation into the cause of 
the fire. Their search began in the basement and they 
quickly confirmed that the fire had originated there beneath 
the basement stairway. They detected a strong odor of fuel 
throughout the basement, and found two more Coleman fuel 
cans beneath the stairway. As they dug through the debris, 
the investigators also found a crock pot with attached wires 
leading to an electrical timer that was plugged into an outlet 
a few feet away. The timer was set to turn on at approxi-
mately 3:45 a. m. and to turn back off at approximately 9:00 
a. m. It had stopped somewhere between 4:00 and 4:30 a. m. 
All of this evidence was seized and marked. 
After determining that the fire had originated in the base-
ment, Lieutenant Beyer and his partner searched the re-
mainder of the house. The warrantless search that followed 
was extensive and thorough. The investigators called in a 
photographer to take pictures throughout the house. They 
searched through drawers and closets and found them full of 
old clothes. They inspected the rooms and noted that there 
were nails on the walls but no pictures. They found wiring 
and cassettes for a video tape machine but no machine. 
Respondents moved to exclude all exhibits and testimony 
based on the basement and upstairs searches on the ground 
that they were searches to gather evidence of arson, that 
they were conducted without a warrant, consent, or exigent 
circumstances, and that they therefore were per se unreason-
1 The can had been found in the basement by the fire officials who had 
fought the blaze. The firemen removed the can and put it by the side door 
where Lieutenant Beyer discovered it on his arrival. 
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able under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Peti-
tioner, on the other hand, argues that the entire search 
was reasonable and should be exempt from the warrant 
requirement. 
III 
In its petition for certiorari, the State does not challenge 
the state court's finding that there were no exigent circum-
stances justifying the search of the Clifford home. Instead, 
it asks us to exempt from the warrant requirement all admin-
istrative investigations into the cause and origin of a fire. 
We decline to do so. 
In Tyler, we restated the Court's position that adminis-
trative searches generally require warrants. 436 U. S., at 
504-508. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307 
(1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967); 
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967). We reaffirm 
that view again today. Except in certain carefully defined 
classes of cases, 2 the nonconsensual entry and search of prop-
erty is governed by the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. The constitutionality of 
warrantless and nonconsensual entries onto fire-damaged 
premises, therefore, normally turns on several factors: 
whether there are legitimate privacy interests in the fire-
damaged property that are protected by the Fourth' Amend-
ment; whether exigent circumstances justify the government 
intrusion regardless of any reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy; and, whether the object of the search is to determine 
the cause of the fire or to gather evidence of criminal activity. 
A 
We observed in Tyler that reasonable privacy expectations 
may remain in fire-damaged premises. "People may go on 
2 See e. g. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594 (1981) (heavily regulated 
business); United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972) (same); Colon-
nade v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970) (same). The exceptions to the 
warrant requirement recognized in these cases are not applicable to the 
warrantless search in this case. 
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living in their homes or working in their offices after a fire. 
Even when that is impossible, private effects often remain on 
the fire-damaged premises." Tyler, 436 U. S., at 505. Pri-
vacy expectations will vary with the type of property, the 
amount of fire damage, the prior and contiimed use of the 
premises, and in some cases the owner's efforts to secure it 
against intruders. Some fires may be so devastating that no 
reasonable privacy interests remain in the ash and ruins, re-
gardless of the owner's subjective expectations. The testes-
sentially is an objective one: whether "the expectation [is] 
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' " 
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring). See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 
739-741 (1979). If reasonable privacy interests remain in 
the fire-damaged property, the warrant requirement applies, 
and any official entry must be made pursuant to a warrant in 
the absence of consent or exigent circumstances. 
B 
A burning building of course creates an exigency that justi-
fies a warrantless entry by fire officials to fight the blaze. 
Moreover, in Tyler we held that once in the building, officials 
need no warrant to remain 3 for "a reasonable time to investi-
gate the cause of the blaze after it has been extinguished." 
436 U. S., at 510. Where, however, reasonable expectations 
of privacy remain in the fire-damaged property, additional in-
vestigations begun after the fire has been extinguished and 
fire and police officials have left the scene, generally must be 
3 We do not suggest that firemen fighting a fire normally remain within 
a building. The circumstances, of course, vary. In many situations ac-
tual entry may be too hazardous until the fire has been wholly extin-
guished, and even then the danger of collapsing walls may exist. Thus, 
the effort to ascertain the cause of a fire may extend over a period of time 
with entry and re-entry. The critical inquiry is whether reasonable expec-
tations of privacy exist in the fire-damaged premises at a particular time, 
and if so, whether exigencies justify the re-entries. 
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made pursuant to a warrant or the identification of some new 
exigency. 
The aftermath of a fire often presents exigencies that will 
not tolerate the delay necessary to obtain a warrant or to se-
cure the owner's consent to inspect fire-damaged premises. 4 
Because determining the cause and origin of a fire serves a 
compelling public interest, the warrant requirement does not 
apply in such cases. c 
If a warrant is necessary, the object of the search deter-
mines the type of warrant required. If the primary object is 
to determine the cause and origin of a recent fire, an adminis-
trative warrant will suffice. 5 To obtain such a warrant, fire 
officials need show only that a fire of undetermined origin has 
occurred on the premises, that the scope of the proposed 
search is reasonable and will not intrude unnecessarily on the 
fire victim's privacy, and that the search will be executed at a 
reasonable and convenient time. 
If the primary object of the search is to gather evidence of 
criminal activity, a criminal search warrant may be obtained 
only on a showing of probable cause to believe that relevant 
evidence will be found in the place to be searched. If evi-
dence of criminal activity is discovered during the course of a 
valid administrative search, it may be seized under the "plain 
view" doctrine. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 
465-466 (1971). This evidence then may be used to establish 
probable cause to obtain a criminal search warrant. Fire of-
ficials may not, however, rely on this evidence to expand the 
' For example, an immediate threat that the blaze might rekindle 
presents an exigency that would justify a warrantless and nonconsensual 
post-fire investigation. Similarly, a post-fire search made to prevent 
the imminent destruction of evidence may be exempt from the warrant 
requirement. 
5 Probable cause to issue an administrative warrant exists if reasonable 
legislative, administrative, or judicially prescribed standards for conduct-
ing an inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. See 
Tyler, 436 U. S. , at 508; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S., at 538. 
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scope of their administrative search without first making a 
successful showing of probable cause to an independent judi-
cial officer. 
The object of the search is important even if exigent cir-
cumstances exist. Circumstances that justify a warrantless 
search for the cause of a fire may not justify a search to 
gather evidence of criminal activity once that cause has been 
determined. If, for example, the administrative search is 
justified by the immediate need to ensure against rekindling, 
the scope of the search may be no broader than reasonably 
necessary to achieve its end. A search to gather evidence of 
criminal activity not in plain view must be made pursuant 
to a criminal warrant upon a traditional showing of probable 
cause. 6 
The searches of the Clifford home, at least arguably, can be 
viewed as two separate ones: the delayed search of the base-
ment area, followed by the extensive search of the residential 
portion of the house. We now apply the principles outlined 
above to each of these searches. 
IV 
The Clifford home was a two-and-one-half story brick and 
frame residence. Although there was extensive damage to 
the lower interior structure, the exterior of the house and 
some of the upstairs rooms were largely undamaged by the 
fire, although there was some smoke damage. The firemen 
had broken out one of the doors and most of the windows in 
fighting the blaze. At the time Lieutenant Beyer and his 
partner arrived, the home was uninhabitable. But personal 
belongings remained, and the Cliffords had arranged to have 
the house secured against intrusion in their absence. Under 
6 The plain view doctrine must be applied in light of the special circum-
stances that frequently accompany fire damage. In searching solely to as-
certain the cause, firemen customarily must remove rubble or search other 
areas where the cause of fires are likely to be found. At the outset of such 
activities the evidence may not be, and often is not, in "plain view" in the 
literal sense of that term. 
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these circumstances, and in light of the strong expectations 
of privacy associated with a home, we hold that the Cliffords 
retained reasonable privacy interests in their fire-damaged 
residence and that the post-fire investigations were subject 
to the warrant requirement. Thus, the warrantless and 
nonconsensual searches of both the basement and the up-
stairs areas of the house would have been valid only if exigent 
circumstances had justified the object and the scope of each. 
A 
As noted, the State does not claim that exigent circum-
stances justified its post-fire searches. It argues that we 
either should exempt post-fire searches from the warrant 
requirement or modify Tyler to justify the warrantless 
searches in this case. We have rejected the State's first ar-
gument and turn now to its second. 
In Tyler we upheld a warrantless post-fire search of a fur-
niture store, despite the absence of exigent circumstances, on 
the ground that it was a continuation of a valid search begun 
immediately after the fire. The investigation was begun as 
the last flames were being doused, but could not be com-
pleted because of smoke and darkness. The search was re-
sumed promptly after the smoke cleared and daylight 
dawned. Because the post-fire search was interrupted for 
reasons that were evident, we held that the early morning 
search was "no more than an actual continuation of the first, 
and the lack of a warrant thus did not invalidate the resulting 
seizure of evidence." 436 U. S., at 511. 
As the State conceded at oral argument, this case is distin-
guishable for several reasons. First, the challenged search 
was not a continuation of an earlier search. Between the 
time the firefighters had extinguished the blaze and left the 
scene and the arson investigators first arrived about 1:00 p. 
m. to begin their investigation, the Cliffords had taken steps 
to secure the privacy interests that remained in their resi-
dence against further intrusion. These efforts separate the 
entry made to extinguish the blaze from that made later to 
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investigate its origin. Second, the privacy interests in the 
residence-particularly after the Cliffords had acted-were 
significantly greater than those in the fire-damaged furniture 
store, making the delay between the fire and the mid-day 
search unreasonable absent a warrant, consent, or exigent 
circumstances. We frequently have noted that privacy in-
terests are especially strong in a private residence. 7 These 
facts-the interim efforts to secure the burned-out premises 
and the heightened privacy interests in the home-distin-
guish this case from Tyler. At least where a homeowner has 
made a reasonable effort to secure his fire-damaged home 
after the blaze has been extinguished and the fire and police 
units have left the scene, we hold that a subsequent post-fire 
search must be conducted pursuant to a warrant, consent, or 
the identification of some new exigency. 8 So long as the pri-
mary purpose is to ascertain the cause of the fire, an adminis-
trative warrant will suffice. 
B 
Because the cause of the fire was then known, the search of 
the upper portions of the house, described above, could only 
have been a search to gather evidence of the crime of arson. 
Absent exigent circumstances, such a search requires a crim-
inal warrant. 
7 See e. g. Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 537, 589-90 (1980); United 
States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). Reason-
able expectations of privacy in fire-damaged premises will vary depending 
particularly on the type of building involved. At one end of the spectrum 
is the private residence, where reasonable expectations are strong and 
where government intrusion should be kept to a minimum. At the other 
end of the spectrum are commercial structures, such as commercial ware-
houses, that are unlikely to contain much that is personal or private. 
8 This is not to suggest that individual expectations of privacy may 
prevail over interests of public safety. For example, when fire breaks out 
in an apartment unit of an apartment complex, the exigency exception may 
allow warrantless post-fire investigations where necessary to ensure 
against any immediate danger of future fire hazard. 
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Even if the mid-day basement search had been a valid ad-
ministrative search, it would not have justified the upstairs 
search. The scope of such a search is limited to that reason-
ably necessary to determine the cause and origin of a fire and 
to ensure against rekindling. As soon as the investigators 
determined that the fire had originated in the basement and 
had been caused by the crock pot and timer found beneath 
the basement stairs, the scope of their search was limited to 
the basement area. Although the investigators could have 
used whatever evidence they discovered in the basement to 
establish probable cause to search the remainder of the 
house, they could not lawfully undertake that search without 
a prior judicial determination that a successful showing of 
probable cause had been made. Because there were no exi-
gent circumstances justifying the upstairs search, and it was 
undertaken without a prior showing of probable cause before 
an independent judicial officer, we hold that this search of a 
home was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, regardless of the validity of the basement 
search. 9 
The warrantless intrusion into the upstairs regions of the 
Clifford house presents a telling illustration of the importance 
of prior judicial review of proposed administrative searches. 
If an administrative warrant had been obtained in this case, 
9 In many cases, there will be no bright line separating the firefighters' 
investigation into the cause of a fire from a search for evidence of arson. 
The distinction will vary with the circumstances of the particular fire and 
generally will involve more than the lapse of time or the number of entries 
and re-entries. For example, once the cause of a fire in a single-family 
dwelling is determined, the administrative search should end and any 
broader investigation should be made pursuant to a criminal warrant. A 
fire in an apartment, on the other hand, may present complexities that 
make it necessary for officials to conduct more expansive searches, to re-
main on the premises for longer periods of time, and to make repeated en-
tries and re-entries into the building. See Tyler, 436 U. S., at 510, n. 6. 
Considerable latitude must be given to the compelling state interest in 
thorough investigations into the causes of recent fires. 
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it presumably would have limited the scope of the proposed 
investigation and would have prevented the warrantless in-
trusion into the upper rooms of the Clifford home. An ad-
ministrative search into the cause of a recent fire does not 
give fire officials license to roam freely through the fire vic-
tim's private residence. 
v 
The only pieces of physical evidence that have been chal-
lenged on this interlocutory appeal are the three empty fuel 
cans, the electric crock pot, and the timer and attached cord. 
Respondents also have challenged the testimony of the inves-
tigators concerning the warrantless search of both the base-
ment and the upstairs portions of the Clifford home. The 
discovery of two of the fuel cans, the crock pot, the timer and 
cord-as well as the investigators' related testimony-were 
the product of the unconstitutional post-fire search of the 
Cliffords' residence. Thus, we affirm that portion of the 
judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals that excluded 
that evidence. One of the fuel cans was discovered in plain 
view in the Cliffords' driveway. This can was seen in plain 
view during the intial investigation by the firefighters. It 
would have been admissible whether it had been seized in 
the basement by the firefighters or in the driveway by the 
arson investigators. Exclusion of this evidence should be 
reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion for the Court. 
This case presents questions as to the authority of arson 
investigators, in the absence of exigent circumstances or con-
sent, to enter a private residence without a warrant to inves-
tigate the cause of a recent fire. 
I 
Respondents, Raymond and Emma Jean Clifford, were ar-
rested and charged with arson in connection with a fire at 
their private residence. At the preliminary examination 
held to establish probable cause for the alleged offense, the 
State introduced various pieces of physical evidence, most of 
which was obtained through a warrantless and nonconsensual 
search of the Clifford's fire-damaged home. Respondents 
moved to suppress this evidence on the ground that it was 
obtained in violation of their rights under the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. That motion was denied and re-
spondents were bound over for trial. Before trial, they 
again moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the 
search. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing 
and denied the motion on the ground that exigent circum-
stances justified the search. · The court certified its eviden-
tiary ruling for interlocutory appeal and the Michigan Court 
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That court held that there were no exigent circumstances 
justifying the search. Instead, it found that the warrantless 
entry and search of the Clifford residence was conducted pur-
suant to a policy of the Arson Division of the Detroit Fire De-
partment that sanctioned such searches as long as the owner 
was not present, the premises were open to trespass, and the 
search occurred within a reasonable time of the fire. The 
Court of Appeals held that this policy was inconsistent with 
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499 (1978), and that the war-
rantless nonconsensual search of the Cliffords' residence vio-
lated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. We granted certiorari to clarify doubt that appears 
to exist as to the application of our decision in Tyler. 
II• 
In the early morning hours of October 18, 1980, a fire 
erupted at the Clifford home. The Cliffords were out of 
town on a camping trip at the time. The fire was reported to 
the Detroit Fire Department, and fire units arrived on the 
scene at about 5:42 a. m. The fire was extinguished and all 
fire officials and police left the premises at 7:04 a. m. 
At 8:00 a. m. on the morning of the fire, Lieutenant Beyer, 
a fire investigator with the arson section of the Detroit Fire 
Department, received instructions to investigate the Clifford 
fire. He was informed that the Fire Department suspected 
arson. Because he had other assignments, Lieutenant 
Beyer did not proceed immediately to the Clifford residence. 
He and his partner finally arrived at the scene of the fire 
about 1:00 p. m. on October 18. 
When they arrived, they found a work crew on the scene. 
The crew was boarding up the house and pumping some six 
inches of water out of the basement. A neighbor told the in-
vestigators that he had called Clifford and had been in-
structed to request the Cliffords' insurance agent to send a 
boarding crew out to secure the house. The neighbor also 
advised that the Cliffords did not plan to return that day. 
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While the investigators waited for the water to be pumped 
out, they found a Coleman fuel can in the driveway that was 
seized and marked as evidence.' 
By 1:30 p. m., the water had been pumped out of the base-
ment and Lieutenant Beyer and his partner, without obtain-
ing consent or an administrative warrant, entered the Clif-
ford residence and began their investigation into the cause of 
the fire. Their search began in the basement and they 
quickly confirmed that the fire had originated there beneath 
the basement stairway. They detected a strong odor of fuel 
throughout the basement, and found two more Coleman fuel 
cans beneath the stairway. As they dug through the debris, 
the investigators also found a crock pot with attached wires 
leading to an electrical timer that was plugged into an outlet 
a few feet away. The timer was set to turn on at approxi-
mately 3:45 a. m. and to turn back off at approximately 9:00 
a. m. It had stopped somewhere between 4:00 and 4:30 a. m. 
All of this evidence was seized and marked. 
After determining that the fire had originated in the base-
ment, Lieutenant Beyer and his partner searched the re-
mainder of the house. The warrantless search that followed 
was extensive and thorough. The investigators called in a 
photographer to take pictures throughout the house. They 
searched through drawers and closets and found them full of 
old clothes. They inspected the rooms and noted that there 
were nails on the walls but no pictures. They found wiring 
and cassettes for a video tape machine but no machine. 
Respondents moved to exclude all exhibits and testimony 
based on the basement and upstairs searches on the ground 
that they were searches to gather evidence of arson, that 
they were conducted without a warrant, consent, or exigent 
circumstances, and that they therefore were per se unreason-
1 The can had been found in the basement by the fire officials who had 
fought the blaze. The firemen removed the can and put it by the side door 
where Lieutenant Beyer discovered it on his arrival. 
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able under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Peti-
tioner, on the other hand, argues that the entire search 
was reasonable and should be exempt from the warrant 
requirement. 
III 
In its petition for certiorari, the State does not challenge 
the state court's finding that there were no exigent circum-
stances justifying the search of the Clifford home. Instead, 
it asks us to exempt from the warrant requirement all admin-
istrative investigations into the cause and origin of a fire. 
We decline to do so. 
In Tyler, we restated the Court's position that adminis-
trative searches generally require warrants. 436 U. S., at 
504-508. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307 
(1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967); 
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967). We reaffirm 
that view again today. Except in certain carefully defined 
classes of cases, 2 the nonconsensual entry and search of prop-
erty is governed by the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. The constitutionality of 
warrantless and nonconsensual entries onto fire-damaged 
premises, therefore, normally turns on several factors: 
whether there are legitimate privacy interests in the fire-
damaged property that are protected by the Fourth' Amend-
ment; whether exigent circumstances justify the government 
intrusion regardless of any reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy; and, whether the object of the search is to determine 
the cause of the fire or to gather evidence of criminal activity. 
A 
We observed in Tyler that reasonable privacy expectations 
may remain in fire-damaged premises. "People may go on 
' See e. g. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (heavily regulated 
business); United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972) (same); Colon-
nade v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970) (same). The exceptions to the 
warrant requirement recognized in these cases are not applicable to the 
warrantless search in this case. 
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living in their homes or working in their offices after a fire. 
Even when that is impossible, private effects often remain on 
the fire-damaged premises." Tyler, 436 U. S., at 505. Pri-
vacy expectations will vary with the type of property, the 
amount of fire damage, the prior and continued use of the 
premises, and in some cases the owner's efforts to secure it 
against intruders. Some fires may be so devastating that no 
reasonable privacy interests remain in the ash and ruins, re-
gardless of the owner's subjective expectations. The testes-
sentially is an objective one: whether "the expectation [is] 
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' " 
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring). See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 
739-741 (1979). If reasonable privacy interests remain in 
the fire-damaged property, the warrant requirement applies, 
and any official entry must be made pursuant to a warrant in 
the absence of consent or exigent circumstances. 
B 
A burning building of course creates an exigency that justi-
fies a warrantless entry by fire officials to fight the blaze. 
Moreover, in Tyler we held that once in the building, officials 
need no warrant to remain 3 for "a reasonable time to investi-
gate the cause of the blaze after it has been extinguished." 
436 U. S., at 510. Where, however, reasonable expectations 
of privacy remain in the fire-damaged property, additional in-
vestigations begun after the fire has been extinguished and 
fire and police officials have left the scene, generally must be 
3 We do not suggest that firemen fighting a fire normally remain within 
a building. The circumstances, of course, vary. In many situations ac-
tual entry may be too hazardous until the fire has been wholly extin-
guished, and even then the danger of collapsing walls may exist. Thus, 
the effort to ascertain the cause of a fire may extend over a period of time 
with entry and re-entry. The critical inquiry is whether reasonable expec-
tations of privacy exist in the fire-damaged premises at a particular time, 
and if so, whether exigencies justify the re-entries. 
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made pursuant to a warrant or the identification of some new 
exigency. 
The aftermath of a fire often presents exigencies that will 
not tolerate the delay necessary to obtain a warrant or to se-
cure the owner's consent to inspect fire-damaged premises. 4 
Because determining the cause and origin of a fire serves a 
compelling public interest, the warrant requirement does not 
apply in such cases. c 
If a warrant is necessary, the object of the search deter-
mines the type of warrant required. If the primary object is 
to determine the cause and origin of a recent fire, an adminis-
trative warrant will suffice. 5 To obtain such a warrant, fire 
officials need show only that a fire of undetermined origin has 
occurred on the premises, that the scope of the proposed 
search is reasonable and will not intrude unnecessarily on the 
fire victim's privacy, and that the search will be executed at a 
reasonable and convenient time. 
If the primary object of the search is to gather evidence of 
criminal activity, a criminal search warrant may be obtained 
only on a showing of probable cause to believe that relevant 
evidence will be found in the place to be searched. If evi-
dence of criminal activity is discovered during the course of a 
valid administrative search, it may be seized under the "plain 
view" doctrine. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 
465-466 (1971). This evidence then may be used to establish 
probable cause to obtain a criminal search warrant. Fire of-
ficials may not, however, rely on this evidence to expand the 
'For example, an immediate threat that the blaze might rekindle 
presents an exigency that would justify a warrantless and nonconsensual 
post-fire investigation. l Smnlarlf, a post-ure searcli ::maae::t~n 
the imminent deitruoti~£-e¥4denee may ee eKsmpt-from-the-w~CU41<.-' 
~ent.--
5 Probable cause to issue an administrative warrant exists if reasonable 
legislative, administrative, or judicially prescribed standards for conduct-
ing an inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. See 
Tyler, 436 U. S., at 508· amara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S., at 538. 
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scope of their administrative search without first making a 
successful showing of probable cause to an independent judi-
cial officer. 
The object of the search is important even if exigent cir-
cumstances exist. Circumstances that justify a warrantless 
search for the cause of a fire may not justify a search to 
gather evidence of criminal activity once that cause has been 
determined. If, for example, the administrative search is 
justified by the immediate need to ensure against rekindling, 
the scope of the search may be no broader than reasonably 
necessary to achieve its end. A search to gather evidence of 
criminal activity not in plain view must be made pursuant 
to a criminal warrant upon a traditional showing of probable 
cause. 6 
The searches of the Clifford home, at least arguably, can be 
viewed as two separate ones: the delayed search of the base-
ment area, followed by the extensive search of the residential 
portion of the house. We now apply the principles outlined 
above to each of these searches. 
IV 
The Clifford home was a two-and-one-half story brick and 
frame residence. Although there was extensive damage to 
the lower interior structure, the exterior of the house and 
some of the upstairs rooms were largely undamaged by the 
fire, although there was some smoke damage. The firemen 
had broken out one of the doors and most of the windows in 
fighting the blaze. At the time Lieutenant Beyer and his 
partner arrived, the home was uninhabitable. But personal 
belongings remained, and the Cliffords had arranged to have 
the house secured against intrusion in their absence. Under 
6 The plain view doctrine must be applied in light of the special circum-
stances that frequently accompany fire damage. In searching solely to as-
certain the cause, firemen customarily must remove rubble or search other 
areas where the cause of fires E_e like! to be fou t the outset o! such t _fl--
activities the evidence may:.?ot hey-and-o en isno , m p am Vlew" m " e 
literal sense of that term. ~ ~ ~ ...J.--ka..J-
~ ~ -y~ ~9 ~c,l.._ ~ ~o...A~ J 
~~1M- ~'-41 a_ wtJJ-z~ 
.. ' 
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these circumstances, and in light of the strong expectations 
of privacy associated with a home, we hold that the Cliffords 
retained reasonable privacy interests in their fire-damaged 
residence and that the post-fire investigations were subject 
to the warrant requirement. Thus, the warrantless and 
nonconsensual searches of both the basement and the up-
stairs areas of the house would have been valid only if exigent 
circumstances had justified the object and the scope of each. 
A 
As noted, the State does not claim that exigent circum-
stances justified its post-fire searches. It argues that we 
either should exempt post-fire searches from the warrant 
requirement or modify Tyler to justify the warrantless 
searches in this case. We have rejected the State's first ar-
gument and turn now to its second. 
In Tyler we upheld a warrantless post-fire search of a fur-
niture store, despite the absence of exigent circumstances, on 
the ground that it was a continuation of a valid search begun 
immediately after the fire. The investigation was begun as 
the last flames were being doused, but could not be com-
pleted because of smoke and darkness. The search was re-
sumed promptly after the smoke cleared and daylight 
dawned. Because the post-fire search was interrupted for 
reasons that were evident, we held that the early morning 
search was "no more than an actual continuation of the first, 
and the lack of a warrant thus did not invalidate the resulting 
seizure of evidence." 436 U. S., at 511. 
As the State conceded at oral argument, this case is distin-
guishable for several reasons. First, the challenged search 
was not a continuation of an earlier search. Between the 
time the firefighters had extinguished the blaze and left the 
scene and the arson investigators first arrived about~
m. to begin their investigation, the Cliffords had taken steps 
to secure the privacy interests that remained in their resi-
dence against further intrusion. These efforts separate the 
entry made to extinguish the blaze from that made later to 
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investigate its origin. Second, the privacy interests in the 
residence-particularly after the Cliffords had acted-were 
significantly greater than those in the fire-damaged furniture 
store, making the delay between the fire and the mid-day 
search unreasonable absent a warrant, consent, or exigent 
circumstances. We frequently have noted that privacy in-
terests are especially strong in a private residence. 7 These 
facts-the interim efforts to secure the burned-out premises 
and the heightened privacy interests in the home-distin-
guish this case from Tyler. At least where a homeowner has 
made a reasonable effort to secure his fire-damaged home 
after the blaze has been extinguished and the fire and police 
units have left the scene, we hold that a subsequent post-fire 
search must be conducted pursuant to a warrant, consent, or 
the identification of some new exigency. 8 So long as the pri-
mary purpose is to ascertain the cause of the fire, an adminis-
trative warrant will suffice. 
B 
Because the cause of the fire was then known, the search of 
the upper portions of the house, described above, could only 
have been a search to gather evidence of the crime of arson. 
Absent exigent circumstances, such a search requires a crim-
inal warrant. 
7 See e. g. Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 537, 589-90 (1980); United 
States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). Reason-
~ J._ ~ 0, ~ )1-----'-able ex ectations of privacy in fire-damaged premises will vary depending Q..__ 
-tJ _ particularly on the type ef building involved. one en o e spectrum 
is fhe pnvate~dence, w ere reasona le expectation trong- and 
where government intrusion ..s ep o a minimum. At the other 
end ~trum are commercial structures, such as commercial ware-
ous nlikel to contain much that is personal or privateJ]==-- ---J 
8 This is not to suggest that individual expectations Qfprivacy y 
prevail over interests of public safety. For example, when fire breaks out 
in an apartment unit of an apartment complex, the exigency exception may 
allow warrantless post-fire investigations where necessary to ensure 
against any immediate danger of future fire hazard. 
~~ 
-------------L----------~ --------------
E~~cJ-~ '1 ~(A~ _oJv- roh).·~ *'~1r 
~ ~~ ~~~ ~ ---w<-~ tv-_)~ . . -
~~ ~ ~ ~~c;t_f\~J ~d 
~"-'-) "(~r-e-t~_ LIL ~~ ~· 
82-357-0PINION 
10 MICHIGAN v. CLIFFORD 
Even if the mid-day basement search had been a valid ad-
ministrative search, it would not have justified the upstairs 
search. The scope of such a search is limited to that reason-
ably necessary to determine the cause and origin of a fire and 
to ensure against rekindling. As soon as the investigators 
determined that the fire had originated in the basement and 
had been caused by the crock pot and timer found beneath 
the basement stairs, the scope of their search was limited to 
the basement area. Although the investigators could have 
used whatever evidence they discovered in the basement to 
establish probable cause to search the remainder of the 
house, they could not lawfully undertake that search without 
a prior judicial determination that a successful showing of 
probable cause had been made. Because there were no exi-
gent circumstances justifying the upstairs search, and it was 
undertaken without a prior showing of probable cause before 
an independent judicial officer, we hold that this search of a 
home was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, regardless of the validity of the basement 
search. 9 
The warrantless intrusion into the upstairs regions of the 
Clifford house presents a telling illustration of the importance 
of prior judicial review of proposed administrative searches. 
If an administrative warrant had been obtained in this case, 
9 In many cases, there will be no bright line separating the firefighters' 
investigation into the cause of a fire from a search for evidence of arson. 
The distinction will vary with the circumstances of the particular fire and 
generally will involve more than the lapse of time or the number of entries 
and re-entries. For example, once the cause of a fire in a single-family 
dwelling is determined, the administrative search should end and any 
broader investigation should be made pursuant to a criminal warrant. A 
fire in an apartment, on the other hand, may present complexities that 
make it necessary for officials to conduct more expansive searches, to re-
main on the premises for longer periods of time, and to make repeated en-
tries and re-entries into the building. See Tyler, 436 U. S. , at 510, n. 6. 
iderable latitude-must be-given to the--oompelling state interest ·n e___ 
rough investig:ations-in~s. __.(._· __ _ 
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it presumably would have limited the scope of the proposed 
investigation and would have prevented the warrantless in-
trusion into the upper rooms of the Clifford home. An ad-
ministrative search into the cause of a recent fire does not 
give fire officials license to roam freely through the fire vic-
tim's private residence. v 
The only pieces of physical evidence that have been chal-
lenged on this interlocutory appeal are the three empty fuel 
cans, the electric crock pot, and the timer. and attached cord. 
Respondents also have challenged the testimony of the inves-
tigators concerning the warrantless search of both the base-
ment and the upstairs portions of the Clifford home. The 
discovery of two of the fuel cans, the crock pot, the timer and 
cord-as well as the investigators' related testimony-were 
the product of the unconstitutional post-fire search of the 
Cliffords' residence. Thus, we affirm that portion of the 
judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals that excluded 
that evidence. One of the fuel cans was discovered in plain 
view in the Cliffords' driveway. This can was seen in plain 
view during the intial investigation by the firefighters. It 
would have been admissible whether it had been seized in 
the basement by the firefighters or in the driveway by the 
arson investigators. Exclusion of this evidence should be 
reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
1st DRAFT 








From: Justice Rehnquist 
Circulated: -' -=-~-'-#/~+--"'-=------
Recirculated: ________ _ 
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JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting. 
Six Terms ago in Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499 (1978), 
we first addressed the applicability of the Fourth Amend-
ment's Warrant Clause to the activities of fire fighters and 
inspectors following a fire at a warehouse. A divided Court 
held that the fire itself was an "exigent circumstance" which 
allowed entry to extinguish the fire and authorized investiga-
tors to remain for a reasonable time to investigate the cause 
of the blaze. I d., at 509-510. We also held that a "re-en-
try" a few hours after these officials had departed was an "ac-
tual continuation" of the earlier investigation, but that subse-
quent visits more than three weeks after the fire required an 
administrative warrant. I d., at 511. These precepts of Ty-
ler have not proved easy to apply, and we are told in the 
Court's opinion in this case that "we granted certiorari to 
clarify doubt that appears to exist as to the application of our 
decision in Tyler." Ante, at 2. But that same opinion dem-
onstrates beyond peradventure that if that was our purpose, 
we have totally failed to accomplish it; today's opinion, far 
from clarifying the doubtful aspects of Tyler, sows confusion 
broadside. I would hold that the "exigent circumstances" 
doctrine enunciated in Tyler authorized the search of the 
basement of the Clifford home, although the remaining parts 
of the house could not have been searched without the issu-
ance of a warrant issued upon probable cause. 
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I 
Judging simply by comparison of these facts to those in Ty-
ler, I believe that the basement inspection conducted by Lt. 
Beyer about 1:30 p.m. on October 18th-some six hours after 
the fire was extinguished and the fire officials and police had 
left the Clifford premises-was an "actual continuation" of 
the original entry to fight the fire, as that term is used in Ty-
ler. The fire fighters who fought the blaze at the Clifford 
house had removed a can containing Coleman lantern fuel and 
placed it in the driveway of the home, where it was later 
seized and marked as evidence by the inspectors who arrived 
about 1:00 p.m. Thus here, as in Tyler, the investigation 
into the cause of the fire went on contemporaneously with the 
efforts to fight it, before the fire fighters first left the 
premises in the early morning. I see no reason to treat the 
six-hour delay between the departure of the fire fighters and 
the arrival of the investigators in this case any differently 
than the Court treated the five-hour delay between the de-
parture of the investigators at 4:00 a.m. from the Tyler ware-
house and their return to the same premises at 9:00 a.m. 
The Court seeks to distinguish the two situations on the 
basis of differences which seem to me both trivial and imma-
terial. It says that in that interim in our case, the Cliffords 
"had taken steps to secure their privacy interests that re-
mained in their residence against further intrusion." Ante, 
at 8. While this may go to the question of whether or not 
there was an invasion of a privacy interest amounting to a 
search, it has no bearing on the question of whether there 
were exigent circumstances which constitute an exception to 
the warrant requirement for what is concededly a search. 
The Court also intimates that the "fire fighters" did nothing 
but fight the fire, and that the arson investigation did not be-
gin until the arson investigators arrived at 1:00 in the after-
noon. Ante, at 8-9. But fire fighting and fire investigation 
are obviously not this neatly compartmentalized, as is shown 
by the fact that the fire fighters themselves had removed the 
~v· ~jy--
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Coleman lantern fuel can for ins ction by the later team f ~ ';}...; 
arson investigators. ~ 
The Court also purports to distinguish the facts in Tyler by 
the statement that "the privacy interests in the residence-
particularly after the Cliffords had acted-were significantly 
greater than those in the fire-damaged furniture store. . . . " 
Ante, at 9. But if the furniture store in Tyler is to be char-
acterized as "fire damaged," surely the Clifford's residence 
deserves the same characterization; it too was "fire-dam-
aged." It is also well-e.stablished that private commerciam 
buildings in this context a~~~much J2!:._0tect~ bY.,the Fourth 
Amendment as are private wellings. See See v. City of Se-
attle, 387 U. S. 541, 542-543 (1967) (citing cases). And cer-
tainly the public interest in determining the cause and origin 
of a fire in a commercial establishment applies with equal, if 
not greater, force to the necessity of determining the cause 
and origin of a fire in a home. 
On the authority of Tyler, therefore, I would uphold the 
search of the Clifford basement and allow use of the evidence 
resulting from that search in the arson trial. 
II 
In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967), and 
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967), this Court im-
posed a warrant requirement on city housing and fire inspec-
tors requiring them to obtain an administrative search war-
rant prior to entering a building to inspect for possible health 
or fire code violations. To protect the privacy interests of 
building owners from the unbridled discretion of municipal in-
spectors, the Court held that administrative searches had to 
be conducted pursuant to a warrant obtained from an inde-
pendent magistrate. Camara, 387 U. S., at 534. But in 
light of the important public interest in abating public health 
hazards, the relatively limited invasion of privacy inhering in 
administrative searches, and the essentially non-criminal 
focus of the inspection, a different kind of warrant was estab-
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lished, a warrant described by the dissenters in that case as 
"newfangled." See, 387 U. S., at 547 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
Probable cause to issue this kind of warrant did not sound in 
terms of suspicion of criminal activity, but in terms of reason-
able legislative or administrative standards governing the de-
cision to search a particular building. Id., at 538. 
One may concede the correctness of the Camara-See line of 
cases without agreeing that those cases should be applied to a 
post-fire inspection conducted to determine the cause and ori-
gin of a fire. The practice of investigating the cause and ori-
gin of fires has long-standing and widespread acceptance. 
The public interest in conducting a prompt and careful inves- ~ 
tigation of the cause and origin of all fires is also undeniably · 
strong. An investigation can reveal w~ether there is a dan-J ~~  ~ 
(
g r of the fire rekindlin and assess the ef£ chvenes onoc~\ ~· ,_ 
- buildin codes in pre entin .a.u,g_ 'miting_!he aQ_rea of e. ~
may bring to ight facts suggesting the crime of arson. 
Entry is also necessary because the causes of a fire may also ~ ~ 
not be observable from outside a building or by an unin- w ,~ c--J hh_ 
formed occupant. See United States v. Green, 474 F. 2d ~ 
1385, 1388-89 (CA5 1973). Certain! these reasons ·us · y a 
~earch to determine the ca origin of..aJire. -._ ) Cl . .f) _ 
The concerns regarding administrative searches expressed W 
in Camara and See to justify the imposition of a warrant re- ~ 
quirement simply do not apply to a post-fire investigation ~,· {;..1_~-<.r (.,G~ 
conducted within a reasonable time of a fire. Under the D r 
emergency doctrine, it is beyond dispute that fire fighters 
may enter a building in order to extinguish the flames. 
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1976). In their ef-
forts to control the blaze fire fighters may knock in doors and 
windows, chop holes in roofs and walls, and generally take 
full control of a structure to extinguish a fire. In the after-
math of a fire an individual is unlikely to have much concern 
over the limited intrusion of a fire inspector coming into his 
premises to learn why there had been a fire. Fire victims, 
unlike occupants at ordinary times, generally expect and wel-
~~ ... d~ 
~~ 
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come the intrusions of fire, police, and medical officials in the\ J.r~~-
period following a fire. Likewise, as here, relative strangers ~ ~=r::A..e..: \M 
such as insurance agents will frequently have authority to ~-n-----"--
enter the structure. In these circumstances, the intrusion of 
the fire inspector is hardly a new or substantially different 
intrusion from that which occurred when the fire fighters 
first arrived to extinguish the flames. Instead, it is analo- ~ 
gous to intrusions of medical officials and insurance investiga....-- ~<..tA- .z ~~ 
tors who may arrive at thascen~ e fire shortl after its -lv .e 
origin. 
Ample justification exists for a state or municipality to au-
thorize a fire inspection program that would permit fire in-~ ~~1 ~ Cv"---' 
spectors to enter premises to determine the cause and origin ..l-"1.-.~L ~~ 
of the fire. But in no real sense can the investigation of the ()...~ \....<) 
Cliffords' home be considered the result of the unbridled dis- .f\..L1w--t-
cretion of the city fire investigators who came to the Clif-
fords' home. 1 No justification existed to inspect the Clif-
fords' home until there was a fire. The fire investigators 
were not authorized to enter the Cliffords' home until the 
happening of some fortuitous or exigent event over which 
they had no control. Thus, if the warrant requirement ex-
ists to prevent individuals from being subjected to an unfet-
tered power of government officials to initiate a search, a 
warrant is simply not required in these circumstances to limit 
the authority of a fire investigator, so long as his authority to 
inspect is contingent upon the happening of an event over 
1 This is made abundantly clear by the Detroit Fire Department's policy 
regulating post-fire investigations. That policy encourages investigators 
to conduct an investigation as promptly as possible. If the property is oc-
cupied or is a place of business trying to conduct business, inspectors are 
instructed to obtain consent or an administrative warrant. If the 
premises are occupied by children, inspectors must obtain consent from an 
adult before entry. To inspect premises secured from trespass, investiga-
tors must obtain consent or an administrative warrant. Only if the owners 
are away and the building open to trespass may fire investigators enter 
without consent or a warrant. Joint Appendix, at 9a, 12a, 19a (testimony 
of Lt. Beyer and Capt. Monroe). 
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which he has no control. 2 
In my view, the utility of requiring a magistrate to evalu-] 
ate the grounds for a search following a fire is so limited that 
the incidental protection of an individual's privacy interests 
simply does not justify imposing a warrant requirement. 
Here the inspection was conducted within a short time of 
extinguishing of the flames, while the owners were away 
from the premises, and before the premises had been fully se-
cured from trespass. In these circumstances the search of 
the basement to determine the cause and origin of the fire 
was reasonable. 3 
2 The Tyler majority stated that a major function of the warrant re-
quirement was to provide a property owner with sufficient information to 
reassure him of the legality of the entry. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 
499, 508 (1976). The relationship of this informational function and the 
privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment is not clear. Some 
attempt at notice or proper identification should allay any reasonable fears 
that the inspectors are impostors or lack authority to inspect for the origin 
and cause of the fire. 
3 There may be some justification for requiring the inspectors to notify 
the building's owners of the inspection. Where, as here, the owners were 
out of town, it does not appear unreasonable to have conducted the inspec-
tion without prior notice to the owners. Notice simply informs the build-
ing owners that the building will be entered by persons possessing author-
ity to enter the building. Yet the failure to notify the Cliffords prior to 
entry fails to advance in any significant way the purposes of the exclusion-
ary rule. In point of fact, the fire investigators were told the Cliffords 
were unavailable, that they had gone fishing. J.A., at 16a. Thus, in 
these circumstances the failure to notify the Cliffords seems reasonabl;;e.. 
1 The Cliffords can also be deemed to have received constructive notice, be-
cause their agents were on the scene, and a neighbor apparently ascer-
tained the legitimacy of the inspectors' visit. ., 
12/06 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82--357 
MICHIGAN, PETITIONER v. RAYMOND CLIFFORD 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion for the Court. 
This case presents questions as to the authority of arson 
investigators, in the absence of exigent circumstances or con-
sent, to enter a private residence without a warrant to inves-
tigate the cause of a recent fire. 
I 
Respondents, Raymond and Emma Jean Clifford, were ar-
rested and charged with arson in connection with a fire at 
their private residence. At the preliminary examination 
held to establish probable cause for the alleged offense, the 
State introduced various pieces of physical evidence, most of 
which was obtained through a warrantless and nonconsensual 
search of the Clifford's fire-damaged home. Respondents 
moved to suppress this evidence on the ground that it was 
obtained in violation of their rights under the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. That motion was denied and re-
spondents were bound over for trial. Before trial, they 
again moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the 
search. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing 
and denied the motion on the ground that exigent circum-
stances justified the search. The court certified its ·eviden-
tiary ruling for interlocutory appeal and the Michigan Court 
of Appeals reversed. 
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That court held that there were no exigent circumstances 
justifying the search. Instead, it found that the warrantless 
entry and search of the Clifford residence was conducted pur-
suant to a policy of the Arson Division of the Detroit Fire De-
partment that sanctioned such searches as long as the owner 
was not present, the premises were open to trespass, and the 
search occurred within a reasonable time of the fire. The 
Court of Appeals held that this policy was inconsistent with 
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499 (1978), and that the war-
rantless nonconsensual search of the Cliffords' residence vio-
lated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. We granted certiorari to clarify doubt that appears 
to exist as to the application of our decision in Tyler. 
II 
In the early morning hours of October 18, 1980, a fire 
erupted at the Clifford home. The Cliffords were out of 
town on a camping trip at the time. The fire was reported to 
the Detroit Fire Department, and fire units arrived on the 
scene at about 5:42 a. m. The fire was extinguished and all 
fire officials and police left the premises at 7:04 a. m. 
At 8:00 a. m. on the morning of the fire, Lieutenant Beyer, 
a fire investigator with the arson section of the Detroit Fire 
Department, received instructions to investigate the Clifford 
fire. He was informed that the Fire Department suspected 
arson. Because he had other assignments, Lieutenant 
Beyer·did not proceed immediately to the Clifford residence. 
He and his partner finally arrived at the scene of the fire 
about 1:00 p. m. on October 18. 
When they arrived, they found a work crew on the scene. 
The crew was boarding up the house and pumping some six 
inches of water out of the basement. A neighbor told the in-
vestigators that he had called Clifford and had been in-
structed to request the Cliffords' insurance agent to send a 
boarding crew out to secure the house. The neighbor also 
advised that the Cliffords did not plan to return that day. 
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While the investigators waited for the water to be pumped 
out, they found a Coleman fuel can in the driveway that was 
seized and marked as evidence. 1 
By 1:30 p. m., the water had been pumped out of the base-
ment and Lieutenant Beyer and his partner, without obtain-
ing consent or an administrative warrant, entered the Clif-
ford residence and began their investigation into the cause of 
the fire. Their search began in the basement and they 
quickly confirmed that the fire had originated there beneath 
the basement stairway. They detected a strong odor of fuel 
throughout the basement, and found two more Coleman fuel 
cans beneath the stairway. As they dug through the debris, 
the investigators also found a crock pot with attached wires 
leading to an electrical timer that was plugged into an outlet 
a few feet away. The timer was set to turn on at approxi-
mately 3:45 a. m. and to turn back off at approximately 9:00 
a. m. It had stopped somewhere between 4:00 and 4:30 a. m. 
All of this evidence was seized and marked. 
After determining that the fire had originated in the base-
ment, Lieutenant Beyer and his partner searched the re-
mainder of the house. The warrantless search that followed 
was extensive and thorough. The investigators called in a 
photographer to take pictures throughout the house. They 
searched through drawers and closets and found them full of 
old clothes. They inspected the rooms and noted that there 
were nails on the walls but no pictures. 'They found wiring 
and cassettes for a video tape machine but no machine. 
Respondents moved to exclude all exhibits and testimony 
based on the basement and upstairs searches on the ground 
that they were searches to gather evidence of arson, that 
they were conducted without a warrant, consent, or exigent 
circumstances, and that they therefore were per se unreason-
'The can had been found in the basement by the fire officials who had 
fought the blaze. The firemen removed the can and put it by the side door 
where Lieutenant Beyer discovered it on his arrival. 
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able under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Peti-
tioner, on the other hand, argues that the entire search 
was reasonable and should be exempt from the warrant 
requirement. 
III 
In its petition for certiorari, the State does not challenge 
the state court's finding that there were no exigent circum-
stances justifying the search of the Clifford home. Instead, 
it asks us to exempt from the warrant requirement all admin-
istrative investigations into the cause and origin of a fire. 
We decline to do so. 
In Tyler, we restated the Court's position that adminis-
trative searches generally require warrants. 436 U. S., at 
504-508. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307 
(1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967); 
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967). We reaffirm 
that view again today. Except in certain carefully defined 
classes of cases, 2 the non consensual entry and search of prop-
erty is governed by the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. The constitutionality of 
warrantless and nonconsensual entries onto fire-damaged 
premises, therefore, normally turns on several factors: 
whether there are legitimate privacy interests in the fire-
damaged property that are protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment; whether exigent circumstances justify the government 
intrusion regardless of any reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy; and, whether the object of the search is to determine 
the cause of the fire or to gather evidence of criminal activity. 
A 
We observed in Tyler that reasonable privacy expectations 
may remain in fire-damaged premises. "People may go on 
2 See e. g. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594 (1981) (heavily regulated 
business); United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972) (same); Colon-
nade v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970) (same). The exceptions to the 
warrant requirement recognized in these cases are not applicable to the 
warrantless search in this case. 
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living in their homes or working in their offices after a fire. 
Even when that is impossible, private effects often remain on 
the fire-damaged premises." Tyler, 436 U. S., at 505. Pri-
vacy expectations Will vary with the type of property, the 
amount of fire damage, the prior and continued use of the 
premises, and in some cases the owner's efforts to secure it 
against intruders. Some fires may be so devastating that no 
reasonable privacy interests remain in the ash and ruins, re-
gardless of the owner's subjective expectations. The test es-
sentially is an objective one: whether "the expectation [is] 
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" 
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring). See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 
739-741 (1979). If reasonable privacy interests remain in 
the fire-damaged property, the warrant requirement applies, 
and any official entry must be made pursuant to a warrant in 
the absence of consent or exigent circumstances. 
B 
A burning building of course creates an exigency that justi-
fies a warrantless entry by fii-e officials to fight the blaze. 
Moreover, in Tyler we held that once in the building, officials 
need no warrant to remain 3 for "a reasonable time to investi-
gate the cause of the blaze after it has been extinguished." 
436 U. S., at 510. Where, however, reasonable expectations 
of privacy remain in the fire-damaged property, additional in-
vestigations begun after the fire has been extinguished and 
fire and police officials have left the scene, generally must be 
3 We do not suggest that firemen fighting a fire normally remain within 
a building. The circumstances, of course, vary. In many situations ac-
tual entry may be too hazardous until the fire has been wholly extin-
guished, and even then the danger of collapsing walls may exist. Thus, 
the effort to ascertain the cause of a fire may extend over a period of time 
with entry and re-entry. The critical inquiry is whether reasonable expec-
tations of privacy exist in the fire-damaged premises at a particular time, 
and if so, whether exigencies justify the re-entries. 
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made pursuant to a warrant or the identification of some new 
exigency. 
The aftermath of a fire often presents exigencies that will 
not tolerate the delay necessary to obtain a warrant or to se-
cure the owner's consent to inspect fire-damaged premises. 4 
Because determining the cause and origin of a fire serves a 
compelling public interest, the warrant requirement does not 
apply in such cases. c 
If a warrant is necessary, the object of the search deter-
mines the type of warrant required. If the primary object is 
to determine the cause and origin of a recent fire, an adminis-
trative warrant will suffice. 5 To obtain such a warrant, fire 
officials need show only that a fire of undetermined origin has 
occurred on the premises, that the scope of the proposed 
search is reasonable and will not intrude unnecessarily on the 
fire victim's privacy, and that the search will be executed at a 
reasonable and convenient time. 
If the primary object of the search is to gather evidence of 
criminal activity, a criminal search warrant may be obtained 
only qn a showing of probable cause to believe that relevant 
evidence will be found in the place to be searched. If evi-
dence of criminal activity is discovered during the course of a 
valid administrative search, it may be seized under the "plain 
view" doctrine. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 
465-466 (1971). This evidence then may be used to establish 
probable cause to obtain a criminal search warrant. Fire of-
'For example, an immediate threat that the blaze might rekindle 
presents an exigency that would justify a warrantless and nonconsensual 
post-fire investigation. "Immediate investigation may also be necessary 
to preserve evidence from intentional or accidental destruction." See Ty-
ler, 436 U. S., at 510. 
5 Probable cause to issue an administrative warrant exists if reasonable 
legislative, administrative, or judicially prescribed standards for conduct-
ing an inspection are satisfied with respect 1P ~ particular dwelling. See l 
particularly Tyler, 436 U. S., see also ~mara v. Municipal Court, 
387 U. S., at 538. 
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ficials may not, however, rely on this evidence to expand the 
scope of their administrative search without first making a 
successful showing of probable cause to an independent judi-
cial officer. 
The object of the search is important even if exigent cir-
cumstances exist. Circumstances that justify a warrantless 
search for the cause of a fire may not justify a search to 
gather evidence of criminal activity once that cause has been 
determined. If, for example, the administrative search is 
justified by the immediate need to ensure against rekindling, 
the scope of the search may be no broader than reasonably 
necessary to achieve its end. A search to gather evidence of 
criminal activity not in plain view must be made pursuant 
to a criminal warrant upon a traditional showing of probable 
cause. 6 
The searches of the Clifford home, at least arguably, can be 
viewed as two separate ones: the delayed search of the base-
ment area, followed by the extensive search of the residential 
portion of the house. We now apply the principles outlined 
above to each of these searches. 
IV 
The Clifford home was a two-and-one-half story brick and 
frame residence. Although there was extensive damage to 
the lower interior structure, the exterior of the house and 
some of the upstairs rooms were largely undamaged by the 
fire, although there was some smoke damage. The firemen 
had broken out one of the doors and most of the windows in 
fighting the blaze. At the time Lieutenant Beyer and his 
partner arrived, the home was uninhabitable. But personal 
belongings remained, and the Cliffords had arranged to have 
the house secured against intrusion in their absence. Under 
6 The plain view doctrine must be applied in light of the special circum-
stances that frequently accompany fire damage. In searching solely to as-
certain the cause, firemen customarily must remove rubble or search other 
areas where the cause of fires are likely to be found. An object that comes 
into view during such a search may be preserved without a warrant. 
... ,. 
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these circumstances, and in light of the strong expectations 
of privacy associated with a home, we hold that the Cliffords 
retained reasonable privacy interests in their fire-damaged 
residence and that the post-fire investigations were subject 
to the warrant requirement. Thus, the warrantless and 
nonconsensual searches of both the basement and the up-
stairs areas of the house would have been valid only if exigent 
circumstances had justified the object and the scope of each. 
A 
As noted, the State does not claim that exigent circum-
stances justified its post-fire searches. It argues that we 
either should exempt post-fire searches from the warrant 
requirement or modify Tyler to justify the warrantless 
searches in this case. We have rejected the State's first ar-
gument and turn now to its second. 
In Tyler we upheld a warrantless post-fire search of a fur-
niture store, despite the absence of exigent circumstances, on 
the ground that it was a continuation of a valid search begun 
immediately after the fire. The investigation was begun as 
the last flames were being doused, but could not be com-
pleted because of smoke and darkness. The search was re-
sumed promptly after the smoke cleared and daylight 
dawned. Because the post-fire search was interrupted for 
reasons that were evident, we held that the early morning 
search was "no more than an actual continuation of the first, 
and the lack of a warrant thus did not invalidate the resulting 
seizure of evidence." 436 U. S., at 511. 
As the State conceded at oral argument, this case is distin-
guishable for several reasons. First, the challenged search 
was not a continuation of an earlier search. Between the 
time the firefighters had extinguished the blaze and left the 
scene and the arson investigators first arrived about 1:00 
p. m. to begin their investigation, the Cliffords had taken 
steps to secure the privacy interests that remained in their 
residence against further intrusion. These efforts separate 
the entry made to extinguish the blaze from that made later 
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to investigate its origin. Second, the privacy interests in the 
residence-particularly after the Cliffords had acted-were 
significantly greater than those in the fire-damaged furniture 
store, making the delay between the fire and the mid-day 
search unreasonable absent a warrant, consent, or exigent 
circumstances. We frequently have noted that privacy in-
terests are especially strong in a private residence. 7 These 
facts-the interim efforts to secure the burned-out premises 
and the heightened privacy interests in the home-distin-
guish this case from Tyler. At least where a homeowner has 
made a reasonable effort to secure his fire-damaged home 
after the blaze has been extinguished and the fire and police 
units have left the scene, we hold that a subsequent post-fire 
search must be conducted pursuant to a warrant, consent, or 
the identification of some new exigency. 8 So long as the pri-
mary purpose is to ascertain the cause of the fire, an adminis-
trative warrant will suffice. 
B 
Because the cause of the fire was then known, the search of 
the upper portions of the house, described above, could only 
have been a search to gather evidence of the crime of arson. 
Absent exigent circumstances, such a search requires a crim-
inal warrant. 
Even if the mid-day basement search had been a valid ad-
ministrative search, it would not have justified the upstairs 
7 See e. g. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 537, 589--90 (1980); United 
States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). Reason-
able expectations of privacy in fire-damaged premises will vary depending 
particularly on the type and use of the building involved. Expectations of I 
privacy are particularly strong in private residences and offices. There 
may bel\depending upon the circumstances, diminished privacy expecta- ~ 
tions in commercial premises. ,, 
8 This is not to suggest that individual expectations of privacy may 
prevail over interests of public safety. For example, when fire breaks out 
in an apartment unit of an apartment complex, the exigency exception may 
allow warrantless post-fire investigations where necessary to ensure 
against any immediate danger of future fire hazard. 
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search. The scope of such a search is limited to that reason-
ably necessary to determine the cause and origin of a fire and 
to ensure against rekindling. As soon as the investigators 
determined that the fire had originated in the basement and 
had been caused by the crock pot and timer found beneath 
the basement stairs, the scope of their search was limited to 
the basement area. Although the investigators could have 
used whatever evidence they discovered in the basement to 
establish probable cause to search the remainder of the 
house, they could not lawfully undertake that search without 
a prior judicial determination that a successful showing of 
probable cause had been made. Because there were no exi-
gent circumstances justifying the upstairs search, and it was 
undertaken without a prior showing of probable cause before 
an independent judicial officer, we hold that this search of a 
home was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, regardless of the validity of the basement 
search. 9 
The warrantless intrusion into the upstairs regions of the 
Clifford house presents a telling illustration of the importance 
of prior judicial review of proposed administrative searches. 
If an administrative warrant had been obtained in this case, 
it presumably would have limited the scope of the proposed 
investigation and would have prevented the warrantless in-
trusion into the upper rooms of the Clifford home. An ad-
ministrative search into the cause of a recent fire does not 
9 In many cases, there will be no bright line separating the firefighters' 
investigation into the cause of a fire from a search for evidence of arson. 
The distinction will vary with the circumstances of the particular fire and 
generally will involve more than the lapse of time or the number of entries 
and re-entries. For example, once the cause of a fire in a single-family 
dwelling is determined, the administrative search should end and any 
broader investigation should be made pursuant to a criminal warrant. A 
fire in an apartment, on the other hand, may present complexities that 
make it necessary for officials to conduct more expansive searches, to re-
main on the premises for longer periods of time, and to make repeated en-
tries and re-entries into the building. See Tyler, 436 U. S., at 510, n. 6. 
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give fire officials license to roam freely through the fire vic-
tim's private residence. v 
The only pieces of physical evidence that have been chal-
lenged on this interlocutory appeal are the three empty fuel 
cans, the electric crock pot, and the timer and attached cord. 
Respondents also have challenged the testimony of the inves-
tigators concerning the warrantless search of both the base-
ment and the upstairs portions of the Clifford home. The 
discovery of two of the fuel cans, the crock pot, the timer and 
cord-as well as the investigators' related testimony-were 
the product of the unconstitutional post-fire search of the 
Cliffords' residence. Thus, we affirm that portion of the 
judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals that excluded 
that evidence. One of the fuel cans was discovered in plain 
view in the Cliffords' driveway. This can was seen in plain 
view during the intial investigation by the firefighters. It 
would have been admissible whether it had been seized in 
the basement by the firefighters or in the driveway by the 
arson investigators. Exclusion of this evidence should be 
reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion for the Court. 
This case presents questions as to the authority of arson 
investigators, in the absence of exigent circumstances or con-
sent, to enter a private residence without a warrant to inves-
tigate the cause of a recent fire. 
I 
Respondents, Raymond and Emma Jean Clifford, were ar-
rested and charged with arson in connection with a fire at 
their private residence. At the preliminary examination 
held to establish probable cause for the alleged offense, the 
State introduced various pieces of physical evidence, most of 
which was obtained through a warrantless and nonconsensual 
search of the Clifford's fire-damaged home. Respondents 
moved to suppress this evidence on the ground that it was 
obtained in violation of their rights under the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. That motion was denied and re-
spondents were bound over for trial. Before trial, they 
again moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the 
search. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing 
and denied the motion on the ground that exigent circum-
stances justified the search. The court certified its ·eviden-
tiary ruling for interlocutory appeal and the Michigan Court 
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2 MICHIGAN v. CLIFFORD 
That court held that there were no exigent circumstances 
justifying the search. Instead, it found that the warrantless 
entry and search of the Clifford residence was conducted pur-
suant to a policy of the Arson Division of the Detroit Fire De-
partment that sanctioned such searches as long as the owner 
was not present, the premises were open to trespass, and the 
search occurred within a reasonable time of the fire. The 
Court of Appeals held that this policy was inconsistent with 
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499 (1978), and that the war-
rantless nonconsensual search of the Cliffords' residence vio-
lated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. We granted certiorari to clarify doubt that appears 
to exist as to the application of our decision in Tyler. 
II 
In the early morning hours of October 18, 1980, a fire 
erupted at the Clifford home. . The Cliffords were out of 
town on a camping trip at the time. The fire was reported to 
the Detroit Fire Department, and fire units arrived on the 
scene at about 5:42 a. m. The fire was extinguished and all 
fire officials and police left the premises at 7:04 a. m. 
At 8:00 a. m. on the morning of the fire, Lieutenant Beyer, 
a fire investigator with the arson section of the Detroit Fire 
Department, received instructions to investigate the Clifford 
fire. He was informed that the Fire Department suspected 
arson. Because he had other assignments, Lieutenant 
Beyer did not proceed immediately to the Clifford residence. 
He and his partner finally arrived at the scene of the fire 
about 1:00 p. m. on October 18. 
When they arrived, they found a work crew on the scene. 
The crew was boarding up the house and pumping some six 
inches of water out of the basement. A neighbor told the in-
vestigators that he had called Clifford and had been in-
structed to request the Cliffords' insurance agent to send a 
boarding crew out to secure the house. The neighbor also 
advised that the Cliffords did not plan to return that day. 
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While the investigators waited for the water to be pumped 
out, they found a Coleman fuel can in the driveway that was 
seized and marked as evidence. 1 
By 1:30 p. m., the water had been pumped out of the base-
ment and Lieutenant Beyer and his partner, without obtain-
ing consent or an administrative warrant, entered the Clif-
ford residence and began their investigation into the cause of 
the fire. Their search began in the basement and they 
quickly confirmed that the fire had originated there beneath 
the basement stairway. They detected a strong odor of fuel 
throughout the basement, and found two more Coleman fuel 
cans beneath the stairway. As they dug through the debris, 
the investigators also found a crock pot with attached wires 
leading to an electrical timer that was plugged into an outlet 
a few feet away. The timer was set to turn on at approxi-
mately 3:45 a. m. and to turn back off at approximately 9:00 
a. m. It had stopped somewhere between 4:00 and 4:30 a. m. 
All of this evidence was seized and marked. 
After determining that the fire had originated in the base-
ment, Lieutenant Beyer and his partner searched the re-
mainder of the house. The warrantless search that followed 
was extensive and thorough. The investigators called in a 
photographer to take pictures throughout the house. They 
searched through drawers and closets and found them full of 
old clothes. They inspected the rooms and noted that there 
were nails on the walls but no pictures. They found wiring 
and cassettes for a video tape machine but no machine. 
Respondents moved to exclude all exhibits and testimony 
based on the basement and upstairs searches on the ground 
that they were searches to gather evidence of arson, that 
they were conducted without a warrant, consent, or exigent 
circumstances, and that they therefore were per se unreason-
' The can had been found in the basement by the fire officials who had 
fought the blaze. The firemen removed the can and put it by the side door 
where Lieutenant Beyer discovered it on his arrival. 
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able under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Peti-
tioner, on the other hand, argues that the entire search 
was reasonable and should be exempt from the warrant 
requirement. 
III 
In its petition for certiorari, the State does not challenge 
the state court's finding that there were no exigent circum-
stances justifying the search of the Clifford home. Instead, 
it asks us to exempt from the warrant requirement all admin-
istrative investigations into the cause and origin of a fire. 
We decline to do so. 
In Tyler, we restated the Court's position that adminis-
trative searches generally require warrants. 436 U. S., at 
504-508. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307 
(1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967); 
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967). We reaffirm 
that view again today. Except in certain carefully defined 
classes of cases, 2 the nonconsensual entcy and search of prop-
erty is governed by the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. The constitutionality of 
warrantless and nonconsensual entries onto fire-damaged 
premises, therefore, normally turns on several factors: 
whether there are legitimate privacy interests in the fire-
damaged property that are protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment; whether exigent circumstances justify the government 
intrusion regardless of any reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy; and, whether the object of the search is to determine 
the cause of the fire or to gather evidence of criminal activity. 
A 
We observed in Tyler that reasonable privacy expectations 
may remain in fire-damaged premises. "People may go on 
2 See e. g. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594 (1981) (heavily regulated 
business); United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972) (same); Colon-
nade v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970) (same). The exceptions to the 
warrant requirement recognized in these cases are not applicable to the 
warrantless search in this case. 
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living in their homes or working in their offices after a fire. 
Even when that is impossible, private effects often remain on 
the fire-damaged premises." Tyler, 436 U. S., at 505. Pri-
vacy expectations Will vary with the type of property, the 
amount of fire damage, the prior and continued use of the 
premises, and in some cases the owner's efforts to secure it 
against intruders. Some fires may be so devastating that no 
reasonable privacy interests remain in the ash and ruins, re-
gardless of the owner's subjective expectations. The test es-
sentially is an objective one: whether "the expectation [is] 
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" 
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring). See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 
739-741 (1979). If reasonable privacy interests remain in 
the fire-damaged property, the warrant requirement applies, 
and any official entry must be made pursuant to a warrant in 
the absence of consent or exigent circumstances. 
B 
A burning building of course creates an exigency that justi-
fies a warrantless entry by fire officials to fight the blaze. 
Moreover, in Tyler we held that once in the building, officials 
need no warrant to remain 3 for "a reasonable time to investi-
gate the cause of the blaze after it has been extinguished." 
436 U. S., at 510. Where, however, reasonable expectations 
of privacy remain in the fire-damaged property, additional in-
vestigations begun after the fire has been extinguished and 
fire and police officials have left the scene, generally must be 
3 We do not suggest that firemen fighting a fire nonnally remain within 
a building. The circumstances, of course, vary. In many situations ac-
tual entry may be too hazardous until the fire has been wholly extin-
guished, and even then the danger of collapsing walls may exist. Thus, 
the effort to ascertain the cause of a fire may extend over a period of time 
with entry and re-entry. The critical inquiry is whether reasonable expec-
tations of privacy exist in the fire-damaged premises at a particular time, 
and if so, whether exigencies justify the re-entries. 
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made pursuant to a warrant or the identification of some new 
eXIgency. 
The aftermath of a fire often presents exigencies that will 
not tolerate the delay necessary to obtain a warrant or to se-
cure the owner's consent to inspect fire-damaged premises. 4 
Because determining the cause and origin of a fire serves a 
compelling public interest, the warrant requirement does not 
apply in such cases. c 
If a warrant is necessary, the object of the search deter-
mines the type of warrant required. If the primary object is 
to determine the cause and origin of a recent fire, an adminis-
trative warrant will suffice. 5 To obtain such a warrant, fire 
officials need show only that a fire of undetermined origin has 
occurred on the premises, that the scope of the proposed 
search is reasonable and will not intrude unnecessarily on the 
fire victim's privacy, and that the search will be executed at a 
reasonable and convenient time. 
If the primary object of the search is to gather evidence of 
criminal activity, a criminal search warrant may be obtained 
only on a showing of probable cause to believe that relevant 
evidence will be found in the place to be searched. If evi-
dence of criminal activity is discovered during the course of a 
valid administrative search, it may be seized under the "plain 
view'' doctrine. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 
46&-466 (1971). This evidence then may be used to establish 
probable cause to obtain a criminal search warrant. Fire of-
'For example, an immediate threat that the blaze might rekindle 
presents an exigency that would justify a warrantless and nonconsensual 
post-fire investigation. "Immediate investigation may also be necessary 
to preserve evidence from intentional or accidental destruction." See Ty-
ler, 436 U. S. , at 510. 
5 Probable cause to issue an administrative warrant exists if reasonable I 
A
'slative, administrative, or judicially prescribed standards for conduct-
- an inspection are satisfied with respect ,tg,..a particular dwelling. See 
articularly Tyler, 436 U. S., see also ~Camara v. Municipal Court, 
387 U. S. , at 538. 
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ficials may not, however, rely on this evidence to expand the 
scope of their administrative search without first making a 
successful showing of probable cause to an independent judi-
cial officer. 
The object of the search is important even if exigent cir-
cumstances exist. Circumstances that justify a warrantless 
search for the cause of a fire may not justify a search to 
gather evidence of criminal activity once that cause has been 
determined. If, for example, the administrative search is 
justified by the immediate need to ensure against rekindling, 
the scope of the search may be no broader than reasonably 
necessary to achieve its end. A search to gather evidence of 
criminal activity not in plain view must be made pursuant 
to a criminal warrant upon a traditional showing of probable 
cause. 6 
The searches of the Clifford home, at least arguably, can be 
viewed as two separate ones: the delayed search of the base-
ment area, followed by the extensive search of the residential 
portion of the house. We now apply the principles outlined 
above to each of these searches. 
IV 
The Clifford home was a two-and-one-half story brick and 
frame residence. Althougp there was extensive damage to 
the lower interior structure, the exterior of the house and 
some of the upstairs rooms were largely undamaged by the 
fire, although there was some smoke damage. The firemen 
had broken out one of the doors and most of the windows in 
fighting the blaze. At the time Lieutenant Beyer and his 
partner arrived, the home' was uninhabitable. But personal 
belongings remained, and the Cliffords had arranged to have 
the house secured against intrusion in their absence. Under 
6 The plain view doctrine must be applied in light of the special circum-
stances that frequently accompany fire damage. In searching solely to as-
certain the cause, firemen customarily must remove rubble or search other 
areas where the cause of fires are likely to be found. An object that comes 
into view during such a search may be preserved without a warrant. 
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these circumstances, and in light of the strong expectations 
of privacy associated with a home, we hold that the Cliffords 
retained reasonable privacy interests in their fire-damaged 
residence and that the post-fire investigations were subject 
to the warrant requirement. Thus, the warrantless and 
nonconsensual searches of both the basement and the up-
stairs areas of the house would have been valid only if exigent 
circumstances had justified the object and the scope of each. 
A 
As noted, the State does not claim that exigent circum-
stances justified its post-fire searches. It argues that we 
either should exempt post-fire searches from the warrant 
requirement or modify Tyler to justify the warrantless 
searches in this case. We have rejected the State's first ar-
gument and turn now to its second. 
In Tyler we upheld a warrantless post-fire search of a fur-
niture store, despite the absence of exigent circumstances, on 
the ground that it was a continuation of a valid search begun 
immediately after the fire. The investigation was begun as 
the last flames were being doused, but could not be com-
pleted because of smoke and darkness. The search was re-
sumed promptly after the smoke cleared and daylight 
dawned. Because the post-fire search was interrupted for 
reasons that were evident, we held that the early morning 
search was "no more than an actual continuation of the first, 
and the lack of a warrant thus did not invalidate the resulting 
seizure of evidence." 436 U. S., at 511. 
As the State conceded at oral argument, this case is distin-
guishable for several reasons. First, the challenged search 
was not a continuation of an earlier search. Between the 
time the firefighters had extinguished the blaze and left the 
scene and the arson investigators first arrived about 1:00 
p. m. to begin their investigation, the Cliffords had taken 
steps to secure the privacy interests that remained in their 
residence against further intrusion. These efforts separate 
the entry made to extinguish the blaze from that made lateV 
/ 
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to investigate its origin. Second, the privacy interests in the 
residence-particularly after the Cliffords had acted-were 
significantly greater than those in the fire-damaged furniture 
store, making the delay between the fire and the mid-day 
search unreasonable absent a warrant, consent, or exigent 
circumstances. We frequently have noted that privacy in-
terests are especially strong in a private residence. 7 These 
facts-the interim efforts to secure the burned-out premises 
and the heightened privacy interests in the home-distin-
guish this case from Tyler. At least where a homeowner has 
made a reasonable effort to secure his fire-damaged home 
after the blaze has been extinguished and the fire and police 
units have left the scene, we hold that a subsequent post-fire 
search must be conducted pursuant to a warrant, consent, or 
the identification of some new exigency. 8 So long as the pri-
mary purpose is to ascertain the cause of the fire, an adminis-
trative warrant will suffice. 
B 
Because the cause of the fire was then known, the search of 
the upper portions of the house, described above, could only 
have been a search to gather evidence of the crime of arson. 
Absent exigent circumstances, such a search requires a crim-
inal warrant. 
Even if the mid-day basement search had been a valid ad-
ministrative search, it would not have justified the upstairs 
7 See e. g. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 537, 589-90 (1980); United 
States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). Reason-
able expectations of privacy in fire-damaged premises will vary depending 
particularly on the type and use of the building involved. Expectations of 
J>ri'vacy are particularly strong in private residences and offices. There 
V may b~epending upon the circumstances, diminished privacy expecta-
tions i@commercial premises. 
8 This is not to suggest that individual expectations of privacy may 
prevail over interests of public safety. For example, when fire breaks out 
in an apartment unit of an apartment complex, the exigency exception may 
allow warrantless post-fire investigations where necessary to ensure 
against any immediate danger of future fire hazard. 
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search. The scope of such a search is limited to that reason-
ably necessary to determine the cause and origin of a fire and 
to ensure against rekindling. As soon as the investigators 
determined that the fire had originated in the basement and 
had been caused by the crock pot and timer found beneath 
the basement stairs, the scope of their search was limited to 
the basement area. Although the investigators could have 
used whatever evidence they discovered in the basement to 
establish probable cause to search the remainder of the 
house, they could not lawfully undertake that search without 
a prior judicial determination that a successful showing of 
probable cause had been made. Because there were no exi-
gent circumstances justifying the upstairs search, and it was 
undertaken without a prior showing of probable cause before 
an independent judicial officer, we hold that this search of a 
home was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, regardless of the validity of the basement 
search. 9 
The warrantless intrusion into the upstairs regions of the 
Clifford house presents a telling illustration of the importance 
of prior judicial review of proposed administrative searches. 
If an administrative warrant had been obtained in this case, 
it presumably would have limited the scope of the · proposed 
investigation and would have prevented the warrantless in-
trusion into the upper rooms of the Clifford home. An ad-
ministrative search into the cause of a recent fire does not 
9 In many cases, there will be no bright line separating the firefighters' 
investigation into the cause of a fire from a search for evidence of arson. 
The distinction will vary with the circumstances of the particular fire and 
generally will involve more than the lapse of time or the number of entries 
and re-entries. For example, once the cause of a fire in a single-family 
dwelling is determined, the administrative search should end and any 
broader investigation should be made pursuant to a criminal warrant. A 
fire in an apartment, on the other hand, may present complexities that 
make it necessary for officials to conduct more expansive searches, to re-
main on the premises for longer periods of time, and to make repeated en-
tries and re-entries into the building. See Tyler, 436 U. S., at 510, n. 6. 
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give fire officials license to roam freely through the fire vic-
tim's private residence. v 
The only pieces of physical evidence that have been chal-
lenged on this interlocutory appeal are the three empty fuel 
cans, the electric crock pot, and the timer and attached cord. 
Respondents also have challenged the testimony of the inves-
tigators concerning the warrantless search of both the base-
ment and the upstairs portions of the Clifford home. The 
discovery of two of the fuel cans, the crock pot, the timer and 
cord-as well as the investigators' related testimony-were 
the product of the unconstitutional post-fire search of the 
Cliffords' residence. Thus, we affirm that portion of the 
judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals that excluded 
that evidence. One of the fuel cans was discovered in plain 
view in the Cliffords' driveway. This can was seen in plain 
view during the intial investigation by the firefighters. It 
would have been admissible whether it had been seized in 
the basement by the firefighters or in the driveway by the 
arson investigators. ExClusion of this evidence should be 
reversed. 
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This case presents questions as to the authority of arson 
investigators, in the absence of exigent circumstances or con-
sent, to enter a private residence without a warrant to inves-
tigate the cause of a recent fire. 
I 
Respondents, Raymond and Emma Jean Clifford, were ar-
rested and charged with arson in connection with a fire at 
their private residence. At the preliminary examination 
held to establish probable cause for the alleged offense, the 
State introduced various pieces of physical evidence, most of 
which was obtained through a warrantless and nonconsensual 
search of the Clifford's fire-damaged home. Respondents 
moved to suppress this evidence on the ground that it was 
obtained in violation of their rights under the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. That motion was denied and re-
spondents were bound over for trial. Before trial, they 
again moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the 
search. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing 
and denied the motion on the ground that exigent circum-
stances justified the search. The court certified its eviden-
tiary ruling for interlocutory appeal and the Michigan Court 
of Appeals reversed. 
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That court held that there were no exigent circumstances 
justifying the search. Instead, it found that the warrantless 
entry and search of the Clifford residence was conducted pur-
suant to a policy of the Arson Division of the Detroit Fire De-
partment that sanctioned such searches as long as the owner 
was not present, the premises were open to trespass, and the 
search occurred within a reasonable time of the fire. The 
Court of Appeals held that this policy was inconsistent with 
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499 (1978), and that the war-
rantless nonconsensual search of the Cliffords' residence vio-
lated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. We granted certiorari to clarify doubt that appears 
to exist as to the application of our decision in Tyler. 
II 
In the early morning hours of October 18, 1980, a fire 
erupted at the Clifford home. The Cliffords were out of 
town on a camping trip at the time. The fire was reported to 
the Detroit Fire Department, and fire units arrived on the 
scene at about 5:42 a. m. The fire was extinguished and all 
fire officials and police left the premises at 7:04 a. m. 
At 8:00 a. m. on the morning of the fire, Lieutenant Beyer, 
a fire investigator with the arson section of the Detroit Fire 
Department, received instructions to investigate the Clifford 
fire. He was informed that the Fire Department suspected 
arson. Because he had other assignments, Lieutenant 
Beyer did not proceed immediately to the Clifford residence. 
He and his partner finally arrived at the scene of the fire 
about 1:00 p. m. on October 18. 
When they arrived, they found a work crew on the scene. 
The crew was boarding up the house and pumping some six 
inches of water out of the basement. A neighbor told the in-
vestigators that he had called Clifford and had been in-
structed to request the Cliffords' insurance agent to send a 
boarding crew out to secure the house. The neighbor also 
advised that the Cliffords did not plan to return that day. 
·" .~ 
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While the investigators waited for the water to be pumped 
out, they found a Coleman fuel can in the driveway that was 
seized and marked as evidence. 1 
By 1:30 p. m., the water had been pumped out of the base-
ment and Lieutenant Beyer and his partner, without obtain-
ing consent or an administrative warrant, entered the Clif-
ford residence and began their investigation into the cause of 
the fire. Their search began in the basement and they 
quickly confirmed that the fire had originated there beneath 
the basement stairway. They detected a strong odor of fuel 
throughout the basement, and found two more Coleman fuel 
cans beneath the stairway. As they dug through the debris, 
the investigators also found a crock pot with attached wires 
leading to an electrical timer that was plugged into an outlet 
a few feet away. The timer was set to turn on at approxi-
mately 3:45 a. m. and to turn back off at approximately 9:00 
a. m. It had stopped somewhere between 4:00 and 4:30 a. m. 
All of this evidence was seized and marked. 
After determining that the fire had originated in the base-
ment, Lieutenant Beyer and his partner searched the re-
mainder of the house. The warrantless search that followed 
was extensive and thorough. The investigators called in a 
photographer to take pictures throughout the house. They 
searched through drawers and closets and found them full of 
old clothes. They inspected the rooms and noted that there 
were nails on the walls but no pictures. They found wiring 
and cassettes for a video tape machine but no machine. 
Respondents moved to exclude all exhibits and testimony 
based on the basement and upstairs searches on the ground 
that they were searches to gather evidence of arson, that 
they were conducted without a warrant, consent, or exigent 
circumstances, and that they therefore were per se unreason-
' The can had been found in the basement by the fire officials who had 
fought the blaze. The firemen removed the can and put it by the side door 
where Lieutenant Beyer discovered it on his arrival. 
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able under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Peti-
tioner, on the other hand, argues that the entire search 
was reasonable and should be exempt from the warrant 
requirement. 
III 
In its petition for certiorari, the State does not challenge 
the state court's finding that there were no exigent circum-
stances justifying the search of the Clifford home. Instead, 
it asks us to exempt from the warrant requirement all admin-
istrative investigations into the cause and origin of a fire. 
We decline to do so. 
In Tyler, we restated the Court's position that adminis-
trative searches generally require warrants. 436 U. S., at 
504-508. See Marshal}, v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307 
(1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967); 
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967). We reaffirm 
that view again today. Except in certain carefully defined 
classes of cases, 2 the nonconsensual entry and search of prop-
erty is governed by the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. The constitutionality of 
warrantless and nonconsensual entries onto fire-damaged 
premises, therefore, normally turns on several factors: 
whether there are legitimate privacy interests in the fire-
damaged property that are protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment; whether exigent circumstances justify the government 
intrusion regardless of any reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy; and, whether the object of the search is to determine 
the cause of the fire or to gather evidence of criminal activity. 
A 
We observed in Tyler that reasonable privacy expectations 
may remain in fire-damaged premises. "People may go on 
2 See e. g. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594 (1981) (heavily regulated 
business); United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972) (same); Colon-
nade v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970) (same). The exceptions to the 
warrant requirement recognized in these cases are not applicable to the 
warrantless search in this case. 
.. 
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living in their homes or working in their offices after a fire. 
Even when that is impossible, private effects often remain on 
the fire-damaged premises." Tyler, 436 U. S., at 505. Pri-
. vacy expectations will vary with the type of property, the 
amount of fire damage, the prior and continued use of the 
premises, and in some cases the owner's efforts to secure it 
against intruders. Some fires may be so devastating that no 
reasonable privacy interests remain in the ash and ruins, re-
gardless of the owner's subjective expectations. The testes-
sentially is an objective one: whether "the expectation [is] 
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" 
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring). See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 
739-741 (1979). If reasonable privacy interests remain in 
the fire-damaged property, the warrant requirement applies, 
and any official entry must be made pursuant to a warrant in 
the absence of consent or exigent circumstances. 
B 
A burning building of course creates an exigency that justi-
fies a warrantless entry by fire officials to fight the blaze. 
Moreover, in Tyler we held that once in the building, officials 
need no warrant to remain 3 for "a reasonable time to investi-
gate the cause of the blaze after it has been extinguished." 
436 U. S., at 510. Where, however, reasonable expectations 
of privacy remain in the fire-damaged property, additional in-
vestigations begun after the fire has been extinguished and 
fire and police officials have left the scene, generally must be 
3 We do not suggest that firemen fighting a fire normally remain within 
a building. The circumstances, of course, vary. In many situations ac-
tual entry may be too hazardous until the fire has been wholly extin-
guished, and even then the danger of collapsing walls may exist. Thus, 
the effort to ascertain the cause of a fire may extend over a period of time 
with entry and re-entry. The critical inquiry is whether reasonable expec-
tations of privacy exist in the fire-damaged premises at a particular time, 
and if so, whether exigencies justify the re-entries. 
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made pursuant to a warrant or the identification of some new 
exigency. 
The aftermath of a fire often presents exigencies that will 
not tolerate the delay necessary to obtain a warrant or to se-
cure the owner's consent to inspect fire-damaged premises. 4 
Because determining the cause and origin of a fire serves a 
compelling public interest, the warrant requirement does not 
apply in such cases. 
c 
If a warrant is necessary, the object of the search deter-
mines the type of warrant required. If the primary object is 
to determine the cause and origin of a recent fire, an adminis-
trative warrant will suffice. 5 To obtain such a warrant, fire 
officials need show only that a fire of undetermined origin has 
occurred on the premises, that the scope of the proposed 
search is reasonable and will not intrude unnecessarily on the 
fire victim's privacy, and that the search will be executed at a 
reasonable and convenient time. 
If the primary object of the search is to gather evidence of 
criminal activity, a criminal search warrant may be obtained 
only on a showing of probable cause to believe that relevant 
evidence will be found in the place to be searched. If evi-
dence of criminal activity is discovered during the course of a 
valid administrative search, it may be seized under the "plain 
view" doctrine. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 
465-466 (1971). This evidence then may be used to establish 
probable cause to obtain a criminal search warrant. Fire of-
• For example, an immediate threat that the blaze might rekindle 
presents an exigency that would justify a warrantless and nonconsensual 
post-fire investigation. "Immediate investigation may also be necessary 
to preserve evidence from intentional or accidental destruction." See Ty-
ler, 436 U. S., at 510. 
5 Probable cause to issue an administrative warrant exists if reasonable 
legislative, administrative, or judicially prescribed standards for conduct-
ing an inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. See 
particularly Tyler, 436 U. S., see also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 
U. S., at 538. 
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ficials may not, however, rely on this evidence to expand the 
scope of their administrative search without first making a 
successful showing of probable cause to an independent judi-
cial officer. 
The object of the search is important even if exigent cir-
cumstances exist. Circumstances that justify a warrantless 
search for the cause of a fire may not justify a search to 
gather evidence of criminal activity once that cause has been 
determined. If, for example, the administrative search is 
justified by the immediate need to ensure against rekindling, 
the scope of the search may be no broader than reasonably 
necessary to achieve its end. A search to gather evidence of 
criminal activity not in plain view must be made pursuant 
to a criminal warrant upon a traditional showing of probable 
cause. 6 
The searches of the Clifford home, at least arguably, can be 
viewed as two separate ones: the delayed search of the base-
ment area, followed by the extensive search of the residential 
portion of the house. We now apply the principles outlined 
above to each of these searches. 
IV 
The Clifford home was a two-and-one-half story brick and 
frame residence. Although there was extensive damage to 
the lower interior structure, the exterior of the house and 
some of the upstairs rooms were largely undamaged by the 
fire, although there was some smoke damage. The firemen 
had broken out one of the doors and most of the windows in 
fighting the blaze. At the time Lieutenant Beyer and his 
partner arrived, the home was uninhabitable. But personal 
belongings remained, and the Cliffords had arranged to have 
the house secured against intrusion in their absence. Under 
6 The plain view doctrine must be applied in light of the special circum-
stances that frequently accompany fire damage. In searching solely to as-
certain the cause, firemen customarily must remove rubble or search other 
areas where the cause of fires are likely to be found. An object that comes 
into view during such a search may be preserved without a warrant. 
82--.'357-0PINION 
8 MICHIGAN v. CLIFFORD 
these circumstances, and in light of the strong expectations 
of privacy associated with a home, we hold that the Cliffords 
retained reasonable privacy interests in their fire-damaged 
residence and that the post-fire investigations were subject 
to the warrant requirement. Thus, the warrantless and 
nonconsensual searches of both the basement and the up-
stairs areas of the house would have been valid only if exigent 
circumstances had justified the object and the scope of each. 
A 
As noted, the State does not claim that exigent circum-
stances justified its post-fire searches. It argues that we 
either should exempt post-fire searches from the warrant 
requirement or modify Tyler to justify the warrantless 
searches in this case. We have rejected the State's first ar-
gument and turn now to its second. 
In Tyler we upheld a warrantless post-fire search of a fur-
niture store, despite the absence of exigent circumstances, on 
the ground that it was a continuation of a valid search begun 
immediately after the fire. The investigation was begun as 
the last flames were being doused, but could not be com-
pleted because of smoke and darkness. The search was re-
sumed promptly after the smoke cleared and daylight 
dawned. Because the post-fire search was interrupted for 
reasons that were evident, we held that the early morning 
search was "no more than an actual continuation of the first, 
and the lack of a warrant thus did not invalidate the resulting 
seizure of evidence." 436 U. S., at 511. 
As the State conceded at oral argument, this case is distin-
guishable for several reasons. First, the challenged search 
was not a continuation of an earlier search. Between the 
time the firefighters had extinguished the blaze and left the 
scene and the arson investigators first arrived about 1:00 
p. m. to begin their investigation, the Cliffords had taken 
steps to secure the privacy interests that remained in their 
residence against further intrusion. These efforts separate 
the entry made to extinguish the blaze from that made later 
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( 
by different officers to investigate its origin. Second, the 
privacy interests in the residence-particularly after the Clif-
fords had acted-were significantly greater than those in the 
fire-damaged furniture store, making the delay between the 
fire and the mid-day search unreasonable absent a warrant, 
consent, or exigent circumstances. We frequently have 
noted that privacy interests are especially strong in a private 
residence. 7 These facts-the interim efforts to secure the 
burned-out premises and the heightened privacy interests in 
the home-distinguish this case from Tyler. At least where 
a homeowner has made a reasonable effort to secure his fire-
damaged home after the blaze has been extinguished and the 
fire and police units have left the scene, we hold that a subse-
quent post-fire search must be conducted pursuant to a war-
rant, consent, or the identification of some new exigency. 8 
So long as the primary purpose is to ascertain the cause of 
the fire, an administrative warrant will suffice. 
B 
Because the cause of the fire was then known, the search of 
the upper portions of the house, described above, could only 
have been a search to gather evidence of the crime of arson. 
Absent exigent circumstances, such a search requires a crim-
inal warrant. 
Even if the mid-day basement search had been a valid ad-
ministrative search, it would not have justified the upstairs 
7 See e. g. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 537, 589-90 (1980); United 
States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). Reason-
able expectations of privacy in fire-damaged premises will vary depending 
particularly on the type and use of the building involved. Expectations of 
privacy are particularly strong in private residences and offices. There 
may be, depending upon the circumstances, diminished privacy expecta-
tions in commercial premises. 
8 This is not to suggest that individual expectations of privacy may 
prevail over interests of public safety. For example, when fire breaks out 
in an apartment unit of an apartment complex, the exigency exception may 
allow warrantless post-fire investigations where necessary to ensure 
against any immediate danger of future fire hazard. 
82-357-0PINION 
10 MICHIGAN v. CLIFFORD 
search. The scope of such a search is limited to that reason-
ably necessary to determine the cause and origin of a fire and 
to ensure against rekindling. As soon as the investigators 
determined that the fire had originated in the basement and 
had been caused by the crock pot and timer found beneath 
the basement stairs, the scope of their search was limited to 
the basement area. Although the investigators could have 
used whatever evidence they discovered in the basement to 
establish probable cause to search the remainder of the 
house, they could not lawfully undertake that search without 
a prior judicial determination that a successful showing of 
probable cause had been made. Because there were no exi-
gent circumstances justifying the upstairs search, and it was 
undertaken without a prior showing of probable cause before 
an independent judicial officer, we hold that this search of a 
home was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, regardless of the validity of the basement 
search. 9 
The warrantless intrusion into the upstairs regions of the 
Clifford house presents a telling illustration of the importance 
of prior judicial review of proposed administrative searches. 
If an administrative warrant had been obtained in this case, 
it presumably would have limited the scope of the proposed 
investigation and would have prevented the warrantless in-
trusion into the upper rooms of the Clifford home. An ad-
ministrative search into the cause of a recent fire does not 
9 In many cases, there will be no bright line separating the firefighters' 
investigation into the cause of a fire from a search for evidence of arson. 
The distinction will vary with the circumstances of the particular fire and 
generally will involve more than the lapse of time or the number of entries 
and re-entries. For example, once the cause of a fire in a single-family 
dwelling is determined, the administrative search should end and any 
broader investigation should be made pursuant to a criminal warrant. A 
fire in an apartment, on the other hand, may present complexities that 
make it necessary for officials to conduct more expansive searches, to re-
main on the premises for longer periods of time, and to make repeated en-
tries and re-entries into the building. See Tyler, 436 U. S., at 510, n. 6. 
• 
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give fire officials license to roam freely through the fire vic-
tim's private residence. v 
The only pieces of physical evidence that have been chal-
lenged on this interlocutory appeal are the three empty fuel 
cans, the electric crock pot, and the timer and attached cord . 
Respondents also have challenged the testimony of the inves-
tigators concerning the warrantless search of both the base-
ment and the upstairs portions of the Clifford home. The 
discovery of two of the fuel cans, the crock pot, the timer and 
cord-as well as the investigators' related testimony-were 
the product of the unconstitutional post-fire search of the 
Cliffords' residence. Thus, we affirm that portion of the 
judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals that excluded 
that evidence. One of the fuel cans was discovered in plain 
view in the Cliffords' driveway. This can was seen in plain 
view during the intial investigation by the firefighters. It 
would have been admissible whether it had been seized in 
the basement by the firefighters or in the driveway by the 
arson investigators. Exclusion of this evidence should be 
reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
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I 
Respondents, Raymond and Emma Jean Clifford, were ar-
rested and charged with arson in connection with a fire at 
their private residence. At the preliminary examination 
held to establish probable cause for the alleged offense, the 
State introduced various pieces of physical evidence, most of 
which was obtained through a warrantless and nonconsensual 
search of the Clifford's fire-damaged home. Respondents 
moved to suppress this evidence on the ground that it was 
obtained in violation of their rights under the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. That motion was denied and re-
spondents were bound over for trial. Before trial, they 
again moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the 
search. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing 
and denied the motion on the ground that exigent circum-
stances justified the search. The court certified its eviden-
tiary ruling for interlocutory appeal and the Michigan Court 
of Appeals reversed. 
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That court held that there were no exigent circumstances 
justifying the search. Instead, it found that the warrantless 
entry and search of the Clifford residence was conducted pur-
suant to a policy of the Arson Division of the Detroit Fire De-
partment that sanctioned such searches as long as the owner 
was not present, the premises were open to trespass, and the 
search occurred within a reasonable time of the fire. The 
Court of Appeals held that this policy was inconsistent with 
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499 (1978), and that the war-
rantless nonconsensual search of the Cliffords' residence vio-
lated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. We granted certiorari to clarify doubt that appears 
to exist as to the application of our decision in Tyler. 
II 
In the early morning hours of October 18, 1980, a fire 
erupted at the Clifford home. The Cliffords were out of 
town on a camping trip at the time. The fire was reported to 
the Detroit Fire Department, and fire units arrived on the 
scene at about 5:42 a. m. The fire was extinguished and all 
fire officials and police left the premises at 7:04 a. m. 
At 8:00a.m. on the morning of the fire, Lieutenant Beyer, 
a fire investigator with the arson section of the Detroit Fire 
Department, received instructions to investigate the Clifford 
fire. He was informed that the Fire Department suspected 
arson. Because he had other assignments, Lieutenant 
Beyer did not proceed immediately to the Clifford residence. 
He and his partner finally arrived at the scene of the fire 
about 1:00 p. m. on October 18. 
When they arrived, they found a work crew on the scene. 
The crew was boarding up the house and pumping some six 
inches of water out of the basement. A neighbor told the in-
vestigators that he had called Clifford and had been in-
structed to request the Cliffords' insurance agent to send a 
boarding crew out to secure the house. The neighbor also 
advised that the Cliffords did not plan to return that day. 
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While the investigators waited for the water to be pumped 
out, they found a Coleman fuel can in the driveway that was 
seized and marked as evidence. 1 
By 1:30 p. m., the water had been pumped out of the base-
ment and Lieutenant Beyer and his partner, without obtain-
ing consent or an administrative warrant, entered the Clif-
ford residence and began their investigation into the cause of 
the fire. Their search began in the basement and they 
quickly confirmed that the fire had originated there beneath 
the basement stairway. They detected a strong odor of fuel 
throughout the basement, and found two more Coleman fuel 
cans beneath the stairway. As they dug through the debris, 
the investigators also found a crock pot with attached wires 
leading to an electrical timer that was plugged into an outlet 
a few feet away. The timer was set to turn on at approxi-
mately 3:45 a. m. and to turn back off at approximately 9:00 
a. m. It had stopped somewhere between 4:00 and 4:30 a. m. 
All of this evidence was seized and marked. 
After determining that the fire had originated in the base-
ment, Lieutenant Beyer and his partner searched the re-
mainder of the house. The warrantless search that followed 
was extensive and thorough. The investigators called in a 
photographer to take pictures throughout the house. They 
searched through drawers and closets and found them full of 
old clothes. They inspected the rooms and noted that there 
were nails on the walls but no pictures. They found wiring 
and cassettes for a video tape machine but no machine. 
Respondents moved to exclude all exhibits and testimony 
based on the basement and upstairs searches on the ground 
that they were searches to gather evidence of arson, that 
they were conducted without a warrant, consent, or exigent 
circumstances, and that they therefore were per se unreason-
1 The can had been found in the basement by the fire officials who had 
fought the blaze. The firemen removed the can and put it by the side door 
where Lieutenant Beyer discovered it on his arrival. 
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able under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Peti-
tioner, on the other hand, argues that the entire search 
was reasonable and should be exempt from the warrant 
requirement. 
III 
In its petition for certiorari, the State does not challenge 
the state court's finding that there were no exigent circum-
stances justifying the search of the Clifford home. Instead, 
it asks us to exempt from the warrant requirement all admin-
istrative investigations into the cause and origin of a fire. 
We decline to do so. 
In Tyler, we restated the Court's position that adminis-
trative searches generally require warrants. 436 U. S., at 
504--508. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307 
(1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967); 
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967). We reaffirm 
that view again today. Except in certain carefully defined 
classes of cases,2 the nonconsensual entry and search of prop-
erty is governed by the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. The constitutionality of 
warrantless and nonconsensual entries onto fire-damaged 
premises, therefore, normally turns on several factors: 
whether there are legitimate privacy interests in the fire-
damaged property that are protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment; whether exigent circumstances justify the government 
intrusion regardless of any reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy; and, whether the object of the search is to determine 
the cause of the fire or to gather evidence of criminal activity. 
A 
We observed in Tyler that reasonable privacy expectations 
may remain in fire-damaged premises. "People may go on 
' See e. g. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594 (1981) (heavily regulated 
business); United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972) (same); Colon-
nade v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970) (same). The exceptions to the 
warrant requirement recognized in these cases are not applicable to the 
warrantless search in this case. 
r 
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living in their homes or working in their offices after a fire. 
Even when that is impossible, private effects often remain on 
the fire-damaged premises." Tyler, 436 U. S., at 505. Pri-
. vacy expectations will vary with the type of property, the 
amount of fire damage, the prior and continued use of the 
premises, and in some cases the owner's efforts to secure it 
against intruders. Some fires may be so devastating that no 
reasonable privacy interests remain in the ash and ruins, re-
gardless of the owner's subjective expectations. The testes-
sentially is an objective one: whether "the expectation [is] 
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" 
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring). See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 
739-741 (1979). If reasonable privacy interests remain in 
the fire-damaged property, the warrant requirement applies, 
and any official entry must be made pursuant to a warrant in 
the absence of consent or exigent circumstances. 
B 
A burning building of course creates an exigency that justi-
fies a warrantless entry by fire officials to fight the blaze. 
Moreover, in Tyler we held that once in the building, officials 
need no warrant to remain 3 for "a reasonable time to investi-
gate the cause of the blaze after it has been extinguished." 
436 U. S., at 510. Where, however, reasonable expectations 
of privacy remain in the fire-damaged property, additional in-
vestigations begun after the fire has been extinguished and 
fire and police officials have left the scene, generally must be 
3 We do not suggest that firemen fighting a fire normally remain within 
a building. The circumstances, of course, vary. In many situations ac-
tual entry may be too hazardous until the fire has been wholly extin-
guished, and even then the danger of collapsing walls may exist. Thus, 
the effort to ascertain the cause of a fire may extend over a period of time 
with entry and re-entry. The critical inquiry is whether reasonable expec-
tations of privacy exist in the fire-damaged premises at a particular time, 
and if so, whether exigencies justify the re-entries. 
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made pursuant to a warrant or the identification of some new 
exigency. 
The aftermath of a fire often presents exigencies that will 
not tolerate the delay necessary to obtain a warrant or to se-
cure the owner's consent to inspect fire-damaged premises. 4 
Because determining the cause and origin of a fire serves a 
compelling public interest, the warrant requirement does not 
apply in such cases. c 
If a warrant is necessary, the object of the search deter-
mines the type of warrant required. Ifthe primary object is 
to determine the cause and origin of a recent fire, an adminis-
trative warrant will suffice. 5 To obtain such a warrant, fire 
officials need show only that a fire of undetermined origin has 
occurred on the premises, that the scope of the proposed 
search is reasonable and will not intrude unnecessarily on the 
fire victim's privacy, and that the search will be executed at a 
reasonable and convenient time. 
If the primary object of the search is to gather evidence of 
criminal activity, a criminal search warrant may be obtained 
only on a showing of probable cause to believe that relevant 
evidence will be found in the place to be searched. If evi-
dence of criminal activity is discovered during the course of a 
valid administrative search, it may be seized under the "plain 
view" doctrine. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 
465-466 (1971). This evidence then may be used to establish 
probable cause to obtain a criminal search warrant. Fire of-
4 For example, an immediate threat that the blaze might rekindle 
presents an exigency that would justify a warrantless and nonconsensual 
post-fire investigation. "Immediate investigation may also be necessary 
to preserve evidence from intentional or accidental destruction." See Ty-
ler, 436 U. S., at 510. 
6 Probable cause to issue an administrative warrant exists if reasonable 
legislative, administrative, or judicially prescribed standards for conduct-
ing an inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. See 
particularly Tyler, 436 U. S., see also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 
U. S., at 538. 
I 
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ficials may not, however, rely on this evidence to expand the 
scope of their administrative search without first making a 
successful showing of probable cause to an independent judi-
cial officer. 
The object of the search is important even if exigent cir-
cumstances exist. Circumstances that justify a warrantless 
search for the cause of a fire may not justify a search to 
gather evidence of criminal activity once that cause has been 
determined. If, for example, the administrative search is 
justified by the immediate need to ensure against rekindling, 
the scope of the search may be no broader than reasonably 
necessary to achieve its end. A search to gather evidence of 
criminal activity not in plain view must be made pursuant 
to a criminal warrant upon a traditional showing of probable 
cause. 6 
The searches of the Clifford home, at least arguably, can be 
viewed as two separate ones: the delayed search of the base-
ment area, followed by the extensive search of the residential 
portion of the house. We now apply the principles outlined 
above to each of these searches. 
IV 
The Clifford home was a two-and-one-half story brick and 
frame residence. Although there was extensive damage to 
the lower interior structure, the exterior of the house and 
some of the upstairs rooms were largely undamaged by the 
fire, although there was some smoke damage. The firemen 
had broken out one of the doors and most of the windows in 
fighting the blaze. At the time Lieutenant Beyer and his 
partner arrived, the home was uninhabitable. But personal 
belongings remained, and the Cliffords had arranged to have 
the house secured against intrusion in their absence. Under 
6 The plain view doctrine must be applied in light of the special circum-
stances that frequently accompany fire damage. In searching solely to as-
certain the cause, firemen customarily must remove rubble or search other 
areas where the cause of fires are likely to be found. An object that comes 
into view during such a search may be preserved without a warrant. 
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these circumstances, and in light of the strong expectations 
of privacy associated with a home, we hold that the Cliffords 
retained reasonable privacy interests in their fire-damaged 
residence and that the post-fire investigations were subject 
to the warrant requirement. Thus, the warrantless and 
nonconsensual searches of both the basement and the up-
stairs areas of the house would have been valid only if exigent 
circumstances had justified the object and the scope of each. 
A 
As noted, the State does not claim that exigent circum-
stances justified its post-fire searches. It argues that we 
either should exempt post-fire searches from the warrant 
requirement or modify Tyler to justify the warrantless 
searches in this case. We have rejected the State's first ar-
gument and turn now to its second. 
In Tyler we upheld a warrantless post-fire search of a fur-
niture store, despite the absence of exigent circumstances, on 
the ground that it was a continuation of a valid search begun 
immediately after the fire. The investigation was begun as 
the last flames were being doused, but could not be com-
pleted because of smoke and darkness. The search was re-
sumed promptly after the smoke cleared and daylight 
dawned. Because the post-fire search was interrupted for 
reasons that were evident, we held that the early morning 
search was "no more than an actual continuation of the first, 
and the lack of a warrant thus did not invalidate the resulting 
seizure of evidence." 436 U. S., at 511. 
As the State conceded at oral argument, this case is distin-
guishable for several reasons. First, the challenged search 
was not a continuation of an earlier search. Between the 
time the firefighters had extinguished the blaze and left the 
scene and the arson investigators first arrived about 1:00 
p. m. to begin their investigation, the Cliffords had taken 
steps to secure the privacy interests that remained in their 
residence against further intrusion. These efforts separate 
the entry made to extinguish the blaze from that made later 
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1 by different officers to investigate its origin. Second, the privacy interests in the residence-particularly after the Clif-fords had acted-were significantly greater than those in the 
fire-damaged furniture store, making the delay between the 
fire and the mid-day search unreasonable absent a warrant, 
consent, or exigent circumstances. We frequently have 
noted that privacy interests are especially strong in a private 
residence. 7 These facts-the interim efforts to secure the 
burned-out premises and the heightened privacy interests in 
the home-distinguish this case from Tyler. At least where 
a homeowner has made a reasonable effort to secure his fire-
damaged home after the blaze has been extinguished and the 
fire and police units have left the scene, we hold that a subse-
quent post-fire search must be conducted pursuant to a war-
rant, consent, or the identification of some new exigency. 8 
So long as the primary purpose is to ascertain the cause of 
the fire, an administrative warrant will suffice. 
B 
Because the cause of the fire was then known, the search of 
the upper portions of the house, described above, could only 
have been a search to gather evidence of the crime of arson. 
Absent exigent circumstances, such a search requires a crim-
inal warrant. 
Even if the mid-day basement search had been a valid ad-
ministrative search, it would not have justified the upstairs 
'See e. g. Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 537, 589-90 (1980); United 
States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). Reason-
able expectations of privacy in fire-damaged premises will vary depending 
particularly on the type and use of the building involved. Expectations of 
privacy are particularly strong in private residences and offices. There 
may be, depending upon the circumstances, diminished privacy expecta-
tions in commercial premises. 
8 This is not to suggest that individual expectations of privacy may 
prevail over interests of public safety. For example, when fire breaks out 
in an apartment unit of an apartment complex, the exigency exception may 
allow warrantless post-fire investigations where necessary to ensure 
against any immediate danger of future fire hazard. 
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search. The scope of such a search is limited to that reason-
ably necessary to determine the cause and origin of a fire and 
to ensure against rekindling. As soon as the investigators 
determined that the fire had originated in the basement and 
had been caused by the crock pot and timer found beneath 
the basement stairs, the scope of their search was limited to 
the basement area. Although the investigators could have 
used whatever evidence they discovered in the basement to 
establish probable cause to search the remainder of the 
house, they could not lawfully undertake that search without 
a prior judicial determination that a successful showing of 
probable cause had been made. Because there were no exi-
gent circumstances justifying the upstairs search, and it was 
undertaken without a prior showing of probable cause before 
an independent judicial officer, we hold that this search of a 
home was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, regardless of the validity of the basement 
search. 9 
The warrantless intrusion into the upstairs regions of the 
Clifford house presents a telling illustration of the importance 
of prior judicial review of proposed administrative searches. 
If an administrative warrant had been obtained in this case, 
it presumably would have limited the scope of the proposed 
investigation and would have prevented the warrantless in-
trusion into the upper rooms of the Clifford home. An ad-
ministrative search into the cause of a recent fire does not 
9 In many cases, there will be no bright line separating the firefighters' 
investigation into the cause of a fire from a search for evidence of arson. 
The distinction will vary with the circumstances of the particular fire and 
generally will involve more than the lapse of time or the number of entries 
and re-entries. For example, once the cause of a fire in a single-family 
dwelling is determined, the administrative search should end and any 
broader investigation should be made pursuant to a criminal warrant. A 
fire in an apartment, on the other hand, may present complexities that 
make it necessary for officials to conduct more expansive searches, to re-
main on the premises for longer periods of time, and to make repeated en-
tries and re-entries into the building. See Tyler, 436 U. S., at 510, n. 6. 
• 
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give fire officials license to roam freely through the fire vic-
tim's private residence. v 
The only pieces of physical evidence that have been chal-
lenged on this interlocutory appeal are the three empty fuel 
cans, the electric crock pot, and the timer and attached cord . 
Respondents also have challenged the testimony of the inves-
tigators concerning the warrantless search of both the base-
ment and the upstairs portions of the Clifford home. The 
discovery of two of the fuel cans, the crock pot, the timer and 
cord-as well as the investigators' related testimony-were 
the product of the unconstitutional post-fire search of the 
Cliffords' residence. Thus, we affirm that portion of the 
judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals that excluded 
that evidence. One of the fuel cans was discovered in plain 
view in the Cliffords' driveway. This can was seen in plain 
view during the intial investigation by the firefighters. It 
would have been admissible whether it had been seized in 
the basement by the firefighters or in the driveway by the 
arson investigators. Exclusion of this evidence should be 
reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
1st DRAFT 
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JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment. 
Because I continue to hold the views expressed in my sepa-
rate opinions in Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 512 (1978), 
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307, 325 (1978), 
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U. S. 547, 577-578, 583 
(1978), and Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594, 606-608 
(1981), I am unable to join JUSTICE POWELL'S opinion. I do 
agree with him, however, that the holding in Tyler supports 
the judgment commanded by his opinion. 
There is unanimity within the Court on three general prop-
ositions regarding the scope of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion afforded to the owner of a fire-damaged building. No 
one questions the right of the firefighters to make a forceful, 
unannounced, nonconsensual, warrantless entry into a burn-
ing building. The reasonableness of such an entry is too 
plain to require explanation. Nor is there any disagreement 
concerning the firemen's right to remain on the premises, not 
only until the fire has been extinguished and they are satis-
fied that there is no danger of rekindling, but also while they 
continue to investigate the cause of the fire. We are also 
unanimous in our opinion that after investigators have deter-
mined the cause of the fire and located the place it originated, 
a search of other portions of the premises may be conducted 
only pursuant to a warrant, issued upon probable cause that a 
crime has been committed, and specifically describing the 
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places to be searched and the items to be seized. The issues 
that divide us in this case are (1) whether the entry by Lieu-
tenant Beyer and his partner at 1:30 p.m. should be regarded 
as a continuation of the original entry or a separate post-fire 
search, and (2) whether a warrantless entry to make a post-
fire investigation into the cause of a fire without the owner's 
consent is constitutional. 
I 
I agree with JUSTICE POWELL'S conclusion that Lieutenant 
Beyer's entry at 1:30 p.m. was a post-fire search rather than 
merely a continuation of an earlier valid entry, ante, at S--9, 
and disagree with JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S position that our 
decision in Tyler is indistinguishable in this regard, post, at 
2-3. In Tyler the Court was willing to treat early morning 
reentries by the same officers who had been on the premises 
a few hours earlier 1 as a "continuation" of their earlier valid 
investigation into the cause of the fire. 436 U. S., at 511. 
The attempt to ascertain the cause of the fire was temporar-
ily suspended in Tyler because visibility was severely hin-
dered by darkness, steam, and smoke. Under these circum-
stances, the return of the same 2 investigators shortly after 
daybreak to ascertain the cause of the fire was indeed "no 
more than an actual continuation" of their earlier valid 
search. Ibid. Unlike Tyler, in this case the challenged en-
try was made by officers who had not been on the premises at 
the time of an earilerViillaSearch. Moreover, in contrast to 
Tyler, an investigation of the fire's origin was not temporar-
ily suspended on account of the conditions at the scene and 
1 Fire Chief See entered with Assistant Chief Sommerville at 8 a.m. and 
Detective Webb accompanied Sommerville at 9 a.m. See had been on the 
the scene at 2 a.m. and Webb had arrived at 3:30a.m. See 436 U. S., at 
501-502. 
2 It is true that in Tyler Assistant Chief Sommerville first arrived on the 
scene at 8 a.m., but presumably he did not observe anything that was not 
also seen by Chief See or Detective Webb, both of whom had been on the 
scene earlier. 
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resumed at the first opportunity when the conditions ham-
pering the investigation subsided. While the investigators 
in this case waited for the work crew on the scene to pump 
water out of the basement before making their entry, the de-
lay in their arrival at the scene apparently had nothing to do 
with the fact that water had collected in the basement. 
While that fact might have justified a temporary suspension 
of an investigative effort commenced by investigators at the 
scene before the premises were abandoned by fire officials, in 
this case it amounts to a post hoc justification without appar-
ent basis in reality. In general, unless at least some of the 
same personnel are involved in a return to the premises and 
the temporary departure was justifiably and actually occa-
sioned by the conditions at the premises, I would apply the 
test expressed by JUSTICE WHITE for measuring the scope of 
the emergency that justified the initial entry and search: 
"[O]nce the fire has been extinguished and the firemen have 
left the premises, the emergency is over." 436 U. S., at 516. 
I would only add that the departure of the firemen should 
also establish a presumption that the fire has been extin-
guished and that any danger of rekindling is thereafter too 
slight to provide an independent justification for a second en-
try, a presumption that could only be rebutted by additional 
information demonstrating a previously unknown or unrec-
ognized danger of rekindling. 
II 
Presumably most post-fire searches are made with the con-
sent of the property owner. Once consent is established, 
such searches, of course, raise no Fourth Amendment is-
sues. We therefore are concerned with the fire investiga-
tor's right to make an entry without the owner's consent, by 
force if necessary. The problem, then, is to identify the con-
straints imposed by the Fourth Amendment on an officer's 
authority to make such an entry. 
82--357-CONCUR 
4 MICHIGAN v. CLIFFORD 
In this context, the Amendment might be construed in at 
least four different ways. First, the Court might hold that 
no warrantless search of premises in the aftermath of a fire is 
reasonable and that no warrant may issue unless supported 
by probable cause that a crime has been committed. Such a 
holding could be supported by reference to the text of the two 
clauses of the Fourth Amendment. 3 No member of the 
Court, however, places such a strict construction on the 
Amendment. 
Second, the Court might hold that no warrantless search is 
reasonable but allow post-fire searches conducted pursuant 
to a warrant issued without a showing of probable cause. 
Following Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., supra, JUSTICE 
POWELL takes this position. In my judgment that position is 
at odds with the text of the Fourth Amendment and defeats 
the purpose of the Warrant Clause, enabling a magistrate's 
rubber stamp to make an otherwise unreasonable search 
reasonable. 
Third, the Court might hold that no warrant is ever re-
quired for a post-fire search. If the search is conducted 
promptly and if its scope is limited to a determination of the 
cause of the fire, it is reasonable with or without probable 
cause to suspect arson. JusTICE REHNQUIST has persua-
sively outlined the basis for that position, 4 and has noted that 
8 As I noted in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., supra, 
"The first Clause states that the right to be free from unreasonable 
searches 'shall not be violated'; 11 the second unequivocally prohibits the is-
suance of warrants except 'upon probable cause.' 21" 436 U. S., at 326. 
"11 'The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated .... ' 
"21 '[A]nd no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized.' " 436 U. S., at 326. 
' To the extent, however, that he relies on the danger of rekindling, I 
believe his analysis is flawed. I would suppose that JusTICE POWELL 
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in certain cases there "may be some justification for requiring 
the inspectors to notify the building's owners of the inspec-
tion." Post, at 6, n. 3. 
A fourth position-the one I believe the two clauses of the 
Fourth Amendment command-would require the fire inves-
tigator to obtain a traditional criminal search warrant in 
order to make an unannouncea entry, but would characterize 
a warrantless entry as reasonable whenever the inspector 
had either given the owner sufficient advance notice to en-
able him or an agent to be present, or had made a reasonable 
effort to do so. 5 
Unless fire investigators have probable cause to believe 
the crime of arson has been committed, I believe that the 
home owner is entitled to reasonable advance notice that offi-
cers are going to enter h.1s remises or t e purpose of as-
caus of e e. uch notice would give the 
owner a fair o ortunit to be present while the investigation 
is conducted, virtual y eliminating e need for a potentially 
confrontational forcible entry. Advance notice of the search 
is the best safeguard of the owner's legitimate interests in 
the privacy of his premises, allowing him to place certain pos-
sessions he would legitimately prefer strangers not to see out 
would also dispense with a warrant requirement if that danger were 
present. Surely I would. For analytical purposes, I believe we must as-
sume that the post-fire investigation cannot be supported on an emergency 
rationale but rather is justified by the general regulatory interest in pre-
venting similar fires, including those set by arsonists. 
5 By prohibiting the issuance of any warrant to make an unannounced, 
nonconsensual entry into the home, unless there is probable cause to be-
lieve a crime has been committed, my reading of the Fourth Amendment 
carries out the express purpose of the Warrant Clause. JUSTICE Pow-
ELL'S view that a so-called administrative warrant will suffice does not, I 
submit, provide the protection contemplated by that clause. On the other 
hand, because I am persuaded that a post-fire investigatory search is rea-
sonable-even without either suspicion or probable cause--when advance 
notice is given to the home owner, the purpose of the Reasonableness 
Clause can be satisfied without obtaining an administrative warrant that is 
nothing more than a rubber stamp. 
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of sight, and permitting him to be present during the search 
to assure that it does not exceed reasonable bounds. More-
over, the risk of unexplained harm or loss to the owner's per-
sonal effects would be minimized and the owner would have 
an opportunity to respond to questions about the premises or 
to volunteer relevant information that might assist the inves-
tigators. It is true, of course, that advance notice would in-
crease somewhat the likelihood th~uld 
concea or es roy re evan ev ence, u it seems fair to as-
su e a e criminal will diligently attempt to cover his 
traces in all events. In any event, if probable cause to be-
lieve that the owner committed arson is lacking, and if the 
justifications for a general policy of unannounced spot inspec-
tions that obtain in some regulatory contexts are also lacking, 
a mere suspicion that an individual has engaged in criminal 
activity is insufficient to justify the intrusion on an individ-
ual's privacy that an unannounced, potentially forceful entry 
entails. 
I would not attempt to define the character of the notice 
that would be appropriate in all cases, but I do not believe 
that a nonexigent, forceful, warrantless entry can be reason-
able unless the investigator has made an effort to give the 
owner sufficient notice to be present while the investigation 
is made. Naturally, if the owner is given reasonable notice 
and then attempts to interfere with the legitimate perform-
ance of the fire investigators' duties, appropriate sanctions 
would be available. 
If there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been 
committed, the issuance of a valid warrant by a neutral mag-
istrate will enable the entry and subsequent search to be con-
ducted in the same manner as any other investigation of sus-
pected criminal conduct, without advance notice to the 
property owner. In such a case, the intrusive nature of the 
potentially forceful entry without prior notice is justified by 
the demonstrated reasonable likelihood that the owner of the 
property will conceal or destroy the object of the search if 
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prior notice is provided. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 
U. 8., at 582 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). 
In this case, as JusTICE REHNQUIST has pointed out, post, 
at 6, n. 3, an argument may be made that the notice require-
ment is inapplicable because the owners were out of town. 
But no attempt whatever was made to provide them with no-
tice, or even to prove that it would have been futile to do so. 
The record does not foreclose the possibility that an effort to 
advise them, possibly through the same party that notified 
the representatives of the insurance company to board up the 
building, might well have resulted in a request that a friend 
or neighbor be present in the house while the search was car-
ried out and thus might have avoided the plainly improper 
search of the entire premises after the cause of the fire had 
already been identified. 
I therefore conclude that the search in this case was unrea-
sonable in contravention of the Fourth Amendment because 
the investigators failed to provide fair notice of the inspection 
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JUSTICE POWELL announced the judgment of the Court J 
and delivered an opinion in which JUSTICES BRENNAN, 
WHITE, and MARSHALL joined. 
This case presents questions as to the authority of arson 
investigators, in the absence of exigent circumstances or con-
sent, to enter a private residence without a warrant to inves-
tigate the cause of a recent fire. 
I 
Respondents, Raymond and Emma Jean Clifford, were ar-
rested and charged with arson in connection with a fire at 
their private residence. At the preliminary examination 
held to establish probable cause for the alleged offense, the 
State introduced various pieces of physical evidence, most of 
which was obtained through a warrantless and nonconsensual 
search of the Clifford's fire-damaged home. Respondents 
moved to suppress this evidence on the ground that it was 
obtained in violation of their rights under the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. That motion was denied and re-
spondents were bound over for trial. Before trial, they 
again moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the 
search. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing 
and denied the motion on the ground that exigent circum-
stances justified the search. The court certified its eviden-
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tiary ruling for interlocutory appeal and the Michigan Court 
of Appeals reversed. 
That court held that there were no exigent circumstances 
justifying the search. Instead, it found that the warrantless 
entry and search of the Clifford residence was conducted pur-
suant to a policy of the Arson Division of the Detroit Fire De-
partment that sanctioned such searches as long as the owner 
was not present, the premises were open to trespass, and the 
search occurred within a reasonable time of the fire. The 
Court of Appeals held that this policy was inconsistent with 
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499 (1978), and that the war-
rantless nonconsensual search of the Cliffords' residence vio-
lated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. We granted certiorari to clarify doubt that appears 
to exist as to the application of our decision in Tyler. 
II 
In the early morning hours of October 18, 1980, a fire 
erupted at the Clifford home. The Cliffords were out of 
town on a camping trip at the time. The fire was reported to 
the Detroit Fire Department, and fire units arrived on the 
scene at about 5:42 a. m. The fire was extinguished and all 
fire officials and police left the premises at 7:04 a. m. 
At 8:00a.m. on the morning of the fire, Lieutenant Beyer, 
a fire investigator with the arson section of the Detroit Fire 
Department, received instructions to investigate the Clifford 
fire. He was informed that the Fire Department suspected 
arson. Because he had other assignments, Lieutenant 
Beyer did not proceed immediately to the Clifford residence. 
He and his partner finally arrived at the scene of the fire 
about 1:00 p. m. on October 18. 
When they arrived, they found a work crew on the scene. 
The crew was boarding up the house and pumping some six 
inches of water out of the basement. A neighbor told the in-
vestigators that he had called Clifford and had been in-
structed to request the Cliffords' insurance agent to send a 
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boarding crew out to secure the house. The neighbor also 
advised that the Cliffords did not plan to return that day. 
While the investigators waited for the water to be pumped 
out, they found a Coleman fuel can in the driveway that was 
seized and marked as evidence. 1 
By 1:30 p.m., the water had been pumped out of the base-
ment and Lieutenant Beyer and his partner, without obtain-
ing consent or an administrative warrant, entered the Clif-
ford residence and began their investigation into the cause of 
the fire. Their search began in the basement and they 
quickly confirmed that the fire had originated there beneath 
the basement stairway. They detected a strong odor of fuel 
throughout the basement, and found two more Coleman fuel 
cans beneath the stairway. As they dug through the debris, 
the investigators also found a crock pot with attached wires 
leading to an electrical timer that was plugged into an outlet 
a few feet away. The timer was set to turn on at approxi-
mately 3:45 a. m. and to turn back off at approximately 9:00 
a. m. It had stopped somewhere between 4:00 and 4:30 a. m. 
All of this evidence was seized and marked. 
After determining that the fire had originated in the base-
ment, Lieutenant Beyer and his partner searched the re-
mainder of the house. The warrantless search that followed 
was extensive and thorough. The investigators called in a 
photographer to take pictures throughout the house. They 
searched through drawers and closets and found them full of 
old clothes. They inspected the rooms and noted that there 
were nails on the walls but no pictures. They found wiring 
and cassettes for a video tape machine but no machine. 
Respondents moved to exclude all exhibits and testimony 
based on the basement and upstairs searches on the ground 
that they were searches to gather evidence of arson, that 
they were conducted without a warrant, consent, or exigent 
1 The can had been found in the basement by the fire officials who had 
fought the blaze. The firemen removed the can and put it by the side door 
where Lieutenant Beyer discovered it on his arrival. 
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circumstances, and that they therefore were per se unreason-
able under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Peti-
tioner, on the other hand, argues that the entire search 
was reasonable and should be exempt from the warrant 
requirement. 
III 
In its petition for certiorari, the State does not challenge 
the state court's finding that there were no exigent circum-
stances justifying the search of the Clifford home. Instead, 
it asks us to exempt from the warrant requirement all admin-
istrative investigations into the cause and origin of a fire. 
We decline to do so. 
In Tyler, we restated the Court's position that adminis-
trative searches generally reqq.ire warrants. 436 U. S., at 
504-508. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307 
(1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967); 
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967). We reaffirm 
that view again today. Except in certain carefully defined 
classes of cases, 2 the non consensual entry and search of prop-
erty is governed by the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. The constitutionality of 
warrantless and nonconsensual entries onto fire-damaged 
premises, therefore, normally turns on several factors: 
whether there are legitimate privacy interests in the fire-
damaged property that are protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment; whether exigent circumstances justify the government 
intrusion regardless of any reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy; and, whether the object of the search is to determine 
the cause of the fire or to gather evidence of criminal activity. 
2 See e. g. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594 (1981) (heavily regulated 
business); United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972) (same); Colon-
nade v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970) (same). The exceptions to the 
warrant requirement recognized in these cases are not applicable to the 
warrantless search in this case. 
\. 
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A 
We observed in Tyler that reasonable privacy expectations 
may remain in fire-damaged premises. "People may go on 
living in their homes or working in their offices after a fire. 
Even when that is impossible, private effects often remain on 
the fire-damaged premises." Tyler, 436 U. S., at 505. Pri-
vacy expectations will vary with the type of property, the 
amount of fire damage, the prior and continued use of the 
premises, and in some cases the owner's efforts to secure it 
against intruders. Some fires may be so devastating that no 
reasonable privacy interests remain in the ash and ruins, re-
gardless of the owner's subjective expectations. The test es-
sentially is an objective one: whether "the expectation [is] 
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' " 
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring). See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 
739-741 (1979). If reasonable privacy interests remain in 
the fire-damaged property, the warrant requirement applies, 
and any official entry must be made pursuant to a warrant in 
the absence of consent or exigent circumstances. 
B 
A burning building of course creates an exigency that justi-
fies a warrantless entry by fire officials to fight the blaze. 
Moreover, in Tyler we held that once in the building, officials 
need no warrant to remain 3 for "a reasonable time to investi-
gate the cause of the blaze after it has been extinguished." 
436 U. S., at 510. Where, however, reasonable expectations 
of privacy remain in the fire-damaged property, additional in-
•we do not suggest that firemen fighting a fire normally remain within 
a building. The circumstances, of course, vary. In many situations ac-
tual entry may be too hazardous until the fire has been wholly extin-
guished, and even then the danger of collapsing walls may exist. Thus, 
the effort to ascertain the cause of a fire may extend over a period of time 
with entry and re-entry. The critical inquiry is whether reasonable expec-
tations of privacy exist in the fire-damaged premises at a particular time, 
and if so, whether exigencies justify the re-entries. 
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vestigations begun after the fire has been extinguished and 
fire and police officials have left the scene, generally must be 
made pursuant to a warrant or the identification of some new 
exigency. 
The aftermath of a fire often presents exigencies that will 
not tolerate the delay necessary to obtain a warrant or to se-
cure the owner's consent to inspect fire-damaged premises. 4 
Because determining the cause and origin of a fire serves a 
compelling public interest, the warrant requirement does not 
apply in such cases. c 
If a warrant is necessary, the object of the search deter-
mines the type of warrant required. If the primary object is 
to determine the cause and origin of a recent fire, an adminis-
trative warrant will suffice. 6 To obtain such a warrant, fire 
officials need show only that a fire of undetermined origin has 
occurred on the premises, that the scope of the proposed 
search is reasonable and will not intrude unnecessarily on the 
fire victim's privacy, and that the search will be executed at a 
reasonable and convenient time. 
If the primary object of the search is to gather evidence of 
criminal activity, a criminal search warrant may be obtained 
only on a showing of probable cause to believe that relevant 
evidence will be found in the place to be searched. If evi-
dence of criminal activity is discovered during the course of a 
valid administrative search, it may be seized under the "plain 
view" doctrine. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 
• For example, an immediate threat that the blaze might rekindle 
presents an exigency that would justify a warrantless and nonconsensual 
post-fire investigation. "Immediate investigation may also be necessary 
to preserve evidence from intentional or accidental destruction." See Ty-
ler, 436 U. S., at 510. 
5 Probable cause to issue an administrative warrant exists if reasonable 
legislative, administrative, or judicially prescribed standards for conduct-
ing an inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. See 
particularly Tyler, 436 U. S., see also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 
U. S., at 538. 
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465-466 (1971). This evidence then may be used to establish 
probable cause to obtain a criminal search warrant. Fire of-
ficials may not, however, rely on this evidence to expand the 
scope of their administrative search without first making a 
successful showing of probable cause to an independent judi-
cial officer. 
The object of the search is important even if exigent cir-
cumstances exist. Circumstances that justify a warrantless 
search for the cause of a fire may not justify a search to 
gather evidence of criminal activity once that cause has been 
determined. If, for example, the administrative search is 
justified by the immediate need to ensure against rekindling, 
the scope of the search may be no broader than reasonably 
necessary to achieve its end. A search to gather evidence of 
criminal activity not in plain view must be made pursuant 
to a criminal warrant upon a traditional showing of probable 
cause.6 
The searches of the Clifford home, at least arguably, can be 
viewed as two separate ones: the delayed search of the base-
ment area, followed by the extensive search of the residential 
portion of the house. We now apply the principles outlined 
above to each of these searches. 
IV 
The Clifford home was a two-and-one-half story brick and 
frame residence. Although there was extensive damage to 
the lower interior structure, the exterior of the house and 
some of the upstairs rooms were largely undamaged by the 
fire, although there was some smoke damage. The firemen 
had broken out one of the doors and most of the windows in 
fighting the blaze. At the time Lieutenant Beyer and his 
partner arrived, the home was uninhabitable. But personal 
6 The plain view doctrine must be applied in light of the special circum-
stances that frequently accompany fire damage. In searching solely to as-
certain the cause, firemen customarily must remove rubble or search other 
areas where the cause of fires are likely to be found. An object that comes 
into view during such a search may be preserved without a warrant. 
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belongings remained, and the Cliffords had arranged to have 
the house secured against intrusion in their absence. Under 
these circumstances, and in light of the strong expectations 
of privacy associated with a home, we hold that the Cliffords 
retained reasonable privacy interests in their fire-damaged 
residence and that the post-fire investigations were subject 
to the warrant requirement. Thus, the warrantless and 
nonconsensual searches of both the basement and the up-
stairs areas of the house would have been valid only if exigent 
circumstances had justified the object and the scope of each. 
A 
As noted, the State does not claim that exigent circum-
stances justified its post-fire searches. It argues that we 
either should exempt post-fire searches from the warrant 
requirement or modify Tyler to justify the warrantless 
searches in this case. We have rejected the State's first ar-
gument and turn now to its second. 
In Tyler we upheld a warrantless post-fire search of a fur-
niture store, despite the absence of exigent circumstances, on 
the ground that it was a continuation of a valid search begun 
immediately after the fire. The investigation was begun as 
the last flames were being doused, but could not be com-
pleted because of smoke and darkness. The search was re-
sumed promptly after the smoke cleared and daylight 
dawned. Because the post-fire search was interrupted for 
reasons that were evident, we held that the early morning 
search was "no more than an actual continuation of the first, 
and the lack of a warrant thus did not invalidate the resulting 
seizure of evidence." 436 U. S., at 511. 
As the State conceded at oral argument, this case is distin-
guishable for several reasons. First, the challenged search 
was not a continuation of an earlier search. Between the 
time the firefighters had extinguished the blaze and left the 
scene and the arson investigators first arrived about 1:00 
p. m. to begin their investigation, the Cliffords had taken 
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steps to secure the privacy interests that remained in their 
residence against further intrusion. These efforts separate 
the entry made to extinguish the blaze from that made later 
by different officers to investigate its origin. Second, the 
privacy interests in the residence-particularly after the Clif-
fords had acted-were significantly greater than those in the 
fire-damaged furniture store, making the delay between the 
fire and the mid-day search unreasonable absent a warrant, 
consent, or exigent circumstances. We frequently have 
noted that privacy interests are especially strong in a private 
residence. 7 These facts-the interim efforts to secure the 
burned-out premises and the heightened privacy interests in 
the home-distinguish this case from Tyler. At least where 
a homeowner has made a reasonable effort to secure his fire-
damaged home after the blaze has been extinguished and the 
fire and police units have left the scene, we hold that a subse-
quent post-fire search must be conducted pursuant to a war-
rant, consent, or the identification of some new exigency.8 
So long as the primary purpose is to ascertain the cause of 
the fire, an administrative warrant will suffice. 
B 
Because the cause of the fire was then known, the search of 
the upper portions of the house, described above, could only 
have been a search to gather evidence of the crime of arson. 
7 See e. g. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 537, 58~90 (1980); United 
States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). Reason-
able expectations of privacy in fire-damaged premises will vary depending 
particularly on the type and use of the building involved. Expectations of 
privacy are particularly strong in private residences and offices. There 
may be, depending upon the circumstances, diminished privacy expecta-
tions in commercial premises. 
8 This is not to suggest that individual expectations of privacy may 
prevail over interests of public safety. For example, when fire breaks out 
in an apartment unit of an apartment complex, the exigency exception may 
allow warrantless post-fire investigations where necessary to ensure 
against any immediate danger of future fire hazard. 
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Absent exigent circumstances, such a search requires a crim-
inal warrant. 
Even if the mid-day basement search had been a valid ad-
ministrative search, it would not have justified the upstairs 
search. The scope of such a search is limited to that reason-
ably necessary to determine the cause and origin of a fire and 
to ensure against rekindling. As soon as the investigators 
determined that the fire had originated in the basement and 
had been caused by the crock pot and timer found beneath 
the basement stairs, the scope of their search was limited to 
the basement area. Although the investigators could have 
used whatever evidence they discovered in the basement to 
establish probable cause to search the remainder of the 
house, they could not lawfully undertake that search without 
a prior judicial determination that a successful showing of 
probable cause had been made. Because there were no exi-
gent circumstances justifying the upstairs search, and it was 
undertaken without a prior showing of probable cause before 
an independent judicial officer, we hold that this search of a 
home was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, regardless of the validity of the basement 
search. 9 
The warrantless intrusion into the upstairs regions of the 
Clifford house presents a telling illustration of the importance 
of prior judicial review of proposed administrative searches. 
If an administrative warrant had been obtained in this case, 
9 In many cases, there will be no bright line separating the firefighters' 
investigation into the cause of a fire from a search for evidence of arson. 
The distinction will vary with the circumstances of the particular fire and 
generally will involve more than the lapse of time or the number of entries 
and re-entries. For example, once the cause of a fire in a single-family 
dwelling is determined, the administrative search should end and any 
broader investigation should be made pursuant to a criminal warrant. A 
fire in an apartment, on the other hand, may present complexities that 
make it necessary for officials to conduct more expansive searches, to re-
main on the premises for longer periods of time, and to make repeated en-
tries and re-entries into the building. See Tyler, 436 U. S., at 510, n. 6. 
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it presumably would have limited the scope of the proposed 
investigation and would have prevented the warrantless in-
trusion into the upper rooms of the Clifford home. An ad-
ministrative search into the cause of a recent fire does not 
give fire officials license to roam freely through the fire vic-
tim's private residence. 
v 
The only pieces of physical evidence that have been chal-
lenged on this interlocutory appeal are the three empty fuel 
cans, the electric crock pot, and the timer and attached cord. 
Respondents also have challenged the testimony of the inves-
tigators concerning the warrantless search of both the base-
ment and the upstairs portions of the Clifford home. The 
discovery of two of the fuel cans, the crock pot, the timer and 
cord-as well as the investigators' related testimony-were 
the product of the unconstitutional post-fire search of the 
Cliffords' residence. Thus, we affirm that portion of the 
judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals that excluded 
that evidence. One of the fuel cans was discovered in plain 
view in the Cliffords' driveway. This can was seen in plain 
view during the intial investigation by the firefighters. It 
would have been admissible whether it had been seized in 
the basement by the firefighters or in the driveway by the 
arson investigators. Exclusion of this evidence should be 
reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
